Balakot Strike and its Aftermath

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on 28 February, 2019.  

There is a long history of de-escalatory efforts following India-Pak crises

On the early morning of February 26, Indian Air Force jets entered Pakistani air space, where they struck a Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) training camp at Balakot. The next day, it appears that Pakistan attempted retaliatory strikes against Indian military facilities. In an engagement with Indian MiG-21s, an Indian aircraft was shot down, landing on the Pakistani side of the line of control. The pilot, reported to be Wing Commander Abhinandan, survived and is in Pakistani custody.

A second aircraft was also downed on the Pakistani side of the LoC. India has said that it successfully took down a Pakistani aircraft, while Pakistan naturally claims that a second Indian aircraft was downed. Separately, an Indian Mi-17 helicopter crashed in Jammu & Kashmir in what is believed to be an accident, with further casualties.

Although a lot of these facts remain to be verified, questions will now be raised about how and why events unfolded as they did.

It is important to assess the significance of the Balakot strike, conducted in response to the February 14 terrorist attack by JeM at Pulwama. Indian aircraft certainly entered Pakistani air space and managed to return unscathed. This, also accepted in Pakistan’s version of events, is itself something of an embarrassment for the Pakistan military, and may have necessitated some form of retaliation as a face-saving gesture.

Additionally, India has framed its strike on Balakot as a pre-emptive action: proportional, motivated by intelligence about further terrorist attacks on India, and designed to minimise civilian casualties. Supportive statements in the immediate aftermath suggest that India’s rationale for its strike has been accepted by certain other countries.

Moreover, the significance of the target needs to be assessed. Balakot is one of the earliest JeM training facilities developed after the release from Indian custody of its leader Masood Azhar in 1999. In its early years, it was used for planning and training for suicide bombings, including against religious minorities in Pakistan, across the LoC against India, and against US targets in Afghanistan.

Although devastated in the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the JeM facility was rebuilt. In recent years it became a venue for lectures by Azhar, his family members, and close associates, and continued to play host for training efforts. And it was part of a general revival of JeM’s fortunes following increased recruitment efforts and a partial crackdown on Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Pakistan’s response should also be seen in context. The shift in narrative over the first 24 hours after Balakot is somewhat reminiscent of that after the 2011 US raid against Abbottabad in which Osama bin Laden was killed. In that instance, the army initially claimed that it was a party to the US operation before it made it a matter of US violations of Pakistani sovereignty (avoiding questions about how and why bin Laden was in Abbottabad).

Now, after claiming that Indian aircraft were chased out of Pakistani air space and inflicted no damage on Balakot, it is asserting a retaliation in self-defence. It is worth asking what – beyond an air space violation – Pakistan is retaliating for if, as it claims, no significant damage was inflicted by India.

The Indian air strike and Pakistan’s retaliatory actions will undoubtedly be seen as part of a dangerous escalation between two nuclear-armed countries. Greater escalation is certainly possible, including in the event of further Pakistani reprisals or depending on the fate of the captured Indian pilot. His mistreatment in custody would undoubtedly increase Indian public hostility.

But unwarranted alarmism is also unnecessary, at least for now. India and Pakistan have tested each others’ militaries in the past, including after the nuclear tests of 1998, the Kargil war of 1999, Operation Parakram in 2002, and the ‘surgical strikes’ of 2016. On both sides, addressing domestic expectations are paramount, especially in the backdrop of the forthcoming Indian general election.

But there has also been a long history of de-escalatory efforts following crises between the two countries, and today there are more channels for diminishing tensions. It is possible, as has been the case in the past, that both sides will find in their recent actions enough to claim a successful defence of their countries. In that case, the facts of the matter, which will be made clear in time, will speak for themselves.

Creating an India-US advantage in the Indo-Pacific

The following article, co-authored with Alyssa Ayres, Tom West, and Michael Fuchs, originally appeared in The Times of India on March 1, 2018. 

The Indo-Pacific region is today the primary locus of global growth and opportunity, but its security and stability are increasingly under duress. China’s rise, while beneficial to international prosperity, has occurred in a manner that continues to generate mistrust and anxiety across the region – and the concerns are only growing. Beijing regularly attempts to consolidate its control of disputed seas, airspace, and land, in the South China Sea and in the Himalayas.

China also continues to flout established international norms of cyber security and non-proliferation, and its international economic policies are likely to leave many countries with unsustainable debt. Meanwhile in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamist terrorist organisations continue to destabilise the region and strike international targets, with little end in sight.

