The following post appeared on China File on November 2, 2017.
Let us give credit where credit is due. For all the talk
of dysfunction and policy incoherence in Washington under President Donald J.
Trump, his administration has started to get some things right, especially when
it comes to Asia policy. It helps that some of the key positions in the U.S.
government, including senior posts at the Department of Defense and important
ambassadorial appointments, are finally being filled by competent and
experienced personnel. Additionally, after some trial and error, regional
policy has started to assume some consistency. Indeed, the Trump
administration’s learning curve on Asia over the past year has actually been
steeper than the Obama administration’s, which often reversed or moderated
course during its first six years.
Admittedly, Trump’s Asia policy got off on the wrong
foot, with the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) sending
a strong signal of American commercial disengagement from Asia. The handling of
the North Korea situation was also mismanaged, to the detriment of U.S.
relations with South Korea, and raised genuine questions about Trump’s ability
to handle sensitive crisis scenarios.
But a lot has changed. One, in contrast to his peculiar presentation
in Beijing in March which appeared to inadvertently rehash Chinese talking
points, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson produced a clear policy speech in
Washington last week. Ostensibly about relations with India, Tillerson’s
remarks offered a carefully-crafted but sharp critique of China’s “predatory
economics,” subversion of its neighbors’ sovereignty, and disrespect of a
rules-based order. It provides an important insight into the administration’s
thinking about the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Moreover, Tillerson, Mattis,
and Vice President Mike Pence have laid some important groundwork with visits
to Indonesia, Australia, and South Korea
Two, the broader policy direction has been complemented
by action on the ground. This is most clearly manifested in more frequent U.S.
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea over the past
several months.
Three, while the Trump administration’s emphasis on
burden sharing may sit uncomfortably with European allies and partners, in
Japan and India, the United States has found partners willing to step up and
burden-share. Indeed, these now account for some of the more positive relationships
that the Trump administration enjoys, despite niggling differences, including
over trade. And finally, despite political distractions at the top, the
strength of the U.S. system has persisted. For all the talk of the Philippines’
growing proximity to China under Rodrigo Duterte, it was U.S. special
operations forces that helped that country’s military retake the city of Marawi
from Islamic State-linked militants.
The ability to articulate a consistent policy line,
follow through, work more seamlessly with partners in achieving those
objectives, and retain strong habits of cooperation lie at the core of sound
policy. As Trump heads to Asia on his maiden trip as President, he has the
opportunity to build upon what has been a reasonably successful reversal and
consolidation of his administration’s regional policy over the past few months.