The following report, co-authored with Ammar Nainar, was originally published by ORF America in September 2022.
Introduction
India has often branded itself as the ‘world’s largest democracy.’ Its very existence as a large, diverse, developing democracy is an extraordinary feat. Yet the conventional wisdom articulated by both Indian commentators and foreign observers is that democracy has rarely played a role in India’s foreign relations.
This reading is somewhat questionable. It is true that for much of India’s independent history its relationships with the United States and other developed democracies in the West were marked by differences and irritants. Like many other countries, New Delhi often prioritized short-term interests over values in its regional diplomacy. Moreover, India was often hesitant about employing the rhetoric of democracy promotion or coalition-building.
At the same time, for decades, India supported decolonization movements in Asia and Africa, both rhetorically and through material means. It was a vociferous proponent of boycotting South Africa for its discriminatory Apartheid policies. India also assisted countries in the developing world in establishing governing institutions and in the conduct of elections.
Recent developments – most notably the rise and assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China – have led to a rethink about the role of democracy in Indian foreign policy. In 2005, former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh joined then-U.S. president George W. Bush in promoting the United Nations Democracy Fund. More recently, current prime minister Narendra Modi participated in the inaugural Summit for Democracies organized by President Joe Biden’s administration. At the same time, and to much less fanfare, India has increased support for democratic institutions in its nascent development assistance programs focused on South Asia and Africa and in its international training and capacity building efforts.
Between December 2021 and March 2022, the Observer Research Foundation America (ORF America) and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) co-hosted a series of five virtual round- tables on the role of democracy in Indian foreign policy. The roundtables, held under the Chatham House Rule, involved participants from the Indian strategic community, including the Indian government, as well as 17 subject matter experts.
This report provides a summary of those discussions as well as broader conclusions; as such, they do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors.
The major conclusions were:
• Democracy is an important aspect of India’s foreign policy outlook, even if it is not – and is unlikely to become – the leading determinant.
• The alignment of values and interests is most pronounced in India’s near neighborhood, as weak institutions compounded by growing Chinese influence have adversely affected Indian interests.
• The primary tools of Indian democratic support for other countries include development assistance and capacity building, but also aspects of diplomatic and military support.
• Sharper geopolitical alignments create opportunities for deeper democratic cooperation involving India. This has been reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine war, growing ties between Moscow and Beijing, and the development of the Quad.
• India has often had to balance short-term interests with longer-term values, as is most evident in recent policy towards Russia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan. In this respect, India is hardly alone among major powers.
• There is a strong generational divide in India’s strategic community on the role of democracy in foreign policy; by and large, an older generation adheres to a more values-neutral approach to international affairs while younger professionals place greater emphasis on the importance of democracy.