India and the US, as the world’s two largest democracies with two of the largest military forces, have a shared interest in ensuring a stable security order in the Indo-Pacific. This shared interest has propelled India-US security ties dramatically forward over the past decade.

Each has something important to offer the other. The US can greatly assist India’s capacity building efforts. India has the potential and willingness to shoulder regional security responsibilities, as evidenced by increased patrols in the Indian Ocean, aid to South Asia, and humanitarian assistance activities. But the India-US strategic partnership is still hobbled by parallel bureaucracies that do not yet move in sync. The US often seeks tangible short-term returns on its investment in India’s capabilities and success, while India wants continued assurances that US support will be neither fickle nor overbearing. A few important steps could help advance security cooperation further.

One, the US could – with Indian inputs – create a Strategic Advantage Initiative. Having designated India a Major Defence Partner, the US could develop an initiative with the explicit objective of enabling India to prevail in contested domains. This government-wide programme would ensure that all US agencies take the appropriate steps to enhance defence cooperation with India and that US commitments become ingrained in policy under future administrations. Among other steps, this could involve refining export licence regulations, offering India access to platforms and equipment that boost its maritime security capabilities, and creating joint mechanisms to identify specific capabilities necessary for various pressing security contingencies.

Two, the countries could better coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the Indian Ocean region, including planning and training. HADR is an area in which India has proven remarkably adept in recent years. Creating a joint India-US Indo-Pacific HADR cell might be one way of accomplishing this objective.

Three, for its part, India could create a more efficient and transparent defence procurement process. This would not only benefit India-US relations but also accelerate India’s self-reliance in defence and thereby improve its ability to effectively perform a range of security functions. Integration of international supply chains and joint defence R&D could help to achieve the vision of Make in India. Currently, despite the US having considerably eased the process for India to acquire sensitive military technologies, India’s procurement process and military industrial base often inhibit the absorption of these technologies.

Finally, India and the US could finalise a joint defence implementation agreement that facilitates information sharing, interoperability and capacity building efforts within the two countries’ comfort zones. This might encompass some long-pending bilateral defence agreements. Such an agreement could provide India disproportionate benefits, including better communications systems, access to more intelligence, and enhanced operational capabilities.

Considerable progress has been made in improving India-US strategic and security relations. Officials from the two countries talk more frankly on more issues than at any time in the past. Military exercises are frequent and defence commerce has increased significantly. But through a handful of key initiatives, India and the US can yet improve their ability to meet the increasingly pressing challenge of preserving stability across the Indo-Pacific.

The rise and rise of Xi Jinping

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on October 26, 2017. 

The National Congress of the Communist Party, held every five years, is the closest thing authoritarian China has to an election. The most recent Congress – the 19th – was held October 18-24, and was an occasion for the over 2,000 delegates to deliberate and agree on policy matters guiding the nation. It also witnessed the selection of the Party’s Central Committee, the 25 member Politburo, the 11 member Central Military Commission, and the 7 member Politburo Standing Committee, which forms the country’s most exclusive leadership circle.

Observers in China and around the world had been on the lookout for signs about the degree of centralised power that will now lie with President Xi Jinping, and hints about his future succession plans. The implications are potentially significant. Among other things, they will affect India’s economic prospects, border security, neighbourhood relations, and global ambitions. With the unveiling yesterday of the Politburo Standing Committee, we now have some tentative answers, although they are far from encouraging.

First, on policy, Xi laid out his thoughts in a marathon three-and-a-half hours speech on October 18, the central theme of which was ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’. With the goal of achieving “national rejuvenation”, Xi has advocated a “people-centred philosophy of development” grounded in “Four Comprehensives”: the continued centrality and strengthening of Communist Party rule, further reform, “law-based governance”, and the building of a “moderately prosperous society”.Xi also spoke of the need for a strong military capable of winning wars and “a new type of international relations”. A cynical reading of Xi’s speech would suggest that the party’s governance philosophy now clearly constitutes a mix of authoritarianism, populism and nationalism.

This broad approach has Xi’s strong personal imprint and ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ has now been written into the Communist Party’s charter. This week, the 19th Congress “unanimously” agreed that Xi Jinping Thought will guide the party for the foreseeable future. Xi and the Party are now effectively one and the same, and opposition to one constitutes opposition to the other. Moreover, the inclusion of Xi Jinping Thought in the charter now sets China’s president on par with only Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as major leaders of Communist China identified with their own philosophies.

