The following article originally appeared in The Hindustan Times on February 15, 2019.
What are we to make of the rapidly shifting situation in
Afghanistan? The country’s welfare has direct security implications for India:
We are approaching 20 years since the hijacking of IC 814 to Kandahar. But
Afghanistan’s future is so difficult to anticipate because a multitude of
internal and external variables are at play.
First, consider the domestic security situation. Attacks
in Kabul are still frequent. Several Indian citizens, many engaged in
development assistance, have lost their lives, including in the recent Kabul
bomb blast of January 14. Parts of the country that were once deemed relatively
peaceful — including central Afghan provinces such as Bamiyan — now feature
periodic Taliban assaults, including devastating attacks against Afghan
security forces.
Second, Afghanistan’s political situation is in
considerable disarray. Parliamentary elections were repeatedly postponed, and
their execution was hardly seamless. The field in this year’s presidential
elections has become incredibly crowded, with former interior minister Hanif
Atmar emerging as the most significant challenger to incumbent Ashraf Ghani.
Third, the Taliban too is divided and has been since
Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed on Pakistani soil by the United States (US) in
a 2016 drone strike, although the return of Mullah Baradar may prove
significant. Still, the Haqqani Network is not represented in leadership
council meetings. The arrival of the Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan has
added further complications, with some using this development to justify
accommodating the Taliban.
Fourth, peace talks between the US and the Taliban are
underway, with a parallel Moscow process also ongoing. The Taliban talks are
still at a very preliminary stage, despite bold announcements of breakthroughs.
The possibility of a ceasefire has been mooted, but the Taliban wants
assurances, including the release of prisoners currently in US custody. While
Donald Trump has made the withdrawal of US forces a priority, the American
security establishment has reason to slow it down, raising the prospect of a withdrawal
in name only.
Fifth, Pakistan is unable to take full advantage of a
situation that it once deemed desirable. Some of it is due to its own
pacification efforts in its northwest, initially conducted under pressure,
while some of it can be explained by Pakistan’s relative international
isolation, economic weaknesses, and internal political divisions. But it is
also increasingly clear, as following the Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s
and after 9/11, that a firm resolution in Afghanistan was never the preferred
outcome for Pakistan’s security establishment.
Sixth, China’s role has been thrown into sharper relief.
Beijing had previously been uncertain about its own objectives when it engaged
in a quadrilateral dialogue with Afghanistan, the US, and Pakistan at the
latter’s insistence. But it is now considering a presence in Afghanistan’s
Wakhan Corridor to stem Islamist infiltration into Xinjiang.
Seventh, Russia has adjusted its position vis-à-vis the
Taliban. Romantic notions of India recreating old alliances are no longer
particularly realistic, as the fault lines have changed significantly since the
1990s. Moscow’s motivations include taking advantage of a US pressure point.
So where does all this leave India? Not in a good place.
India has staked out two positions in Afghanistan after 2001. One is as the
most stringently anti-Taliban external actor, a position that some observers
have criticised as hopelessly unrealistic. But not only has this bought India
credibility with virtually all major parties within Kabul, it has also placed
India in a position to grant legitimacy, as when former warlord and
Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar agreed a peace deal in 2016. Former
Indian diplomat Amar Sinha recently clarified India’s position on the issue of
Taliban talks, and subtly warned against undercutting Kabul.
Additionally, India has continued to be involved in
state-building efforts, which remain poorly appreciated even within India. It
has been among the largest providers of aid to Afghanistan since 2001,
developed significant electricity and healthcare infrastructure, built the
country’s parliament, and trained large numbers of students, security
personnel, and administrators. Being at the vanguard of Afghanistan’s air
freight corridor programme, India has become the largest destination of
high-value Afghan exports. At the same time, Indian efforts at developing the
Iranian port of Chabahar represents a long-term investment in bolstering
Afghanistan’s commercial links.
India’s state-building efforts have won it widespread
goodwill among the Afghan population. But its ongoing political and assistance
efforts will remain subject to the security situation and it has ruled out the
possibility of military boots on the ground. India therefore finds itself with
many carrots and few sticks. But as security deteriorates, politics becomes
more unstable, and external actors alter their approaches, some creative ways
to secure Indian interests in Afghanistan will have to be contemplated.