By most accounts, the Summit for Democracy hosted by United States (US) President Joe Biden earlier this month was a mess. Many rightly criticised the decision to invite or not invite certain countries: Why, for example, include Pakistan, which, in any case, chose not to officially participate in reported deference to China’s sensitivities, but not Bangladesh? Others thought the agenda was poorly thought through. The participation of Taiwan, while perceived as a pointed message by the US to China, was also accompanied by unnecessary controversy.
In truth, the summit was motivated by a number of factors beyond simply idealism. It was originally proposed when Biden was a presidential candidate to be the centerpiece of an affirmative agenda for his foreign policy, and Biden pledged to hold such a meeting in his first year in office. The summit also advanced the Democratic Party’s domestic agenda, amid the perception among its electoral base about the erosion of democratic institutions under Donald Trump’s presidency. A further consideration was geopolitical, given intensifying US competition with China and Russia. The fact that China marshalled counter events — and that its ambassador co-authored a joint op-ed with his Russian counterpart criticising the summit — reinforced this competitive perspective.
Proponents in the US administration argue that the summit did succeed in bringing together the leaders of several countries — by some reckoning, one of the largest conclaves of heads of State and government outside a United Nations framework — along with civil society leaders. They also hope that this will be followed by a second edition, hosted by another country, and thus represents the start of a long-term process.
India proved an active participant in the summit, as reflected in the prime minister’s brief but pointed country statement. That statement reinforced the importance to India of democracy, including at the State and grassroots levels, which — among other things — has witnessed the increased participation of women. It also emphasised the structural foundations of democracy, including the mechanics of elections and the democratic delivery of social services. Finally, it highlighted some challenges to democracy as perceived by the Indian government, including specifically social media and cryptocurrency.
Overall, the Summit for Democracy reflected a number of areas of growing convergence between New Delhi and Washington. The first was the importance of demonstrating the success of democratic governance. For all its many flaws, the US is an example of a State that can play a global leadership role while remaining a competitive democracy and open society. For its part, India has much to contribute as a model of democratic development, whether in terms of pioneering electronic voting, biometric identification, or the distribution of certain public goods.
Another broad area of convergence between the US and India involves recognising the longer-term value of democracy, in its largest sense, even if it requires short-term modifications to accommodate national interests. This dilemma for both countries is most evident when the stakes are highest, such as in the near abroad. The US has historically backed some very undemocratic regimes, whether in Latin America or Southeast Asia, when it has suited its interests. Similarly, India has had to engage with a variety of governments in its neighborhoods even as it has recognised the long-term value of transparency, accountability, and civic participation. Recent experience has shown that ignoring these factors has come at the cost of stability and security in India’s periphery.
Finally, there is a great deal of overlap in Indian and US perceptions to challenges to democracy. This extends to misinformation and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors, the corrosive effects of unregulated digital tools, and challenges related to corruption and black money. The fact that corruption featured as a priority for the US at the summit, represents a widening of Washington’s conception of democracy. Similarly, India has started to think of connectivity, technology, and investment in increasingly democratic terms.
Despite some areas of evidently growing convergence between India and the US, some important differences remain. Two, in particular, stand out. One, while the US has long adopted a more evangelical approach to democratic support and promotion, India retains a stronger impulse to “do democracy” rather than to preach it. Efforts at labelling Indian foreign assistance or technical cooperation as democratic support are deemed counterproductive, particularly from the perspective of many recipient countries in the developing world.
Additionally, the US has a very different approach to democratic coalition-building, perhaps an outgrowth of its alliance mentality. This results in an instinct to stand with fellow democracies (many of which are also US treaty allies, such as in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and South Korea). For India, there is less of a motivation to join other democracies on matters of symbolic importance or when interests are not significantly compromised.
Overall, cooperation on democracy ought to come more naturally to India and the US, despite their many differences. More than 15 years ago, two very different leaders — George W Bush and Manmohan Singh — opted to collaborate on the UN Democracy Fund. The intervening years have only injected the issue with greater importance and urgency.