The second indicator of Xi’s power – the politics, rather than the policy – resulted in more ambiguous outcomes. To some degree, there was steady continuity, particularly on accounts that directly affect relations with India. General Zhao Zongqi, commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s vast Western Theatre Command (with responsibility for the entire border with India), has retained his position in the Central Committee. The country’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi, who acts as the special representative for the border talks with New Delhi, was elevated to the Politburo.

Of greater curiosity, observers were looking to see whether the 69-year-old Wang Qishan, who has led Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and is sometimes described as the country’s second most powerful person, would retain his position on the Standing Committee, in contravention of informal age limitation rules. Wang’s retention would have been a key indicator of Xi’s dominance over various rival factions within the Party, and a sign that Xi would have a recent precedent to hold on to power for another five-year term beyond 2022 after he crosses the age threshold of 68. However, Wang was not included in the Central Committee list, and is expected to be replaced by new Standing Committee member Zhao Leji.

Furthermore, questions lingered about who would fill the leadership vacuum caused by Xi’s purge of those who have opposed his rise to power. Bo Xilai, the charismatic head of the party in Chongqing and once considered a potential rival of Xi’s, was found guilty of corruption in 2013 and sentenced to life imprisonment after a high profile trial. Xi also went after the old guard. In 2015, Zhou Yongkang, once one of the country’s most powerful people as head of internal security and law enforcement, was similarly charged and sentenced. Sun Zhengcai, who until recently was considered a future senior leader, was suddenly expelled from the party.

Eyes were therefore on a handful of younger political leaders as potential successors to Xi. Hu Chunhua of Guangdong Province was seen as an earlier frontrunner, but the rise of Chen Min’er as the party chief of Chongqing following Sun’s expulsion had created an alternative. Heilongjiang chief Zhang Qingwei, a former aerospace engineer, represented an outside possibility. But as it turned out, none were appointed to the Standing Committee, leaving open the questions about Xi’s likely successor.

In sum, the 19th Congress has seen Xi consolidate power to a degree not seen since the days of Deng Xiaoping and possibly since Mao Zedong. He has maintained the authoritarian, populist, and nationalist tone that has characterised his presidency to date, and now has fewer checks on his power and vision. At the same time, questions about his succession remain as open as ever. For India, as with other countries around the region that have been confronted with China’s growing assertiveness under Xi, these are discouraging signs.

A Long Battle Ahead

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on 20 May 2017. The full text can be found here.

On May 18, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – the principal judicial arm of the United Nations – ruled on the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, whom Pakistan alleges is an Indian spy. The court unanimously declared that Pakistan must take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Jadhav is not executed, pending a final judgment of the court. What are we to make of this ICJ decision?

First, the matter is far from over. The court simply determined that it had jurisdiction in this case, despite Pakistan’s arguments to the contrary. It also stated that the rights alleged by India were plausible, that there was a clear link with the measures being sought by India, and that the matter was urgent as Jadhav faced a death sentence which – if carried through – could not be reversed.

Second, India’s case concerns Pakistan’s violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, not so much the merits or circumstances of Jadhav’s death sentence. Since his Indian citizenship was not in question, Pakistan should have allowed Jadhav to meet with Indian government representatives. The recent ICJ ruling should thus be seen as a reprieve that buys India time, and has little direct bearing on the overall circumstances of Jadhav’s arrest and sentencing.

The indirect implications are, however, far more significant, as they raise questions about why Pakistan denied Jadhav consular access in the first place. The element of irreparable prejudice and urgency in ICJ proceedings also highlight just how incredibly unusual it is for any country to execute an alleged foreign spy in peacetime, when life imprisonment is usually the harshest sentence. Moreover, the entire episode portrays the rule of law in Pakistan in an incredibly poor light. Questions remain about the circumstances of Jadhav’s arrest and detention (India believes that he was kidnapped from Iran). A video released by Pakistan in which Jadhav appears to admit his guilt is suspicious, and suggests that it was forced or done under duress. And the opacity of the legal process – in a Pakistani military court, no less – that resulted in his death sentence is very disturbing.

Third, we must look upon this as a political victory for India as much as a legal one. ICJ is an international court, and like much international law, the court lacks appropriate enforcement mechanisms. In the past, parties – including the United States – have ignored ICJ rulings concerning the Vienna Convention and executed citizens of other countries, although not for alleged espionage. Yet should Pakistan now ignore ICJ and execute Jadhav, it will clearly be an act of bad faith.

Two other criticisms that have been made in India concerning the decision to go to ICJ should be addressed. First, concerns have been expressed that India might be unnecessarily internationalising relations with Pakistan by taking this case to ICJ. This should not be a major concern. India’s position on ICJ’s jurisdiction is clearly stated, and based on its declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the court as mandatory, which were submitted in 1974. India’s determination, however, was that a matter related to the Vienna Convention overrode its own stated objections to the jurisdiction of the court, specifically that such jurisdiction would not extend to disputes between two current or former Commonwealth members.

