This following essay appeared in a Taiwan Asia Exchange Foundation report Taiwan and India Strategizing the Relations, edited by Sana Hashmi and Alan Hao Yang.
India and Taiwan are dynamic democratic entities in the Indo-Pacific involved in military confrontations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Yet for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons, the two entities do not loom as significantly in each other's consciousness as might be warranted. Diplomatic legacies, competing priorities, and political and resource constraints at both ends have conspired to keep diplomatic and security cooperation between India and Taiwan limited. But developments in 2020-21 – specifically the military stand-off on the India-China boundary that resulted in fatalities in the Galwan Valley and greater saber-rattling by Beijing against Taipei threatening forceful unification – have increased the interest and appreciation in India and Taiwan of each other's predicaments. Both are also in the process of deepening their cooperation with the United States as well as with its allies such as Japan and Australia. Under these circumstances, a five-point agenda consisting of economic, technology, security, education, and think tank cooperation can serve to accelerate cooperation between New Delhi and Taipei at this critical juncture.
From Constraints to Cooperation
It may not be well appreciated today, but one of modern India's first diplomatic relationships was with the Republic of China (ROC) and the government of Chiang Kai-Shek. During the second World War, the British Indian government established an Agent General at Chongqing to assist with war efforts, and informal diplomatic contacts were made between the Indian National Congress (INC) and the ROC. Following the war, in early 1946, an Indian trade and goodwill mission to Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Chongqing sought exports for Indian cotton and tobacco. However, after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, India was quick to recognize the government of Mao Zedong, formalize diplomatic relations, and support Beijing's entry to the United Nations.
In the mid-1990s, India-Taiwan relations were given a fillip through the establishment of representative offices in each other's capitals. India-Taipei Association (ITA) served as a de-facto diplomatic mission for India in Taipei since 1995, while Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) became its counterpart in New Delhi. Political relations, however, have been inhibited by a number of factors. On India's part, there is continued recognition of the PRC and adherence to the 'One China Policy', even if this remains distinct from the rigid 'One China Principle' insisted upon by Beijing. On Taiwan's side, there are continued claims on behalf of the ROC of territory disputed with India, claims that are unlikely to be relinquished soon. For these reasons, political support for each other's disagreements with Beijing remains limited.
These intractable legacy issues have been compounded by other factors. In Taipei, apprehensions about India's regional preoccupations, capacity constraints, and legacy of non-alignment persist. In India, there are concerns about Taiwan's own orientation, including a sizable (if diminishing) pro-unification sentiment embodied by elements of the Kuomintang (KMT), as well as the lack of preparedness of a very 'political' military. India does not have the legacy of military cooperation with Taiwan as the latter has with countries such as the United States (when it comes to equipment) or Singapore (when it comes to training). Nor will it be immediately embroiled in a military crisis in the manner of Japan, which is increasingly engaged in planning for cross-Strait scenarios. Military cooperation between India and Taiwan has, therefore, remained underdeveloped, and barring truly unforeseen developments is likely to remain so.
A Five-Point Agenda
While maintaining a realistic assessment of the state of relations between India and Taiwan, the present moment certainly offers an opportunity to improve broader relations for taking the strategic partnership to a qualitatively different plane. Continuing Chinese assertiveness along the border with India, in the Taiwan Strait, in the broader Indo-Pacific, and on international diplomacy has underscored the need for like-minded cooperation on regional and global issues. In India, there is greater appreciation for the need to understand China, including language and cultural training, intelligence on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People's Liberation Army (PLA), and on emerging technologies. There are obvious complementarities with Taiwan. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, diplomatic pressures, concerns about supply chains, and broader Indo-Pacific shifts – including the development of the Quad – have enhanced the appreciation of India as a potential partner. With these opportunities in mind, a five-point agenda will help strengthen India-Taiwan relations in the years ahead.
The first and most important priority will involve improvements to the bilateral economic relationship. Specifically, India will need to evolve into a preferred destination for investment and manufacturing by Taiwanese companies, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) involved in integration into trusted global value chains. Taiwan has comparative advantages in a number of high technologies – of which the best known is the semiconductor sector – and an organic movement of manufacturing out of mainland China to other markets is already underway. However, India faces stiff competition from other emerging manufacturing hubs, notably Vietnam, but also South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mexico, and even Taiwan itself.
