The following originally appeared as part of an Asia Society Policy Roundtable on 12 November 2018.
For a large and rising power such as India, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is critical to its regional
engagement. This represents a considerable turnaround from earlier decades.
ASEAN initially arose in circumstances brought about by failures of Indian
leadership efforts in Asia—specifically, the Non-Aligned Movement and
principles of peaceful coexistence that defined the region in the 1950s. At the
time, India viewed both ASEAN and its agenda with considerable suspicion,
concerned that it would contribute to regional divisiveness. This began to
change in the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War realigned both India’s and
ASEAN’s priorities, enabling India’s “Look East” policy; its eventual
incorporation into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS),
and the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus); and its involvement in
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations.
Today, ASEAN is being tested. And yet it is at this very
moment that India has chosen to increase its engagement, establishing a
separate diplomatic mission and ambassador in Jakarta, as well as a new ASEAN
Multilateral division in its foreign ministry. India’s Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, in a 2018 speech in Singapore, underscored that “ASEAN unity is essential
for a stable future for this region … it has laid the foundation of the
Indo-Pacific Region.” In January of this year, India invited all ten ASEAN
leaders to a summit in New Delhi, wherein a joint declaration they agreed to
“ensure an open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based regional architecture.”
While India has stepped up its diplomatic engagement with
ASEAN, and bolstered security and – to a lesser degree – economic links with
its member states, concerns are mounting about ASEAN’s internal unity and
external relevance. Indeed, the various ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategies and policies
that are emerging, including those of the United States, Japan, Australia, and
India, are primarily efforts to reinforce the regional order in the absence of
ASEAN’s ability to do so. This includes efforts at deepening security
cooperation and interoperability, particularly in the maritime domain; offering
new financial instruments that increase regional prosperity and connectivity
without compromising national sovereignty; and promoting globally-accepted
norms of behavior in contested domains. An over-emphasis on consensus – the
much-vaunted “ASEAN Way” – has proved inadequate in meeting many of these
demands, particularly in the face of China’s rise and newfound assertiveness.
If ASEAN did not exist today, it would have to be
invented. Its achievements to date have been commendable in terms of advancing
cooperation in an otherwise contested and diverse environment. The EAS, in
particular, will grow in salience as the primary regional political
institution. But none of this means that ASEAN is immune to criticism. Nor can
it afford to exempt itself from necessary and difficult reforms if it hopes to
preserve its centrality in Asia’s 21st century regional architecture. For a
country such as India that is committed to ASEAN centrality, this will require
redoubling its efforts at cooperation, to help strengthen a central institution
at a critical juncture.