Finally, questions have been raised as to whether this was a necessary step, or the best recourse. For this, the answer must be found in ICJ’s statement. Given that this is a death sentence and that the circumstance of Jadhav’s trial and detention are suspect, it was necessary to do everything possible to delay his execution. Going to the ICJ and thus overriding prior concerns about internationalisation was one way of doing so, and given the court’s stay order, has proved successful for that limited purpose.

Overall, the ICJ stay on Jadhav’s execution is a political victory for India, one that casts aspersions on Pakistan’s goodwill and the rule of law in that country. But it should be seen for what it is: the start of what may still be a long and messy process to bring Jadhav home.

Assessing the Islamic State Threat to India

The following article, coauthored with Sara Perlangeli, originally appeared in The Times of India on 6 May 2017. The full text can be accessed here.

The so-called Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, is back in the news in India. Recent reports suggest that Indian IS fighters were killed by US forces in Afghanistan, and the Telangana police has been accused of trying to lure and entrap potential IS sympathisers. This raises the question of how big a challenge IS poses to Indian interests and national security.

To investigate, we assessed all Indian citizens confirmed to have affiliated themselves with IS. This includes those who attempted or succeeded in travelling to Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan as recruits, as well as propagandists, recruiters, funders, conspirators and other sympathisers. While acknowledging that this comprises only a sample of actual IS affiliates in India, a few tentative conclusions can nonetheless be drawn.

First, only 142 Indian citizens (132 named) can be confirmed to have affiliated with IS in some way. This suggests that IS has made only scant inroads in India, relative to Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Australia – let alone West Asia and North Africa. In fact, some of these Indians were radicalised abroad, including in the US, UK, Singapore and Australia.

That said, the numbers of Indians linked to IS has steadily grown. From only one confirmed individual in 2013, the numbers grew to six in 2014, 35 in 2015 and 75 in 2016. The trend may now be plateauing, with 25 in the first four months of 2017. The IS challenge is a serious one, but does not yet appear to be on par with other countries or with other terrorist challenges facing India.

Second, certain states in the south and west appear particularly prone to IS-inspired radicalism. We identified 37 recruits or sympathisers from Kerala, 21 from Telangana, 19 from Maharashtra, 16 from Karnataka, 15 from UP, six from MP, five from Tamil Nadu, four from Gujarat, three each from Uttarakhand and Bengal, two from Jammu & Kashmir, and one each from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and Rajasthan.

The fact that over three-quarters come from just five states suggests that localised responses may be more beneficial than any national policy. Additionally, with the exception of UP, these states represent among the most prosperous and best-networked parts of the country. This is in line with similar trends elsewhere, with more liberal or developed countries (such as Tunisia and Morocco among Arab states, or Australia, the Nordic nations, France and Belgium globally) among the most vulnerable to IS-inspired radicalisation.

Third, India appears to have a relatively good track record of countering the IS threat. 85 of 142 known IS sympathisers from India (60%) have been arrested or interrogated, while two returned home, although successful cases are probably overrepresented. A significant number of those Indians who have been arrested were intercepted at Indian airports, and several were caught in transit before being deported back to India. Of those that were not arrested or apprehended, 11 have been confirmed killed: six in Syria, three in Afghanistan, one in a police encounter in India, and one in either Iraq or Syria. This means at least 43 are active or at large, although many of these have been reported (but not confirmed) killed.

Finally, despite many cases of self-radicalisation, IS often tends to graft onto pre-existing organisations. About one-third of the reported Indian IS sympathisers have affiliations with other groups, including the Indian Mujahideen (IM), Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), or IS-inspired groups such as Junood ul Khalifa fil Hind (JKH). IS radicalisation also tends to spread through family, school or neighbourhood ties, often coalescing into cells, such as Ansarul Khilafa Kerala.

As IS is defeated as a state – a self-proclaimed Caliphate with defined territory and a military – it could very well morph into a global network, akin to al-Qaida. This presents a new kind of challenge for India and the world. Without unnecessarily exaggerating the threat, details available in public about IS recruitment and propaganda can be a valuable way of anticipating its future challenge to India’s national security.

How to Tame a Dragon

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on November 29, 2016.

