Like every major country, India has a strategic
community: a relatively small group of professionals who, in different ways,
direct or influence India’s foreign and security policy. This strategic
community includes career diplomats, bureaucrats, military commanders, and
intelligence officers, as well as political leaders from the ruling
party/coalition and
the opposition. Additionally, reporters and commentators in
the media, scholars at universities and think tanks, and members of the
business community also play a role in shaping perceptions and influencing
outcomes.
While general attitudes and areas of broad consensus can
be discerned in a variety of ways, no systematic survey of India’s strategic
community has been accomplished.
In an attempt to fill this gap, a survey of India’s
strategic community was fielded in December 2018. Email invitations to
participate in a 20-question survey were sent to 290 members of India’s
strategic community from 14 December, 2018 onwards. Of those who received the email
invitation to answer the SurveyMonkey questionnaire, 127 (44%) responded by 25
December, 2018. The survey was anonymous but linked to individual email
addresses to ensure its integrity. The average time spent on the survey was
seven minutes. Respondents were required to answer all 20 questions to
successfully submit their responses.
The survey reveals some distinct trends concerning
India’s biggest domestic and foreign challenges, its major global and regional
partners, institutional and policy priorities, and variations across sectors
and age profiles. Here are some highlights from the survey:
71% of respondents believe that economic issues
constitute India’s biggest domestic challenge. These include, specifically, (1)
inequality and lack of opportunity and (2) insufficient skills, education, and
employment. Addressing these deficiencies, including through sourcing external
investment and financing, research collaborations, and the import of
technology, are considered high policy priorities by India’s strategic
community.
54% see China’s assertiveness as the most significant
external challenge India faces. There are particular concerns about the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Chinese investment in the Indian Ocean.
Only 2% believe that India should collaborate more with China in the event of
greater U.S.-China competition. However, Chinese global dominance is not seen
as assured and the strategic community considers the odds of a limited conflict
between India and China unlikely.
75% perceive the United States to be India’s most
important partner on global issues. Additionally, a large minority of
respondents (43%) are in favour of closer collaboration with the United States
in the event of greater U.S.-China competition. However, trade disputes and
U.S.-Pakistan relations are believed to be constraining the India-U.S.
partnership.
74% believe the Indo-Pacific is the dominant framework
for India’s extended neighbourhood. The Indian Ocean, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia are the regions of chief importance for Indian interests and the East Asia
Summit is considered by the largest number of respondents to be a very
important institution for Indian interests. Regional connectivity with South
and Southeast Asia and maritime investments are considered among the top
foreign policy priorities for India.
Views are varied concerning engagement with Pakistan and
partnerships in West Asia. There are competing clusters of opinions concerning
engagement with Pakistan’s military, civilian government, and civil society.
Opinion is also divided as to whether Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Iran,
or Saudi Arabia is India’s most important regional partner in West Asia.
Certain historically dominant institutions, regions, and
issues are now low priorities. These include: the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Commonwealth;
developments in Europe, Africa, and Latin America; and nuclear and missile
modernisation, foreign aid, and cultural diplomacy.
Those who believe that India’s most important global
partnership is with Russia reflect divergent views on a number of other issues.
While only a minority (12%), they are more likely to advocate remaining
equidistant between the United States and China in the event of greater
competition, believe Iran is India’s most important partner in West Asia, and
prioritise the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS in India’s
institutional engagements.
Minor differences are discernible between the attitudes
of decision-makers and influencers. Current and former members of the military,
civil services, and political parties exhibit slightly greater wariness about
engaging Pakistan than academics, think tank experts, and members of the media.
They also deem military interventionism in India’s neighbourhood as more likely
and place a marginally higher priority on defence industrialisation and the
import of technology over incoming economic investment.
There are some clear differences in attitudes across age
cohorts. Those born before 1960 attribute greater importance to the United
Nations and do not prioritise an expansion of India’s diplomatic capacity.
Those born between 1960 and 1979 generally place a greater priority on the
partnership with the United States and on trade issues. Finally, those born
after 1980 are more comfortable with the concept of the Indo-Pacific and are
less likely to believe that sectarianism and identity politics constitute
India’s major domestic challenge.
Strategic elites hold similar views to the Indian public
except on Pakistan (and to a lesser extent on China). A comparison with a
similar survey of Indian public opinion conducted in March 2017 suggests
India’s strategic community shares similar views on international partnerships
with the United States, including in the context of U.S.-China competition.
However, the public appears to be more critical of Pakistan and slightly less
concerned about China than elites, although different methodologies and timings
make exact comparisons difficult.