Some solutions may be found in working with third partners, such as Japan, which has been much more successful in penetrating the Indian market and creating manufacturing hubs. Additionally, recent efforts by the Indian government, including under the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, offer an attractive option for Taiwanese companies to bypass regulatory hurdles. However, a number of challenges remain and continue to inhibit the bilateral economic partnership. These include third-country market access in the absence of Indian trade agreements, high and in some cases unpredictable Indian tariffs (including on intermediary goods), and a lack of appropriately skilled labor in India. Beyond that, a lack of awareness in both countries has helped ensure that two-way investment is still modest.
A second agenda item relates to technology cooperation. The border crisis with China has underscored the need for trusted hardware providers for the growing Indian economy. As part of retaliatory steps taken, the Indian government has required greater scrutiny of Chinese bids for public procurement and effectively kept out Chinese companies from the development of India's 5G telecommunications infrastructure. On the other hand, Taiwan will require relatively low-cost software development in a manner that the United States, European, Japanese, or South Korean companies might not be able to provide. Beyond geopolitical and security concerns, there are compelling commercial prospects for cooperation in a range of emerging technologies. The sensitivity of some of these domains will naturally have positive implications for political, diplomatic, and possibly security relations as well.
A third area of cooperation concerns defense and security. Although direct cooperation may still be constrained, indirect cooperation along with partners in the Quad, Southeast Asia, or Europe is certainly possible. In recent years, India has become more involved in the Pacific security, whether through small-scale official assistance, humanitarian aid to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and regular naval flotillas for public diplomacy, exercises, and operations. While building trust between militaries will take considerable time, deepening cooperation on strategic assessments, intelligence, language and technical training, and dual-use system development remain conceivable possibilities. Furthermore, security cooperation along all these vectors can be led by civilian agencies.
Fourth, educational opportunities remain underutilized. Much like relations between India and much of the Anglosphere (e.g., the United States, United Kingdom, Australia), education can be an important springboard to accelerate relations. For India, Taiwan represents a natural bridge to understanding the Sinic world in a democratic setting. Expanding educational links and language training, including for those engaged in security functions, represent valuable opportunities to broaden the strategic relationship. However, this will require facilitating and communicating opportunities for higher and professional education, including graduate fellowships, English-language courses in certain disciplines, recognition of degrees, and attractive visa and short-term employment opportunities. Shorter- term exchange programs also represent another avenue for accelerating university- to-university engagement.
Finally, given the complexities of diplomatic and military engagement, non- government dialogues and convening arranged by policy institutes in India and Taiwan represent an obvious way to deepen contacts between the two countries' policy and business communities. These could be pure 'Track II' initiatives involving private organizations or 'Track 1.5' dialogues involving government officials from both sides. Although some are already underway, these kinds of engagements can be widened on critical issues such as managing disinformation and foreign interference. The Raisina Dialogue – India's flagship foreign policy conference co-hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation – has prominently featured Taiwanese think tanks in several editions. Beyond universities, think tank engagement provides opportunities for facilitating policy dialogue, understanding, and discrete cooperation in a number of sectors. In time, these could extend to such important areas as investment and supply chain cooperation, technological development, military assessments, and public health, climate change, and international institutional reform.
Opportunities over the Next Decade
A qualitative upgrade in India-Taiwan relations will require considerable spadework and is unlikely to occur overnight. Despite the increasingly heated rhetoric emerging from Beijing, New Delhi is concerned that a more likely military crisis scenario in the Taiwan Strait could emerge in a number of years, following the next general election in Taiwan, the entrenchment of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in a third term as party General Secretary, and the completion of a number of reforms by the PLA. These developments do offer time to implement a number of changes in India- Taiwan relations, whether the redirection of investment and supply chains or the building of trust between the two security establishments.
Yet there is a meaningful opportunity now to deepen and broaden the strategic relationship, which is still at a very nascent stage. The fact that President Tsai Ing- wen singled out India in her inaugural address in 2016 is simply one major indicator of the heightened interest and enthusiasm at the highest levels for improved relations. It will be important to manage expectations and remain realistic given the obvious constraints. Nonetheless, a five-point agenda as outlined above – that includes aspects of economic, technology, security, education, and think tank cooperation – could help transform the India-Taiwan relationship and realize its potential over the coming decades.