To deal with Chinese muscle in a post-American world, India must think asymmetrically

The election of Donald Trump as US president has unleashed further uncertainty on a world already in considerable flux. Trump has promised economic protectionism, reversals on immigration and militarism against terrorists, but has outlined few concrete policies. Much will depend on his cabinet appointments and his ability to work with US Congress and bureaucracy.

Whatever path the US takes going forward, the actions and orientations of China and India – and the relationship between the two – will have even greater implications for the international system. China and India have two of the world’s four largest militaries, both of which are modernising. They also remain among the fastest growing major economies: China’s is second behind the United States and India could well be the third largest by 2030.

All countries have a grand strategy, whether or not they know it. But the Chinese government under Xi Jinping and the Indian government under Narendra Modi have been clearer and bolder than many of their predecessors in articulating what they would like to achieve nationally, regionally and globally.

China’s current leadership has adopted three big concepts. The first is the Chinese Dream (or China Dream), which aims to make China a “fully developed nation” by 2049 as part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The second is the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as One Belt, One Road), an ambitious effort to export excess industrial capacity and thereby extend Chinese strategic influence to Central and Southeast Asia, Pakistan and West Asia, and on to Africa and Europe. The third is a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’, the idea that China and the United States can recognise one another as peers and respect each other’s spheres of influence.

India has its own equivalents. Make in India is a campaign to accelerate India’s economic development through increases in manufacturing, large-scale employment and boosts in exports. ‘Neighbourhood First’ attempts to preserve India’s regional primacy through diplomatic attention, connectivity and assistance, while Act East is meant to improve India’s connectivity eastwards while deepening security and institutional partnerships. Finally, the notion of ‘India as a Leading Power’ outlines India’s ambition to become a great power in a multipolar world.

Make in India finds some natural complementarities with the economic dimensions of the Chinese Dream. Should China evolve into an advanced consumer- and services-driven economy, an India that boosts manufacturing and exports is necessary and should (from Beijing’s point of view) be desirable. But for now, both China and India appear to be struggling with their internal economic transformations. There is less overlap between China’s One Belt, One Road and India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East policies. Security competition between China and India in South Asia is intensifying, although Southeast Asia offers some avenues for mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Finally, a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’ is at complete odds with India as a Leading Power: a world run by two countries leaves little space for others.

Given China’s overall trajectory and the concerns shared by many of its neighbours, the onus today is on Beijing to ensure a more cooperative international environment. Should China make efforts to move from a territorially revisionist to a status quo power, from a mercantilist to a market economy, from an opaque to a more transparent political system, and from a violator to an abider of norms on non-proliferation and freedom of navigation, India (and indeed most others) should have every reason to celebrate and facilitate its rise and deepen cooperation. But there are few indications to date that China is moving in these directions. For now, an opaque, mercantilist, revisionist, and delinquent China is here with us to stay and, more importantly, is primed for ascendancy.

In the absence of positive signs, India must be prepared for a more competitive approach to China. It must double down on its efforts at improving connectivity with South and Southeast Asia, including infrastructure projects, facilitation agreements and institutional cooperation. India must also clearly delineate behaviour that fundamentally threatens its interests in its immediate vicinity and act decisively to advance those regional interests. It will have to deepen its security and commercial partnerships with like-minded countries in the region, including the United States, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea.

And India may even have to start thinking asymmetrically about China. This might involve engaging more with Chinese civil society, being more mindful of overseas Chinese facilities, reviewing aspects of market access, developing offensive capabilities with respect to new technologies, and contrasting itself with China at global governance forums. All the while, New Delhi must constantly remind Beijing that the successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy can be win-win for both countries.

The United States will not disappear as a global power overnight. But it would be a mistake to respond to Trump’s election with business as usual. Few priorities will be as important as rethinking Sino-Indian relations in a transformed international environment.

What does India think?

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on September 22, 2016. 

What does India think? This is a question that those of us who work on policy issues outside of government are often expected to answer. A country as big and diverse as India is naturally home to a wide variety of views. Often, we tend to reflect the positions of our peers, or what we read and see in the media. It is also easy and tempting to let one’s personal biases come in the way of any assessment of the mood of the nation.

For this reason, the recently-released public opinion survey by the Pew Research Center is important. Unlike most surveys, Pew conducts face-to-face interviews with some 2500 people from across India each year. This makes their results a much more accurate reflection of Indian public sentiment than, say, spot polls conducted online or surveys done only in major metropolitan centres. For example, unlike many others, Pew accurately predicted Narendra Modi’s landslide electoral victory in 2014.

Quality surveys are important because they help policy elites in New Delhi and elsewhere escape their little bubbles and transcend short-term, media-driven narratives. What, then, can we discern from the latest Pew survey? In my mind, five results are particularly surprising or noteworthy.

