2+ 2 Delay Does Not Mean India-US Ties Are In Trouble

The following article originally appeared on NDTV.com on 29 June 2018.

The postponement, for the second time, of the first '2+2 Dialogue' involving the foreign and defence ministers of India and the United States is being projected by some as a setback in India-US strategic relations. The previous postponement related to the absence of a US Secretary of State following the firing of Rex Tillerson. The latest reason is the unavailability of his successor Mike Pompeo due to North Korea-related travel. While disappointing for India, and indicative of US political priorities at the moment, citing this as evidence of a reversal or setback in India-US security relations is short-sighted.

It is remarkable to consider how much the India-US strategic and security relationship has evolved over the past quarter century. A visit by the Indian Air Force chief to Washington in 1995 and a 1997 trip by the US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to India were ground-breaking at the time. After India's 1998 nuclear test, the US led the imposition of strong sanctions on India, suspending all defence sales, lines of credit, international financial institution loans, visas for Indian scientists, and non-critical aid. Even after the repair in ties between 1999 and 2005, India had justifiable reservations about US intentions, including its continued relationship with and dependence on Pakistan.

Today, the India-US security partnership encompasses a large variety of activities, from information sharing and joint exercises to defence sales and emerging industrial cooperation. Even after Donald Trump's election, developments in security relations over the past 18 months have surpassed expectations in several areas. The first is in terms of bilateral engagement. In 2017 not only did Trump meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and agree to a joint statement that reflected many Indian concerns, but cabinet-level officials - Secretary of Defence James Mattis, Tillerson, and National Security Adviser HR McMaster (the latter two no longer in office) - all made their way to New Delhi. Less noticed, but no less significant, is the almost constant two-way traffic of working level security officials, both from the armed services and among civilian bureaucrats. Not surprisingly, the US National Security Strategy and still-evolving 'free and open Indo-Pacific' strategy reflect considerable alignment with Indian positions on key issues. And while purely symbolic, the emphasis on the Indian Ocean inherent in the renaming of "US Pacific Command" to "Indo-Pacific Command" is evident.

Second, cooperation and coordination involving third countries has also increased. India-US-Japan conversations have been upgraded to the ministerial level. A working-level quadrilateral dialogue has been resurrected, and has now met twice. A new trilateral infrastructure working group involving India, the US, and Japan has also been established. India, US and Afghan officials converse more today than they did a few years ago. Country-specific coordination in third countries has increased, as in Sri Lanka. Differences on Pakistan have also been moderated, including by a sharp decline in US aid to Pakistan.

Third, a host of bilateral security agreements have been advanced in recent years. A logistics supply agreement - which had been under negotiation for a decade - was finally concluded, as was an agreement to facilitate helicopter operations. While not yet finalised, negotiations towards an agreement to facilitate secure communications are underway.

Fourth, there has been some movement on arms sales and defence industrial cooperation, although important roadblocks remain at both ends. The US recently approved the sale of additional attack helicopters to India, and the possibility of the sale of armed drones has been broached. The manufacturing of defence components in India by US companies is already underway with Hyderabad emerging as a nascent hub as India slowly integrates into global defence supply chains.

Fifth, military exercises have continued apace between the two countries' armies, air forces, and navies, and are increasing in complexity. India recently participated in the United States' multilateral RIMPAC exercise and tri-service amphibious exercises are now on the horizon with the U. armed forces. The only precedent for the latter is a tri-service exercise that India conducted last year with Russia.

Despite this convergence, which has only accelerated in the past few years, India-U. defence relations have been the subject of constant criticism, a combination of unrealistic expectations and doubt. Sceptics in both India and the United States regularly raise the canard about a budding alliance. India has been consistently clear that an alliance is not the objective of improved India-US military cooperation. This is not out of any fidelity to non-alignment, but rather a well-grounded belief that alliances are constraining, politically unrealistic, and somewhat anachronistic in today's world. However, a much deeper defence partnership that facilitates information exchanges, interoperability, and capacity building efforts is certainly feasible, and arguably necessary given India's daunting strategic challenges. Many in Washington - accustomed to formal alliance structures - struggle to comprehend this, although that too is gradually changing. Meanwhile, inflated expectations coexist with criticism in both countries by those who are against the very idea of India-US defence cooperation on political or ideological grounds.

