The following article originally appeared in DailyO on February 27, 2019.
Why the Balakot strike is so significant.
We will not have the full picture of what transpired
between India and Pakistan on the morning of February 26 for some time.
However, based on official statements from the two countries, and initial
reporting, a few takeaways can be gleaned with some certainty within the first
24 hours.
Under the cover of darkness, Indian Air Force (IAF) jets
entered Pakistani air space — where they struck a terrorist training camp at
Balakot in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. We may never know the
full extent of the damage, and any reporting on casualties is for now no more
than guesswork. Pakistan admits that the IAF entered its air space and dropped
a ‘payload’ in Balakot, but apparently inflicted no damage. Given that similar
denials initially followed the US raid in Abbottabad, in which Osama bin Laden
was killed, and the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ by India across the Line of Control
(LoC), Pakistan’s face-saving claims should be taken with a considerable degree
of scepticism.
How is this strike significant? First, India has shown
its willingness to rewrite the rules of engagement. For many years, New Delhi
was effectively limited by the constraints dictated by Pakistan. These included
no reprisals against Pakistan outside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, even though
Pakistan-sponsored terrorists had no hesitation in attacking targets in Punjab,
Delhi, Mumbai and elsewhere in India. Another aspect was that India had
contemplated and effectively ruled out air strikes in the 1980s and again in
the 2000s. Such a measure, it was believed, would cause too much collateral
damage, risk Indian casualties and increase the prospect of escalation,
including potentially to the nuclear level. The latest air strike tests this
proposition.
Second, India’s official statement delivered by foreign
secretary Vijay Gokhale argued that the air strikes were pre-emptive, based on
intelligence about Jaish-e-Mohammed’s (JeM) preparations for future attacks. As
self-defence against an imminent attack, India’s strikes were also
proportional, limited and designed to inflict minimal collateral damage, such as
civilian casualties. This line of reasoning both strengthens India’s case in
the eyes of the international community and coupled with Pakistani denials
helps to mitigate the prospect of Pakistani reprisals.
Third, the target, a JeM training camp in Balakot, is
significant. This was one of the earliest training camps established by JeM
after Masood Azhar’s release from Indian custody in 1999, and was built up over
2000 and 2001. In its early years, it was a centre for planning, equipping and
training suicide bombers used against Pakistani and foreign targets. These
included terrorists responsible for attacks against religious minorities in
Pakistan, US targets in Afghanistan and infiltrations across the LoC. In 2005,
the camp was damaged by the massive earthquake in Kashmir, and was subsequently
rebuilt. Over the years, it was a regular site of speeches and lectures by
Maulana Masood Azhar, his relatives and other associates. Gokhale said the camp
was being run by Yousuf Azhar, Masood Azhar’s brother-in-law. There had been a noticeable
uptick in activity at Balakot in recent years as part of JeM’s revival. This
revival was a consequence of increased JeM recruitment efforts after 2014 — and
limitations on Lashkar-e-Taiba’s activities. Given the number of terrorists in
custody who had passed through the training facility at Balakot, it is probable
that not just India, but also the United States and Saudi Arabia, among others,
had detailed intelligence inputs about the training facility, its layout and
activities.
There are still a lot of unanswered questions — and some
may never be fully answered. The repercussions are also impossible to predict,
but will depend in part on how the strikes are perceived in Pakistan. After the
Abbottabad raid in which Osama bin Laden was killed, the public narrative in
Pakistan did an abrupt about-turn within 48 hours. The Pakistan army went from
claiming it had been informed about the attack to lambasting the US for
violation of its sovereignty (while conveniently side-stepping questions about
how bin Laden ended up there). There are already signs that we may see
something similar, which will increase pressure on the Pakistan army to
escalate.
Alternatively, we could still see events stage-managed so
that India will have achieved a degree of retribution for Pulwama, Pakistan
will claim a response, and the needle will continue to slowly shift in India’s favour
on Pakistan-based terrorism in the eyes of the international community.