First, Prime Minister Modi’s popularity remains very high at 81%. But what is more unexpected is that a far higher number of Indians think the state of the Indian economy is good: 80% compared to 74% in 2015 and 64% in 2014. Additionally, far more Indians believe that the country is moving in the right direction: 65% this year compared to 56% in 2015 and 36% in 2014. Despite all the justifiable frustrations with the pace of change among many commentators, the government should be heartened by these findings – although they should not lead to complacency.

The second surprise concerns the popularity of political parties and their leaders. Public views of BJP and Congress are generally favourable. 80% have a favourable view of BJP in contrast to 16% who do not, while 67% like Congress compared to 29% who do not. But the numbers for the insurgent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) are far less encouraging, with 47% in favour and 32% against.

The high unfavourability rating for AAP is particularly surprising given that the majority of Indians have never been governed by the party, and that it is supposed to represent a breath of fresh air in Indian politics. Moreover, the public appeal of Arvind Kejriwal has declined sharply since last year to 50%, compared to 63% for Rahul Gandhi and 81% for Modi. This suggests there are limitations to AAP’s brand of protest politics.

Third, while the Indian public has a high opinion of Modi’s handling of most policies – both domestic and foreign – they are particularly dissatisfied with his handling of Pakistan, with 50% disapproving of his approach towards that country. Presumably, such dissatisfaction has increased over the past few months since the Pew poll was conducted, particularly following the Uri attack. However, some of the dissatisfaction might have been mitigated by the prime minister’s mention of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech, and the signal that sends.

Fourth, while public opinion is generally wary of China, perspectives are sharply divided along partisan lines. For example, 54% of BJP supporters are concerned about China’s support for Pakistan, compared to just 44% of Congress supporters. Similarly 48% of BJP backers worry about India’s territorial dispute with China, compared to only 39% of those supporting Congress. This suggests that forging a national consensus on India’s China policy could be challenging in the coming years.

Finally, it is noteworthy that Indians seem conflicted about the country’s global role. The survey reveals that average Indians are very much in favour of defence spending (63%) and greater involvement in the international economy (52%), and they believe overwhelmingly that India is playing a bigger role on the world stage (68%). However, they do not yet believe that Indian power should be used to “help other countries deal with their problems” (23%). But perhaps these views – both pride and caution about a greater international role – are normal for a rising power such as India.

Critical Seoul NSG meet in 2 days will have reverberations for India’s international orientation

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on June 21, 2016. 

A decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on June 23-24 – as to whether to include India as a member – may be overshadowed in international media by other expected developments. These include the results of Britain’s referendum on staying in the European Union, an unprecedented US presidential election campaign, and the imminent ruling by an international court of arbitration in The Hague between China and the Philippines on the South China Sea.

But the NSG meeting is no less important, for the potential implications it could have for relations between India and China. A decision, particularly if it were not to go in India’s favour, would have reverberations for Asian security, climate change and global governance.

NSG is a 48-country cartel initially formed in 1974 after India’s first nuclear test, to control the flow of nuclear technology and supplies. A consensus decision at its next plenary meeting in Seoul, South Korea, to include India as a member would help India’s integration into the global nuclear order, completing its transition from an alleged rule-breaker to a formal rule-maker. India’s ability to export civilian nuclear materials and technology could also help lower the costs of nuclear energy and could boost the sector in energy-starved India.

By extension, it would facilitate India’s ability to deliver upon its commitment, made before the 2015 Paris climate summit, to source 40% of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. For the past several years India has been working to align its nuclear and dual-use export controls with NSG guidelines, to make a strong case for membership.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has in recent months become personally invested in the matter, visiting Mexico and Switzerland to secure those countries’ support and personally reaching out to leaders of other countries who have expressed hesitation. Support for India’s NSG membership has consequently become a litmus test of relations with India.

Resistance to India’s inclusion has emanated from some predictable sources. Several smaller countries in Europe and elsewhere had earlier expressed concerns, echoed by non-proliferation groups in the US and elsewhere who believe that India’s entry somehow undermines the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and encourages Pakistan’s rapidly-growing nuclear arsenal. These are hollow arguments. NSG and NPT are distinct arrangements, while Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal is increasingly an insurance against US intervention.

However, the primary resistance to India’s inclusion comes from China. Beijing’s main argument is that India is a non-signatory of NPT, but it conveniently overlooks the fact that France was admitted as an NSG member before it joined NPT. India believes NPT is fundamentally unfair, permanently legitimising the nuclear weapons of certain countries, including China, while denying India for no reason other than its belated development of nuclear weapons.

