We need a quality revolution in public policy decision-making

The following article, co-authored with Rahul Tongia, originally appeared in Mint on May 30, 2019. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.

As a second Narendra Modi government takes office, the demands it will face to deploy its renewed political capital will be immense. In every area of policy priority—from education and financial inclusion, to health and infrastructure, and energy and defence—an impatient electorate will expect it to deliver. But every policy challenge must necessarily confront trade-offs, even before further complications arise from bureaucratic or party politics.

There’s a popular adage in the tech world: “Cheaper, faster, better. Pick any two." This applies widely to Indian policy, a field where it sometimes assumes the form of a variant: “Cheaper, more, better. Pick any two."

Given India’s human development imperatives, the natural policy impulse has usually been to rush towards providing healthcare, energy access, infrastructure and education on a vast scale. Most evaluations of policy have focused on input measures: How much of a certain public good can be built, deployed, or delivered? Recent examples include the opening of bank accounts as part of Jan Dhan Yojana or household electrification. How such bank accounts are being used or how consistent the supply of electricity on a new connection is, are understandably not the immediate priority.

Moreover, given historical resource scarcity, a second Indian government priority has been to focus on achieving its objectives cheaply. In public tender issuing and procurement—which dictates a lot of public service delivery in India—this has manifested itself in a rigid focus on the lowest-cost bids, known as L1. Together, the emphasis on “more" and “cheaper" has almost always meant that “better" has been sacrificed.

But India has changed. In many policy fields, the challenge of “more" is now being addressed: school enrolment is near full potential, there is surplus power generation supply, housing is readily available but remains vacant, allocated capital budgets for defence are not spent in their entirety, and agricultural yields in certain crops have exceeded demand (resulting in drops in prices and farmer distress). The question of limited financial resources, while still a constraint, is less relevant today, in part due to better tax revenue collection, a natural consequence of the goods and services tax (GST) and digitization. The India of 2019 is no longer as resource-starved it was in the 1970s or 1960s.

26/11 anniversary: Clock hasn’t turned back in terror fight

The following article originally appeared in Mint on 26 November 2018, on the tenth anniversary of the Mumbai attacks.

The 26/11 attack was a watershed moment. It was not the most lethal incident of terrorism in India, or even in Mumbai, which experienced more fatalities in 1993 blasts and the train bombings of 2006. But 26/11 stood out for receiving unprecedented media coverage. The targets were high-profile. Victims from 17 countries lost their lives. These factors had several important consequences.

Firstly, it placed Pakistan at the epicentre of international terrorism. Not only were the perpetrators from Pakistan, but the role of Lashkar-e-Taiba was firmly established, as were links to handlers in ISI. After 26/11, it was not only India crying hoarse about Pakistan’s state support for terrorism. Further developments, including the Haqqani Network’s attacks on Kabul and the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, underscored the role played by Pakistan’s security services in fomenting acts of global terrorism.

Secondly, 26/11 resulted in unprecedented international cooperation for India on counter-terrorism. The role of FBI and others in the investigation opened room for bilateral and multilateral cooperation from which India continues to benefit.

Thirdly, the nature of terror attacks against India changed significantly. The years before 2008 witnessed routine terror attacks against civilians in Indian urban centres. After 2008, with a few prominent exceptions, terrorists began to focus more on security installations, such as in Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Uri, that were less likely to invite international opprobrium.

If these changes were decisive, there were other developments that were less so, such as the institutional reform of India’s intelligence apparatus. While P. Chidambaram, who became home minister after 26/11, outlined an ambitious programme to overhaul the internal security apparatus, many efforts became mired in issues such as centre-state relations. While India’s counter-terrorism capabilities have improved, 26/11 arguably did not result in the wholesale security reforms that had been expected.

The legacy of 26/11 is, therefore, significant. Even though the one surviving perpetrator Ajmal Kasab, was tried, convicted and executed, several key planners remain active in Pakistan. With the passage of time, other developments in Indian security, India-Pakistan relations, and the global environment have threatened to overshadow the events of November 2008. But for global perceptions of Pakistan’s support for terrorism, India’s transnational security cooperation, and the nature of terrorism in India, the clock has not turned back.

Moving Forward on Defence and Security

The following article, co-authored with Tanvi Madan, originally appeared in Mint on June 20, 2017. The full text is available here. 

