The following article originally appeared in The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute, on October 19, 2020. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.
The Quad – the grouping comprised of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – held its first stand-alone foreign ministerial meeting this month in Tokyo. In the words of one Australian analyst, the grouping that once faltered and restarted with a crawl now finally stands on its two feet, ready to take some strides.
Often lost amid the copious commentary on the Quad, however, is how it has been both a test and a catalyst for improved Australia-India security cooperation.
It’s fashionable to be pessimistic about the India-Australia strategic partnership. Ask most observers of strategic affairs in Canberra and New Delhi, and they’re likely to characterise the relationship as long on promises and short on deliverables. A lot of it has to do with the two countries’ troublesome history. For more than half a century after India’s independence in 1947, India and Australia talked past each other. Antiquated stereotypes have persisted, and ties are still subject to some unrealistic expectations. (“When will India become a driver of the Australian economy like China?” goes one. “Why is India resistant to joining the US alliance network in Asia?” runs another.)
The reality, however, is both more prosaic and more promising. Since 2000, the two countries have developed a steadily improving security relationship, in part because they have managed to put their past differences behind them. Their contrasting security priorities and approaches to foreign relations diminished following the end of the Cold War. India’s nuclear program, once the subject of international sanctions, went mainstream, resulting in normalisation with Australia after 2007.