Certainly, India and the United States will continue to have their differences. The US Congress has imposed tough sanctions against countries engaging economically with Russia, despite reluctance by the White House and concerns by the Pentagon and State Department about its impact on ties with India. While the wiggle room afforded the executive branch in pending US legislation remains to be seen, the imposition of sanctions would definitely harm defence relations with India, which has made it clear that it will continue major arms purchases from Russia. Similarly, the unilateral US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal risks American sanctions on Indian entities engaged in commerce with Iran, a move that will particularly affect India's energy sector. An escalating trade war between the United States and China has already begun to affect India, which has retaliated by giving notification of increased tariffs on select imports from the US In all three cases, from Washington's standpoint, India is a secondary target to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. Nonetheless, it is natural that India should adopt a tough negotiating position with Washington in a bid to resolve these differences in its favour. Barring severe escalations in these three areas, which are still possible if they are not carefully negotiated in the coming weeks and months, such differences will not fundamentally alter the broad trajectory of India-US defence relations.

China Miscalculated How To Handle India, Allowed Face-Saving Exit

The following article originally appeared on August 29, 2017 on NDTV.com. 

To the considerable relief of all parties involved, India and China agreed yesterday to end a 74-day stand-off by their security forces near the trijunction with Bhutan. India initiated the announcement with a short statement that simply said that an "expeditious disengagement of border personnel...has been agreed to and is ongoing." China confirmed that India had withdrawn border personnel. Its spokesperson added that Beijing would "continue to exercise its sovereignty and uphold its territorial integrity" and reportedly that its forces "will continue to patrol in Doklam region." Beijing acknowledged that "adjustments" would be made on the ground.

A lot was left unsaid, and deliberately so. China did not say that its own troops had fallen back or that it was calling off the road building activities in the disputed territory that had provoked the stand-off. Equally - and more importantly - Chinese officials did not confirm that road building would continue or deny a disengagement of forces. Affairs had been choreographed so that both sides could claim victory. China was satisfied with Indian forces withdrawing to their prior positions to the west. But India accomplished its objective of ensuring that China would cease road building to its south.

The Doklam situation has provoked a host of commentary, much of it ill-informed, in part due to uncertainty and initially vague reports about its exact location, the competing legal claims made by China, Bhutan, and India, and the extraordinarily harsh rhetoric by China's officials and state media leading to concerns about escalation. But three questions remain. Why did the situation come about? Why did it end? And what might be the long-term consequences?

The exact reasons and timing for China's actions which precipitated the impasse on June 16 may never be known. Construction activities meant to strengthen China's position in disputed territory have become a common practice, including in the South China Sea. It is also now clear that China's leaders miscalculated, and did not anticipate an Indian intervention as their forces pushed forward in territory disputed with Bhutan. Speculative theories that China intended to teach a lesson to India - including possibly for its boycott of the Belt and Road Initiative - do not withstand scrutiny, given that events unfolded at a site where India had natural advantages.

The reasons for the stand-off's conclusion are easier to fathom. China had attempted to threaten and cajole India through public messages, mocking videos, and travel advisories intended to limit Chinese tourists from traveling to India. None of that worked. Indian forces were also better positioned on the ground, with more robust supply lines than their Chinese counterparts. The forthcoming BRICS Summit in the south-eastern Chinese city of Xiamen risked being overshadowed. It would have been awkward and embarrassing for China to welcome an Indian prime minister as a guest even as Indian forces were present in (what Beijing believes to be) Chinese territory. Finally, the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was looming, and an unresolved stand-off with India risked having domestic political ramifications. For these reasons, it was in Beijing's interest to ensure an early resolution to the stand-off, assuming a face-saving formula could be found.