China’s resistance to India’s membership is ultimately political, intended to constrain India’s rise as a global power. India is often described as a swing power in the evolving international system.

While deepening its strategic partnership with the US as a fellow democracy and status quo power, New Delhi has found common cause with Beijing in many areas. China is India’s largest trade partner in goods, and is an increasingly important source of investment. India and China also cooperate in various international forums, including on matters of national sovereignty and on increasing representation for the emerging markets in global governance.

China’s decision to accept or deny India’s membership in the NSG is therefore crucial. Its marshalling resistance in the face of overwhelming support for India would severely set back its relations with India, with possible consequences for bilateral goodwill, cooperation on climate change and multilateral groupings such as Brics.

China’s actions would stand in stark contrast to the US, which has actively lobbied for India’s inclusion in NSG. This would have reverberations for India’s international orientation. The future of Asian geopolitics could well be determined later this year in The Hague. But just as easily, it could be shaped by a decision made at Seoul in a couple of days.

Japan Bets Big on India

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on December 15, 2015. 

In the early 1990s, just a few years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown drew international opprobrium, China began raking in foreign investment. Between 1990 and 1996 some $435 billion was committed to China, helping to fuel that country’s transformative economic modernisation. Japanese pledges during that period accounted for a significant proportion, including almost 11% of total investment into Shanghai. At the same time, Tokyo was committing similar amounts to the Asian Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) and to the emerging economies of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia).

If there is one takeaway from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s just concluded visit to India, it is that Japan is willing to make the same big bet on India that it once did on China and Southeast Asia. During Abe’s visit, Japan and India signed a spate of agreements – 16 in all. But there were four developments of major significance.

The first was the much-anticipated agreement to introduce high-speed railway technology between Mumbai and Ahmedabad, with financial and technical assistance from Japan. If seen through to its full conclusion, this agreement has the potential to create a valuable demonstration effect for Indian infrastructure, much as Hyderabad showed that India could have world-class airports or Delhi demonstrated the possibility of efficient and safe metro rail systems.

Neither was considered possible in India until they happened, and their successful implementation saw demand increase around the country for similar ventures. Today, 15 metro transit systems are in operation or under construction in India. The Mumbai-Ahmedabad highspeed railroad could, consequently, be the start of something much bigger for India.

The low-interest loan to develop an Indian ‘bullet train’ may have stolen the headlines, but Japan’s commitment to create a $12.4 billion financing facility to “help materialise Make-in-India” is no less significant. This is in addition to almost $1billion in overseas development assistance to projects in Bengaluru, northeast India and Jharkhand, following on a similar $1billion commitment to metro rail projects in Chennai and Ahmedabad. Taken together, this is beginning to emulate the scale of investment that allowed the Chinese and Southeast Asian economies to take off in the 1980s and 1990s.

Three, the long-awaited agreement for cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy has implications far beyond the bilateral relationship. Japan’s civil nuclear industry, still hurting from the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, is deeply integrated with the industries of other countries, notably the United States. For India to truly access global nuclear markets, a Japanese decision to allow the sale or transfer of civilian nuclear technology, material and fuel was necessary.

Beyond that, Japan’s faith in India’s stewardship of nuclear technology is an emotional issue, it being the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. That was the reason that India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests were a major setback for bilateral relations, so much so that just 15 years ago even the visit of a Japanese prime minister to India was considered ground-breaking. It represents a complete turnaround in relations that Japan is today willing to entrust India with the sale of nuclear material, as a responsible nuclear power outside the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).

If there was one issue that went unfulfilled during Abe’s visit, it was the inability to seal an agreement on the sale or joint production of US-2 aircraft, although the intention to work towards such an agreement in the future was mentioned specifically in the bilateral joint statement. Such an arrangement has been on the cards for two years.

But even that was offset by two important security agreements, one to share defence equipment and technology and the other to facilitate the sharing of classified military information. Additionally, India and Japan agreed to begin talks between the two countries’ air force staffs, thus institutionalising formal contacts between all three branches of the military.

Japan got something quite significant in return: India “welcomed and supported” Japan’s recent legislation to expand the scope of its use of force overseas. This is an important aspect of India’s facilitating Japan’s evolution into a ‘normal’ military power, unencumbered by its constitutional limitations on the use of force.

