The standoff between Chinese and Indian forces near the
trijunction with Bhutan is a live, and sensitive, issue for all three
countries. It has also given rise to considerable misinformation. The facts of
the matter are that on June 16, Chinese forces attempted to extend a road
southwards in territory that China disputes with Bhutan, immediately adjacent
to India. This extension traversed a narrow gap between an Indian military
outpost in Sikkim and a steep gorge in the disputed territory. Confronted by a
Royal Bhutan Army patrol, the Chinese construction party attempted to push
forward, involving Indian forces stationed only a few hundred meters away. On
June 20, Bhutan protested officially to the Chinese government. An unarmed
military standoff between Chinese and Indian forces has since continued.
The legal and diplomatic basis for China’s actions is
flimsy. It rests on Beijing’s claim that the China-Bhutan boundary lies about
two kilometers south of the site of the stand-off. As supporting documentation,
China cites the 1890 Tibet-Sikkim Convention between the British and Qing
Empires. But Beijing conveniently overlooks the fact that the same document
states that the boundary “shall be the crest of the mountain range separating
the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters
flowing into the Thibetan Machu and northwards” or about four kilometers north
of the stand-off’s location. Second, Beijing ignores the fact that Bhutan was
not party to the 1890 arrangement. Third, China has violated written agreements
with Bhutan from 1988 and 1998 to “maintain status quo on the boundary as
before March 1959,” and “refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force,
to change the status quo on the boundary.” Fourth, China has also violated an
agreement with India from 2012 that “tri-junction boundary points between
India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the
concerned countries.” Fifth, Indian forces have not crossed a settled
international boundary, as has been widely reported. In fact, both sides in
2012 agreed only on the “basis of alignment” and China had also previously
indicated that the boundary with Sikkim was not entirely settled. Finally,
China ignores India’s longstanding defence arrangements with Bhutan, including
the two countries’ 2007 treaty. The last three facts mean that, far from being
solely a bilateral China-Bhutan issue, India very much has a stake in the
matter.
To date, analysts can only speculate about the motives
for China’s action and its subsequent response. But what is clear is that it
sets a poor precedent for Chinese leadership. Not only is Beijing attempting to
ride roughshod over prior written agreements with two neighbors, it has
proceeded to heighten belligerent rhetoric rather than try to create space for
a mutually acceptable diplomatic solution. A peaceful resolution could yet be
found, but Beijing should not underestimate the extent to which this episode
undermines its bona fides—certainly in India, but also elsewhere.