The Doklam Standoff – Is it a hyperbole game between
Indian and Chinese media or is the situation really dire? Your take on the
matter.
We should appreciate that this is a live situation, about
which there are still a lot of uncertainties. What can be ascertained is that
there is an ongoing non-violent stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces in
territory disputed between Bhutan and China. This came about because in June,
Chinese forces attempted to extend a road in a manner that altered the status
quo on the ground and threatened Indian security interests. China justifies its
actions by citing an 1890 agreement between the British and Qing Empires. India
justifies its intervention on the grounds that China had previously agreed that
the boundary should follow the watershed, that India and China agreed in 2012
to not determine trijunction points unilaterally, and that New Delhi has
longstanding defence arrangements with Bhutan.
What has been different about this India-China stand-off,
compared to other recent episodes, is not just that this is in a third country,
but the extremely harsh tenor of China’s official response. By contrast, the
Indian media has been relatively muted in its criticism, and barring one press
release and a few public statements by Indian diplomats, the Indian government
has been mostly silent. It is possible that through aggressive threats,
including via the state-run media, China is hoping to enter into a slanging
match with India. If that is the case, the best thing for India to do is to not
become embroiled in one. Not all Chinese threats should be taken at face value,
and while taking necessary precautions it would be a mistake to unduly panic.
The fact is that China finds itself in a very unusual situation, one that it is
not accustomed to: it is unable to get its way in a dispute through political
pressure, threats, or economic leverage without significantly escalating the
situation or discrediting itself. This situation, and how it resolves itself,
should be seen as a test of China’s credentials as a responsible global leader.
From an Aid Taker to Aid Giver – How do you see India’s
journey into Africa and other developing nations competing with China for aid
diplomacy and building strong goodwill with potential partner countries?
India is playing a new, and growing, role as an aid
provider, primarily in its neighbourhood from Afghanistan to Myanmar and south
into the Indian Ocean region, as well as in parts of Africa. I would warn
against viewing this purely as part of a competition with China. Many of these
projects would probably have been implemented even in the absence of Chinese
grants, loans, and lines of credit, although without doubt there is more
urgency now as a result of China’s behaviour. Furthermore, the objective of aid
is not simply goodwill. Indian aid, like that of other countries, is meant to
help a recipient country with public goods through financial, technical, and
technological assistance, in a manner that advances the interests of both donor
and recipient countries.
In India’s immediate region, the focus has been on
fast-tracking connectivity projects, including roads, ports, and other transit
corridors, although many challenges remain, including in cost assessments and
implementation. Ultimately, Indian projects need to be financially viable and
also have to take into account local concerns, such as environmental
considerations. These naturally lead to a lot of delays and cost overruns, and
for this reason I would warn against direct comparisons with Chinese
activities. India also has important equities in Afghanistan, where it has
become the fifth largest aid provider. In Africa, Indian projects are more
focused. We should keep in mind that India’s resources are still limited, but
I’d expect a slight acceleration in this realm in the near future.
India’s Soft Power Strategy – Initiatives like the
International Yoga Day are welcome moves to enhance India’s public profile in
the world. In addition to this, how can India sell itself better to the world
to raise awareness about its cultural and historic significance?
I perhaps have a dissenting view on this issue. Soft
power is the power of attraction – the pull factor – that makes other countries
behave in a favourable manner. As such, a soft power strategy is not really
possible, beyond perhaps better amplifying existing realities. That being said,
India is a prime example of a country that benefits from its soft power.
India’s rise is not feared or resisted as much as other countries, in part
because it is a relatively transparent democracy, is status quo oriented, and
it broadly respects international norms and international law. To give some
obvious examples, countries of Southeast Asia actively seek greater Indian
involvement despite its rise, while the United States publicly supports India’s
entry into several global institutions. In the past few weeks alone, I have
heard both Australia and Vietnam’s foreign ministers credit India with
respecting an international ruling on its maritime dispute with Bangladesh.
That is soft power.
Culture is certainly an important component, but the
successful spread of Indian culture, whether yoga or Bollywood or Buddhism, has
largely come despite Indian government efforts, not because of them. Attempting
a soft power strategy along the lines of China – creating Confucius Institutes
and the like – may thus be both a poor use of resources and counterproductive.
