The following article originally appeared in the Lowy Interpreter on January 21, 2019.
At the Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship geopolitical
conference held last week in New Delhi, Australia’s high-level presence was
noticeable. Foreign Minister Marise Payne led the delegation from Canberra and
was accompanied by Chief of Defence Force General Angus Campbell. Campbell’s
appearance on a panel with four-star admirals from India, the United States,
Japan, and France was certainly a symbolic highlight. But of greater
substantive interest was Payne’s articulation of an Indian Ocean approach for
Australia.
As usual, China offered the backdrop. In the session that
immediately followed Payne’s address, India’s Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba
succinctly described China’s naval modernisation and growing presence in the
Indian Ocean: "Since 2008, there has been a permanent presence of the
Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean region in the form of an anti-piracy escort
force. The 31st anti-piracy escort force is presently in the Gulf of Aden. So
at any given time there are 6 to 8 Chinese navy ships in the northern part of
the Indian Ocean. Also, two years ago they commissioned their first overseas
facility, or base, in Djibouti.
"The stated aim of this deployment is to protect
their trade, which is flowing through this area, from piracy. That included
deployed submarines for anti-piracy operations, which is the most unlikely
platform to be used for this role. There is no doubt they are spending a huge
sum of money in developing their military capability. They are modernising
their forces, they are modernizing the command structure. And in my opinion, no
navy has grown so rapidly in the last 200 years as the Chinese navy. They’ve
added 80 new ships in the last five years. So the Chinese navy is a force, and
it is a force which is here to stay."
In her remarks, Payne clarified that “none of us want to
see confrontation become the dominant shaper of US-China relations,” but argued
that “the peaceful and open character of the (Indian) ocean is a vital national
interest for Australia.” She reminded her audience that Australia has a long
Indian Ocean coastline, boasts a large Exclusive Economic Zone, and bears
responsibility for the Ocean’s largest Search and Rescue Zone. She noted that
Australia possessed territory closer to New Delhi than to Canberra and had
major oil and gas reserves off its north-west shore. “Few Australians would
consciously be aware of this,” she said, “but more than half of all of
Australia’s exports depart from Indian Ocean ports.” The minister also
highlighted steps Australia was undertaking to secure the Indian Ocean. These
included Australia’s largest annual naval deployment, Indo-Pacific Endeavour;
its bilateral naval exercise with India (AUSINDEX); continuing military
rotations in the northwest Indian Ocean and Middle East; cooperation in
response to natural disasters; and future military investments in Western
Australia.
The mainstay of Payne’s remarks, however, was the articulation
of a four-pronged Australian approach to the Indian Ocean. Chief among these
was a closer partnership with India. “We welcome India’s leadership in the
Indian Ocean,” she said. She argued that the two countries held similar
worldviews as “free, open, and independent democracies” that respect
international law, support an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, and believe that
“might is not right.” India’s success, she said, is a reminder “of the merits
of democracy, of the rule of law, of a strong private sector and an
increasingly open market economy.”
A second element involved building stronger regional
institutions and norms. This included Australia’s continued support for the
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOR) and its Jakarta Concord of 2017. While name-checking
cooperation among the Quad (Australia, India, the United States, and Japan),
the minister also echoed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for nations
to support ASEAN centrality. The two approaches, she argued, were not
contradictory: “Our view is that mini-lateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean
region can complement the region’s architecture.”
Third, she argued that India needed to support countries’
resilience to withstand coercion, mirroring similar Australian initiatives to
its east. These include a $2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing
Facility and the development of regional peacekeeping and disaster
infrastructure in Fiji.
Finally, Payne argued for policies to promote economic
growth and market liberalisation. A major focus of these efforts, she said,
would be India and South Asia. She reiterated support for the India Economic
Strategy commissioned by the Australian government and also announced a new
South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity (SARIC) initiative, a $25
million, four-year programme focused on improving transportation and energy
infrastructure.
Taken together, Payne made a strong case to both an
international and domestic audience for Australia having important equities in
the Indian Ocean region. While the totality of Australia’s military and
institutional involvement appeared impressive, and the direction clear and
concise, expectations could yet increase for Canberra on the economic front.
There’s only one hitch: to a considerable degree, the direction and priority of
Australia’s Indian Ocean policy will depend on the outcome of this year’s
federal election. New Delhi, for one, will hope Payne’s successor can only
build further upon her remarks at Raisina.