The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on November 29, 2016.
To deal with Chinese muscle in a post-American world, India must think asymmetrically
The election of Donald Trump as US president has
unleashed further uncertainty on a world already in considerable flux. Trump
has promised economic protectionism, reversals on immigration and militarism
against terrorists, but has outlined few concrete policies. Much will depend on
his cabinet appointments and his ability to work with US Congress and
bureaucracy.
Whatever path the US takes going forward, the actions and
orientations of China and India – and the relationship between the two – will
have even greater implications for the international system. China and India
have two of the world’s four largest militaries, both of which are modernising.
They also remain among the fastest growing major economies: China’s is second
behind the United States and India could well be the third largest by 2030.
All countries have a grand strategy, whether or not they
know it. But the Chinese government under Xi Jinping and the Indian government
under Narendra Modi have been clearer and bolder than many of their
predecessors in articulating what they would like to achieve nationally,
regionally and globally.
China’s current leadership has adopted three big
concepts. The first is the Chinese Dream (or China Dream), which aims to make
China a “fully developed nation” by 2049 as part of the “great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation”. The second is the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as
One Belt, One Road), an ambitious effort to export excess industrial capacity
and thereby extend Chinese strategic influence to Central and Southeast Asia,
Pakistan and West Asia, and on to Africa and Europe. The third is a ‘New Type
of Great Power Relationship’, the idea that China and the United States can
recognise one another as peers and respect each other’s spheres of influence.
India has its own equivalents. Make in India is a
campaign to accelerate India’s economic development through increases in
manufacturing, large-scale employment and boosts in exports. ‘Neighbourhood
First’ attempts to preserve India’s regional primacy through diplomatic
attention, connectivity and assistance, while Act East is meant to improve
India’s connectivity eastwards while deepening security and institutional
partnerships. Finally, the notion of ‘India as a Leading Power’ outlines
India’s ambition to become a great power in a multipolar world.
Make in India finds some natural complementarities with
the economic dimensions of the Chinese Dream. Should China evolve into an
advanced consumer- and services-driven economy, an India that boosts
manufacturing and exports is necessary and should (from Beijing’s point of
view) be desirable. But for now, both China and India appear to be struggling
with their internal economic transformations. There is less overlap between
China’s One Belt, One Road and India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East
policies. Security competition between China and India in South Asia is
intensifying, although Southeast Asia offers some avenues for mutually
beneficial economic cooperation. Finally, a ‘New Type of Great Power
Relationship’ is at complete odds with India as a Leading Power: a world run by
two countries leaves little space for others.
Given China’s overall trajectory and the concerns shared
by many of its neighbours, the onus today is on Beijing to ensure a more
cooperative international environment. Should China make efforts to move from a
territorially revisionist to a status quo power, from a mercantilist to a
market economy, from an opaque to a more transparent political system, and from
a violator to an abider of norms on non-proliferation and freedom of
navigation, India (and indeed most others) should have every reason to
celebrate and facilitate its rise and deepen cooperation. But there are few indications to date that China is
moving in these directions. For now, an opaque, mercantilist, revisionist, and
delinquent China is here with us to stay and, more importantly, is primed for
ascendancy.
In the absence of positive signs, India must be prepared
for a more competitive approach to China. It must double down on its efforts at
improving connectivity with South and Southeast Asia, including infrastructure
projects, facilitation agreements and institutional cooperation. India must
also clearly delineate behaviour that fundamentally threatens its interests in
its immediate vicinity and act decisively to advance those regional interests. It
will have to deepen its security and commercial partnerships with like-minded
countries in the region, including the United States, Japan, Australia,
Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea.
And India may even have to start thinking asymmetrically
about China. This might involve engaging more with Chinese civil society, being
more mindful of overseas Chinese facilities, reviewing aspects of market
access, developing offensive capabilities with respect to new technologies, and
contrasting itself with China at global governance forums. All the while, New
Delhi must constantly remind Beijing that the successful rebalancing of the
Chinese economy can be win-win for both countries.
The United States will not disappear as a global power
overnight. But it would be a mistake to respond to Trump’s election with
business as usual. Few priorities will be as important as rethinking
Sino-Indian relations in a transformed international environment.