This is not to say that International Yoga Day or other forms of cultural
diplomacy are without merit – they can help to identify a cultural attribute
with a country. But rather than trying to bureaucratise something that has been
organically successful, perhaps the focus should be only on narrative shaping
and leveraging India’s attractiveness for the nation’s benefit.
Working with Neigbours – India seems to be in a difficult
position with respect to its immediate neighbourhood. Is it a trust deficit or
a long term game of competing for significance in the region with China?
Every country, especially a big one, has difficulties
with its neighbours. So does India. But there is also a propensity on the part
of many Indian commentators to overstate the differences. Consider that India
has an open border with Nepal and that Nepali citizens serve in the Indian
army, or that India has a special diplomatic and defence relationship with
Bhutan. With Bangladesh, India has settled its longstanding boundary disputes.
India has been intimately involved in the repatriation of refugees following
the Sri Lankan civil war, and has in recent months been a first responder to
natural disasters in both Sri Lanka and the Maldives. At this juncture, in
particular, India is fortunate to have good relationships with the current
leaders of Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. With Myanmar, India has managed to
preserve relatively good relations with the previous regime and the new
democratic dispensation, even if the tangible outcomes have been a bit
disappointing.
This is not to say that these neighbours enjoy
problem-free relationships with India. But compared to – say – China or Russia,
India has not done badly. The challenge now lies in two areas. One, there are
political constituencies in all of India’s neighbours that derive legitimacy or
popularity from anti-India rhetoric and actions. This has always been the case:
after all, in the past India had to deal with the likes of Ziaur Rehman, R.
Premadasa, and King Gyanendra. The fact that there are overlapping ethnicities
across borders further blurs the line between the domestic politics of India
and many of its neighbours. The second challenge is that these countries are
now willing to fall back on Chinese support when Indian assistance has not been
forthcoming, sometimes in a manner that threatens to undermine India’s
security. For this reason, India has to be watchful. India has tried to address
these shortcoming by prioritising diplomacy with its neighbours, become more
forthcoming in aid and disaster assistance, prioritising connectivity, and
reclaiming a leadership role in regional integration.
The regional outlier is, of course, Pakistan. The
Pakistan military has a longstanding policy of supporting terrorist groups
against India, and Islamabad has also not been responsive to efforts to
normalize economic and trade relations with India. Compelling Pakistan to alter
its position is a major challenge, without any easy answers because India has
few levers of influence. The analogy is imperfect, but we face some of the same
problems that South Korea, Japan, and the United States face with North Korea,
in that we are attempting to engage a nuclear-powered, revisionist country
where a small elite benefits domestically from perpetuating a siege mentality
and provoking periodic crises with a more powerful neighbour. Engagement with
Pakistan will be made harder for India because it is contingent upon several
factors, not least the fluid situation in Afghanistan, domestic political
dynamics in both countries, and increasingly, the role that China plays in Pakistan’s
economic and political trajectory. I fear none of these trends currently point
in a positive direction. As a result, in the short term, India will simply have
to manage the Pakistan problem rather than try to resolve it.
Energy Diplomacy – As a country dependent on heavy
imports of energy supplies, how can we develop priority based strategic
partnership with energy rich nations in Gulf and Central Asia, with immense
potential for Gas in Central Asia?
India is among the major economies that is most dependent
on oil and gas imports for its energy, but it is pursuing ambitious plans to
diversify its energy portfolio. This is taking a few forms. One is a major
focus on renewables, particularly solar and wind. Even if India misses its
ambitious deadlines over the next five years, there is no question that solar
and wind energy will be a bigger part of the Indian energy mix, with positive
implications for energy security. Additionally, India is also diversifying its
sources of fossil fuel imports, importing more from such places as Nigeria and
Angola.
Nonetheless, for the near future, security in the Gulf
will matter, not just for oil and gas, but also for the large Indian diaspora
and various security considerations. For their part, several Gulf economies –
notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – have started planning also
for a post-oil future. A big change over the past few years, and one that has
surprised me as well, is the growing cooperation on security matters between
India and the Gulf Arab monarchies. We shouldn’t expect a dramatic change in
their position, but – for example – their criticism of Pakistan after the Uri
attacks last year is part of a gradual change in their approach to India and
Indian concerns. The visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to India this year
for Republic Day, and the joint statement that followed, clearly emphasised the
security component of the relationship. At the same time, India’s interests
will require it to continue balancing between the various actors in West Asia,
including the GCC, Iran, and Israel.