The latest raft of agreements sealing a closer economic and security partnership between India and Japan builds upon 15 years of work by several governments in both countries. Just as Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Yoshiro Mori helped normalise relations after the Pokhran tests, and Junichiro Koizumi and Manmohan Singh foresaw the strategic potential of the relationship, Abe and Modi have the political capital, economic agendas, and strategic impetus to realise the relationship’s full potential.

Still, much work needs to be done, particularly on the Indian side. Japan has made a strong pledge to help build up India’s economy through technological and financial assistance, in a manner in which few of India’s partners – not even the United States – are currently capable of committing. It is up to India now to leverage that.

If India is to fulfil its economic potential – much as China and Southeast Asia did before it – Japan will be an indispensable partner.

A New Deal

The following article originally appeared in the Times of India on October 2, 2014. 

Modi’s visit to the US has set the stage for a reset of Indo-US ties based on realism

Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States may have been one of the most unusual and remarkable visits abroad by any Indian prime minister. It featured an astonishingly crowded schedule, with at least seven speeches, numerous interactions with smaller groups, and almost two dozen bilateral meetings with US officials, CEOs, and political and civic leaders.

In five days, Modi met not just with almost the entire US political leadership and a who’s who of the American corporate world, but also more unexpected figures, such as Jewish and Sikh community leaders, the director of the National Cancer Institute, and the mayor of New York City.

It was also a visit rich in symbolism. The itinerary featured Modi’s stroll with President Barack Obama around the Martin Luther King Memorial, his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that effectively dehyphenated Israel from Palestine, a darshan at the 9/11 Memorial, and his outreach to the international NGO community at the Global Citizen Festival in New York’s Central Park. All of this marked a dramatic change in India’s official engagement with the US, particularly in terms of tone, style, and imagery.

The New York leg of Modi’s visit, while initially planned around the United Nations General Assembly meeting, was notable for witnessing the coming of age of Indian-American politics. The gaudy and at times over-the-top extravaganza organised in Modi’s honour by the Indian-American community at New York’s legendary Madison Square Garden was a genuine expression of a community that is carving out a unique identity for itself.

‘Born in the USA’ and ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ blared alongside ‘Chak De India’ and ‘Jana Gana Mana.’ The message: being American does not make Indian-Americans any less Indian, nor is their Indian identity at odds with their American patriotism.

Showcasing their dual identity, coupled with the rousing Beatlemania-like reception they gave the prime minister, served a real political purpose, particularly in the presence of one US state governor, four senators, and several members of the House of Representatives. The occasion effectively consolidated a political constituency that can be leveraged to advance Indo-US relations in concrete terms in the years ahead.

The fact that several possible US presidential aspirants – former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, New Jersey governor Chris Christie, and Maryland governor Martin O’Malley – took the time and effort to meet with Modi was a further indication of this changing political dynamic between India and the US.

After all the speeches and meetings – including what was reportedly a candid discussion on campaigns and electoral politics between Modi and Obama – there were the outcomes, some expected, others surprising.

The most eye-catching related to counterterrorism, with specific commitment by India and the US to a joint effort to disrupt and dismantle terrorist and criminal networks such as al-Qaida, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis. This goes well beyond what the US has been publicly willing to commit to in the past.

There was also notable progress in terms of defence ties, including a commitment to renew the 2005 Indo-US defence framework, US cooperation with the Indian national defence university, and an upgrading of the bilateral Malabar naval exercises. There is also a hint that the US might play a bigger role in technology cooperation with the Indian Navy, which could even extend to shipbuilding, a not inconsequential development for securing freedom of navigation and a favourable balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

Other announcements were in line with Modi’s vision for India’s development, which he repeatedly articulated before and during his American sojourn. These included lower barriers for travel (including visas on arrival for US tourists beginning in 2015), joint cooperation on smart cities focussed on Ajmer, Vishakhapatnam, and Allahabad, and $1 billion for financing India’s transition into a low carbon and climate resilient economy.

In a natural continuation of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, the US also agreed to back India’s membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group, which would mark India’s further integration into the global nuclear mainstream.

This is but Modi’s first visit to the US as prime minister, and it is unlikely to be his last. Over the course of his tour, he managed to make India some new friends. He also managed to charm US business, getting at least one major investment management corporation to commit to an investors’ conference in India. With Thatcher-like plain speak, he told the US-India Business Council that the government has no business being in business, clarifying that he saw its role as a facilitator.

But despite all the positive energy, there’s much work yet to be done in order to recreate an environment of genuine collaboration between India and the US, one marked by candour, private disagreement, and sensitivity to one another’s concerns. Nevertheless, as he returns to India, Prime Minister Modi can feel confident that the basis for such a relationship has been set.