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets US President Donald Trump for the first time, the focus will be on establishing a good rapport between the two leaders. There remain concerns that their two governments’ objectives are not compatible: that Trump’s “America First” approach, which conceives of US interests in narrow, transactional terms, will be at odds with Modi’s agenda to transform India. But one area of natural convergence is in the defence and security realm.

...Modi’s forthcoming visit is, therefore, a chance to boost security cooperation, understand each other’s strategic priorities, and build constituencies for the bilateral relationship in both countries. While greater clarity on issues such as China will facilitate cooperation, uncertainty can impede these efforts. There will continue to be differences, and these too should be addressed candidly. India will also need to follow up words with actions, and promises with performance. But on security and strategic matters, India has a good story to tell. Modi’s visit provides an opportunity to highlight for Trump the value of an India that is willing to buy American military equipment, play a greater burden-sharing role, enhance dialogue on regional security, and work more seamlessly with the US military to meet common objectives.

Passing the Baton

The following article originally appeared in Mint on January 20, 2017.

With Donald Trump taking over as US President from Barack Obama, what legacy does he inherit? How could the change in administration in Washington affect India, directly or indirectly?

Bilateral Issues

Immigration: Trump campaigned on anti-immigration sentiment, but sometimes tried to make an exception for high-skilled immigration, which includes the H-1B visa programme that benefits Indian IT professionals. There is also considerable hostility to H-1Bs in the US Congress, among both Republicans and Democrats. On the other hand, Indian companies and Silicon Valley will continue to lobby in favour of the programme at the current level. We might see a moderate scaling back of high-skilled immigration under Trump.

Investment: Trump’s ‘America First’ economic approach, which has included using social media to call out major US multinationals that were planning on taking manufacturing abroad, will conflict directly with Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign. We may see some companies becoming reluctant to move operations overseas, particularly manufacturing. But several multinationals, particularly in services, have already made plans to expand their Indian operations significantly. We can expect this to become a sore point, but not necessarily an unmanageable one.

Defence trade: This is an area that has seen a significant expansion over the past few years. While defence technology transfers may become more difficult, or at least a lower priority with the departure of secretary of defence Ashton Carter, the new administration should have no problem with India buying American arms off the shelf. While potentially useful in some areas, this will complicate India’s quest for defence technological self-sufficiency.

Regional issues

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Afghanistan received surprisingly little attention during Trump’s campaign and his Pakistan policy remains somewhat uncertain. While Trump and his advisors have promised to take a tougher approach to terrorism and have been critical of Pakistan’s double-dealing, the amount of attention and resources they would be willing to devote to the continuing Afghan War is uncertain.

China: Trump has promised a more confrontational diplomatic and military approach to China, while scaling back economic involvement in the region, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership that excluded both China and India. These steps will not be wholly unwelcome in New Delhi, but an unmanageable military or economic conflict between Beijing and Washington would benefit no one, and certainly not India.

The Indian Ocean: The Indian Ocean is becoming more contested, and while the US does have a permanent presence, there remain opportunities for India to play a bigger role. If India is able to sell itself as a country willing to share the burden of maritime security, that should resonate well with the new White House, just as it did with the old one.

Iran: The Iran nuclear agreement was one of Obama’s biggest breakthroughs, and one New Delhi welcomed. It enabled the lifting of international sanctions against Tehran, allowing India to access Iran’s energy resources and resume its investments in the Chabahar port project.

While Trump has spoken of walking back on the Iran deal, it is unlikely to make much of a difference for India. Other actors—notably Europe—will probably not follow suit in imposing sanctions on Iran if Tehran has not violated the deal. This would alleviate pressure on India to follow suit.

Global affairs

Climate Change: In contrast with the Obama administration, climate change is unlikely to be a high American priority under Trump. But a decrease in government-to-government cooperation does not necessarily prevent India from securing cooperation and technology transfers from the US private sector on renewables.

Terrorism: Trump has talked tough on terror. One of the biggest developments in India-US relations since the 2008 Mumbai attacks has been deeper counter-terrorism cooperation. We can expect this to continue, and intensify.

Global governance: Multilateral affairs and changes to global governance, whether at the UN or non-proliferation regimes, are unlikely to be high priorities under Trump. India had a window of opportunity to gain membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group at the tail end of the Obama years, but it will now have to wait a few years more.

Donald Trump’s team and its India policy

The following article originally appeared in Mint on January 10, 2017.

It’s a parlour game played in many capitals around the world: Who is to get what senior position in government? And what can the backgrounds and viewpoints of those appointed tell us about changes in policy? Nowhere is this more relevant than during a presidential transition in the US, a massive undertaking in which more than 2,000 senior government positions and many more subordinate ones change hands. The economic and military importance of the US naturally increases global interest and speculation about those elected or selected to senior leadership positions.

