The following article originally appeared in The Wire on April 6, 2016.
Next week’s visit by US Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter to India has raised the prospect of deeper security cooperation between
the two countries. Rumours about impending defence sales may be unfounded, as
might the expectation that several bilateral defence agreements – long under
negotiation – will be concluded. The agreements in question include the
Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA), the Communication and Information Security
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA). These are modest, and largely operational and technical
agreements that would facilitate information sharing and the provision of
supplies between the Indian and US armed forces. Being reciprocal, both
militaries could potentially benefit from these agreements. The US has also
expressed a willingness to tailor them to Indian circumstances and address
certain Indian concerns. As with all important international agreements, the
devils are in the details, and an argument can be made that some of the
agreements (e.g. LSA and BECA) provide India with greater benefits and have
fewer latent risks than others (e.g. CISMOA).
The probability of these agreements being concluded
during Carter’s visit is low. However, regardless of the merits of these
specific agreements, they have become a proxy for a renewed discussion on
whether and to what extent a defence partnership between India and the US is
desirable. The Modi government has indicated the outlines of strategic
cooperation with the US in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region, agreed in January 2015. But there are reports of
opposition to the foundational agreements from within the Ministry of Defence
(MoD). Analyst Bharat Karnad, similarly opposed in principle to closer
cooperation with the US, has called the signing of these agreements
“disastrous”. Meanwhile, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India’s foremost public
intellectual, has also questioned the wisdom of moving forward with these
agreements without further debate. While the arguments being made by the MoD
and Karnad appear to be circular – that closer partnership with the US is
fundamentally undesirable, and thus arguments must be found to oppose the
agreements – Mehta’s concerns are worth addressing. Indeed, they must be
addressed because his arguments, and how they are framed, implicitly imperil a
healthy debate on India’s national security interests.
A first criticism is that the Indo-US defence partnership
is progressing without a sufficient debate on its merits. This overlooks the
fact that a robust debate has taken place on this very issue in India for years
– in fact decades. (Indeed, Mehta has even contributed to it.) Beyond ties with
Pakistan, relations with the US are among the most frequently discussed issues
concerning India’s external relations in parliament. Newspaper op-ed pages
reflect a wide-ranging debate on the nature and extent of Indian security
cooperation with the US. And, as the MoD opposition suggests, there are healthy
internal differences within the Indian government as well. It is all very well
to call for more debate; nobody has ever prevented one from taking place.
A second line of criticism is that India is deepening
cooperation with the US – and against China – at Washington’s behest and not in
accordance with Indian interests. “The US is making no secret of the fact that
it wants to position India in its plans for China,” Mehta writes. “But it is
not in India’s interests to become a frontline state in that emerging
faultline.”
There are several problems with this line of reasoning.
One is that a privileged relationship with Washington in no way thwarts
cooperation with Beijing. In fact, over the past twenty years, as Indo-US
defence relations have strengthened, India has also deepened military contacts
with China, as part of important confidence building measures. More recently,
India has also joined a number of Chinese-led multilateral initiatives, from
the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Additionally, the Indian government has increasingly sought
investment from China, widening the bilateral economic relationship. There is
no reason to believe that the foundational agreements with the US, which even
the likes of Singapore and Sri Lanka have signed, narrow India’s options with
China. Quite the opposite.
Besides, India may not want to be a “frontline state”
against China, but it already is one, not because of Washington’s exhortations,
but because of Beijing’s intentions and actions. These include China’s building
up of defence infrastructure on its border with India, its occasional attempts
at altering the territorial status quo, its military support – including its
history of providing nuclear and missile technology – to Pakistan and its
growing military reach in India’s neighbourhood. In fact, the situation is
rather reminiscent of India’s position in the evolving international system of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the time, it was not India’s desire to
create a rift with Washington, but the US’ instrumental relationships with
Pakistan and China that necessitated the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, and Cooperation. Today, China’s opacity, military modernisation and
strategic intent mean that India must reconsider its security posture rather
than persevere with much-vaunted but illusory notions of great power
neutrality.
Third, preserving neutrality or equidistance between the
US and China will in no way contribute to Indian security. One need only look
at the recent experience of Indonesia, perhaps the only large country more
wedded to antiquated notions of Cold War-era non-alignment than India. Despite
remaining steadfastly neutral and currying favour with Beijing by awarding it
high-value infrastructure contracts, Indonesia has seen growing tensions with
China over the presence of fishing and coast guard vessels around its Natuna
Islands. Neutrality, it turns out, is a false comfort blanket.
Finally, the notion that a closer Indian defence
relationship with the US is a mark of “defeatism” is particularly confounding.
That very fear of weakness or defeatism prevented India from seizing
opportunities for cooperation with not just the US, but many of its allies,
such as Japan, opportunities it is now seizing squarely, with barely a squeak
from Beijing. The argument about defeatism also underestimates India’s own
agency and its ability to make decisions based on its own interests. The
progress in India’s relations with the US has never been motivated by naïve
sentimentalism. The idea that these agreements are some sort of “parting gift”
to US President Barack Obama is ludicrous. In the past few years, India has
responded severely to the treatment of an Indian diplomat by US authorities,
condemned the administration’s support for the Pakistani military, and
criticised the US’ public calls for joint military patrols. India has also
locked horns with the US recently over its solar program and US immigration
policies. Any number of American officials would attest to the fact that South
Block can hold its own in any negotiation with Foggy Bottom. Far from
defeatism, India’s ability to shake hands with Washington is a sign of growing
confidence in its own abilities.
There is a dangerous subtext in much of this criticism.
Those implying that deeper defence cooperation with the US, by its very nature,
cannot be in Indian interests and is a product of American pressure, are
narrowing the space for any rational arguments in its favour. This is a
slippery slope. Mehta, of all people, should appreciate its possible
implications.
By all means, elevated defence ties with the US – and the
specific foundation agreements under question – must be considered very
carefully, even if they are unlikely to be concluded in the near future. But a
security partnership with the US should also be discussed and debated on its
merits rather than on sentimentalism, whether in favour of the US or based on
nostalgia for a principle that was unceremoniously discarded 45 years ago. It
is worth keeping in mind that a healthy debate on defence ties with the US has
taken place for a long time in India, and continues; that such cooperation in
no way makes India a frontline state against China at Washington’s behest; and
that defence agreements with the US are neither a sign of weakness nor of
defeatism, but are instead reflective of India’s growing confidence in its own
capabilities.