The following essay originally appeared in the 2018 Soft Power 30 report, the full text of which is available here.
Arguably, few phrases are as misused in international
relations as “soft power.” When he coined the term, Joseph Nye captured the
important and (at the time) poorly-studied phenomenon in international affairs
of “getting others to want the outcomes that you want,” predicated on the
attractiveness of one’s culture, political values, and foreign policy. As the
world’s largest democracy that is also home to the world’s largest number of
impoverished people, India is variously described as a model soft power or a
country that makes remarkably poor use of it. For some, its rich culture and
democracy stand in contrast to other authoritarian and revisionist great
powers, and indeed many Indian leaders speak positively about the country’s
soft power potential. By contrast, as implied by its absence from The Soft
Power 30 Index, India evidently does not yet benefit as much from international
awareness, positive associations, or investments in cultural diplomacy as many
other countries.
In reality, the picture is mixed. Indeed, there are many
ways in which India fares poorly in terms of elements of national attraction.
It has a widespread (and often justified) reputation for corruption, endemic
poverty, and hostility to business. Reports in the international media of
pollution in urban areas, child labour, and violence against women have also
detracted expatriates, tourists, businesspeople, and other visitors. At the
same time, India’s associations have started to change over the past quarter
century from a land of poverty and Mother Theresa to a source of software
programmers and techies.
As the world’s largest democracy that is also home to the
world’s largest number of impoverished people, India is variously described as
a model soft power or a country that makes remarkably poor use of it.
However, despite these contrasting trends, there are
several reasons that may explain why India fares worse on objective metrics of
soft power than it perhaps should. Firstly, any measure of soft power that
compares countries on a per capita basis is bound to favour developed states
over developing ones such as India. India may be home to more top 30 unicorns
(billion dollar start-ups) than any country other than the United States and
China, but its digital penetration remains low, with millions still without
access to electricity, let alone basic digital technologies. Similarly, India
has more UNESCO World Heritage sites than all but five other countries and more
public policy think tanks than any country outside the United States, China,
and United Kingdom, but still fares poorly on tourism and education on a per
capita basis.
Secondly, India rates badly on any measure of
state-driven cultural diffusion rather than more organic and natural private
sector and citizen-led efforts. For example, India’s national airline – Air
India – is in such woeful shape that the government struggles to find buyers or
investors. But four of the fastest growing airlines in the world by aircraft
orders (Indigo, SpiceJet, GoAir, and Jet Airways) are Indian, all privately
owned and operated. Indeed, most Indian cultural diffusion to overseas
audiences – from yoga to Bollywood – has occurred without the involvement of
the Indian government, which has made only belated attempts at reclaiming these
phenomena as national contributions. In a similar vein, the Indian government
has made no more than modest efforts at promoting the study of Hindi abroad in
large part because of its linguistic diversity at home. Recent efforts at doing
so have been controversial and hotly debated within India.
Thirdly, there are Indian contributions that are not
necessarily associated with the country. The most successful export of India’s
largest car manufacturer Tata Motors is Jaguar Land Rover, manufactured
primarily in Britain. To give a very different example, Buddhism has hundreds
of millions of adherents around the world but very few in its birthplace in
India. While Buddhism has become indigenised in such places as Japan, Thailand,
Sri Lanka, and Mongolia, India has only recently made efforts at appealing to
these countries as the fount of Buddhism, by facilitating pilgrimages and
sponsoring religious renovations, in China and Myanmar.
Finally, in many cases India’s appeal is to others in the
developing world rather than to high-value or prestige markets. For example,
despite their many evident shortcomings, India’s universities continue to
attract a large number of students from across the developing world, including
Nepal, Afghanistan, and Africa. Indian food is popular around the world but is
often seen as a cheap eat rather than worthy of a Michelin-starred fine dining
experience. Indian popular films may not be rewarded at the Academy Awards or
at Cannes but have massive followings in China, Central Asia, and the Middle
East. There are recent signs that Indian culture may be moving up the value
chain: consider the establishment of luxury Taj Hotel properties in Boston, San
Francisco, and London, or the New Delhi fine dining establishment Indian Accent
opening up a branch in New York City in 2016.
Despite the evident shortcomings – both in terms of
actual soft power and in ways in which metrics capture India’s soft power
capabilities – India has a reasonably good track record of leveraging its
culture, political values, and foreign policy for national objectives. In the
1950s, India benefited from significant aid from both the United States and
Soviet Union. Democrats in the US Congress saw India as a darling of the
developing world even as Soviet leaders perceived the country as a foothold for
their engagement outside the Communist bloc. India benefited in very real terms
from these associations and relationships, resulting in the establishment of
the Indian Institutes of Technology, which formed the backbone of India’s
software boom in the 1990s, and the Green Revolution in the 1960s that helped
make the country agriculturally self-sufficient.
There was also a strong moral streak in India’s external
engagement during the Cold War, helped in part by its self-perception as a
pluralistic but postcolonial democracy. In 1959, it was in India that the Dalai
Lama sought refuge, and the presence of the Tibetan spiritual leader and his
followers in India continues to attract visitors and supporters from around the
world. Similarly, India’s principled boycott of South Africa for its racist
Apartheid policies won it respect from post-colonial states across Africa. In
1971, despite overwhelming opposition from the US and United Nations, India
created international acceptability for its intervention in East Pakistan
(which resulted in the independent state of Bangladesh) by calling attention to
the morality of its actions. It was assisted in no small part by the appeal of
Indian culture among the likes of former Beatles member George Harrison, who
organised a sold out concert for Bangladesh in New York’s Madison Square Garden
that featured Eric Clapton and Bob Dylan, and helped bring acceptability to
India’s military intervention and creation of an independent state. India’s
soft power appeal manifested itself even after the end of the Cold War. In the
1990s, India was brought into Asian institutions by the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), who saw the appeal of its growing economy and democratic
values. Similarly, in the 2000s, the US worked to gain India an international
waiver from nuclear sanctions, effectively recognising it as a de facto nuclear
weapon state, a process that was enabled by mostly positive associations of
India as a democracy, growing market, and responsible steward of nuclear
weapons. Even more recently, governments and dissidents in India’s neighbouring
countries – from Bangladesh and Nepal to the Maldives and Afghanistan – turn to
India for assistance in conducting free and fair elections, drafting their
constitutions, and developing welfare schemes.
As these examples suggest, the metrics of soft power –
particularly those that capture state-led efforts, high-end cultural exports,
or per capita capabilities – may understate India’s record of utilising its
soft power for national objectives. India has found soft power to be a
necessary but insufficient ingredient in its engagement with the world. As a
democracy with a rich culture and a modicum of principle in its international
engagement, it has often benefited in real, tangible ways from its soft power.
Clearly though, it has its work cut out in better projecting its culture and
values to international audiences. As India builds upon a range of ongoing
political and diplomatic efforts – from improving its ease of doing business
rankings, unveiling its Incredible India tourism campaign, getting
International Yoga Day recognised by the United Nations, or investing in
Buddhist diplomacy – we can expect its soft power to gradually grow.