Indian interest in US president-elect Donald Trump and his team is therefore natural. India-US ties are never problem-free even at the best of times, but the US is nonetheless India’s most important global partner. Ever since Trump’s election to the presidency in November, US officials have been at pains to emphasize the bipartisan nature of recent American engagement with India, implying that individuals will matter little to the overall trajectory of bilateral relations. This is only partly true. If Trump’s election has shown one thing, it is that personalities matter.

The first one to consider will be Trump himself: He famously stated last year that on foreign policy he is his own top advisor. He has already shown himself to be unpredictable, voicing his views on social media without necessarily indicating whether these are reflective of his administration’s policies. He is also evidently a man of strong likes and dislikes. Thus, his initial interactions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and their personal dynamic will be very important for the short-term relationship with India.

A second individual who matters is Mike Pence, who could very well turn out to be one of the most powerful vice-presidents in American history. Pence has already met with Indian officials following his election and in 2008 voted in favour of the India-US civilian nuclear agreement while a member of the House of Representatives. All this suggests that he is generally positively disposed to the relationship with India.

Trump’s expected national security advisor, retired lieutenant-general Mike Flynn, comes from an intelligence background, much like his Indian counterpart. While Flynn has made waves for his inflammatory rhetoric, there are hints of a natural meeting of minds with Indian officials. In his book The Field Of Fight: How We Can Win The Global War Against Radical Islam And Its Allies, Flynn critically details Pakistani perfidy on terrorism, an issue about which he had first-hand knowledge as head of intelligence for US forces in Afghanistan and later as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The likely nominee for secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, is among the biggest surprises among Trump’s cabinet picks. Tillerson, till recently the head of energy giant ExxonMobil, forged his reputation on a successful deal with Russia’s state-owned Rosneft for the Sakhalin-I oil and gas project. India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd bought a 20% stake in the project, although not without some delays and complications. Tillerson has a good reputation as a manager, but how much sway he will have on policy at the top levels is uncertain.

Then there is James Mattis, a legendary Marine commander and highly respected scholar-warrior, who is expected to be Trump’s secretary of defence. Mattis’ background has involved working in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and overseeing the US Central Command, which covers Afghanistan and Pakistan but not India. As such, his exposure to Indian views has been limited. Compared to the outgoing Ashton Carter, Mattis is less likely to play a guiding role in India policy. But among other things, he will have to get up to speed on the maritime dynamics of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, where India is uniquely positioned to play a burden-sharing role.

Finally, Peter Navarro, an economist, is expected to help manage trade policy in the Trump administration. Navarro is the author of the book Death By China: Confronting The Dragon—A Global Call To Action, which describes the threat to US economic primacy posed by China. In this context, India—as an investor in the US economy and a net importer of goods from the US—is well placed to advocate an enhanced and balanced economic partnership.

Although no one—not even senior members of the US government—has a clear idea of the directions policy will take under Trump, we can already get glimpses of positives, negatives, and uncertainties from India’s point of view. On the positive side, an expected thawing of US relations with Russia under Trump and the likely withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership will be welcomed in New Delhi. We can also expect counter-terrorism cooperation to increase. By contrast, Trump’s public criticism of overseas investments by US corporations will conflict with Modi’s campaign to attract US companies to “Make In India”, while the new administration’s anti-immigration rhetoric—including on H-1B visas—could hurt Indian information technology companies.

The uncertainties for India will concern four broad areas. One will involve the nature of US-China relations. India could leverage a more competitive relationship to its benefit, in terms of commercial opportunities and military technologies. But equally, a return to a notion of realms of influence or the exploration of a modus vivendi between Washington and Beijing could put India at a disadvantage. A second area of uncertainty concerns Afghanistan and Pakistan. Will Trump’s generals be persuaded, initially, by Rawalpindi? Or will a strong counter-terrorism instinct prevail? Third, can win-win economic and trade solutions be found in an increasingly protectionist political environment? And finally, what approach will the Trump administration take on multilateral affairs and global governance?

Whatever the outcomes, there will be growing pains, and those taking over at the helm of US government will have to be familiarized with Indian views on a wide range of issues, including on terrorism, trade, immigration, and military technologies. Like any new administration, it will take time to get settled. But in each area, and with each personality, there are clear opportunities for India to seize.