What are the consequences? In the near future, it heralds a return to some possible normalcy in India-China relations. The two sides demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric, a peaceful and diplomatic solution could be found. But the long-term implications will be more uncertain. India has shown considerable resolve, not just in an effort to protect its own security interests but those of its neighbours. China, meanwhile, has done considerable damage to its reputation in India, less by precipitating the problem, and more by its poor handling of the situation. Whether on the border or beyond - in other domains, including regional security, multilateral affairs, or economic and trade relations - it would not be surprising if New Delhi was to approach its relations with Beijing with greater wariness. Particularly following its behaviour on the South China Sea, it would be natural for India not to trust Chinese promises on the disputed frontier, but to continue to remain vigilant.

If the Chinese state has hurt its reputation, so has the press, which did not acquit itself very well over the course of the past two months. The Chinese media resorted to ugly taunts and uglier threats. The Indian media, while more tepid, was often speculative and sometimes wildly misleading. Both the Indian and the international media were particularly insensitive in their portrayal of Bhutan, whose government proved admirably level-headed in what was an extraordinarily delicate and occasionally tense situation. But even the resolution of the impasse produced confident interpretations by journalists who lacked both immediate information and broader context.

Doklam shows that a military confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers can be resolved diplomatically, and without escalation. But for China's leadership there is perhaps a need for introspection about why it let relations with India deteriorate so sharply for no material gain.

On China, Modi Won Unexpected Support From Trump

The following article originally appeared on NDTV on June 28, 2017. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.

But amid all the surprises and continuity, the pomp and personal rapport, two takeaways really stand out from this meeting. One concerns India-U.S. convergence in the Indo-Pacific. This really was the headline from the visit, and underscored the central strategic rationale for the bilateral relationship. While not using the same language, perhaps too closely associated now with the Barack Obama administration, the meeting reflected an effective continuation of the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, which was agreed in January 2015. The latest statement encompasses common principles concerning the freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. Indian Ocean security - whether U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium or the centrality of the Malabar naval exercises - features prominently. The U.S. offer to sell Sea Guardian unarmed drones could mark a major contribution to India's ability to monitor the Indian Ocean, just as India's earlier acquisition of P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft proved a game-changer.

But what really stands out in the joint statement is a passage on regional economic connectivity. It outlines a set of principles, specifically that such connectivity should be based on "the transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment." These principles closely reflect India's prior statement of May 13 concerning its refusal to participate in the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. Some Indian commentators felt that India was being "isolated" when it opted to boycott the Forum, a major diplomatic initiative of the Chinese government. But the U.S. endorsement of principles first articulated by India, coupled with similar concerns described separately by the EuropeanUnion and Japan, has put India in the unusual position of being a normative leader when it comes to regional connectivity, an increasingly important arena of international competition. The challenge, moving forward, is how India can further articulate, promote, and enforce such norms in its extended neighbourhood and beyond.

Can Trump Really Value A Strong, Independent India?

The following article originally appeared on NDTV on 15 February 2017. The full text can be found here. 

The US capital is a strange place these days. The District of Columbia's coffee shops are running a brisk business, attending to a steady stream of ex-Obama administration officials and patient federal government employees awaiting policy direction from on high. Many members of the Republican policy firmament appear alienated, some bitterly so. Eyeballs are glued to cable news and (especially) to Twitter, curious about where @realDonaldTrump will next train its gunsights. Meanwhile, the White House appears riven by infighting, with considerable speculation as to who might follow National Security Advisor Michael Flynn as the administration's next fall guy. Hidden monsters lurk everywhere in this upside-down world.

At the same time, US diplomacy is beginning to assume a semblance of normalcy. Rex Tillerson's arrival at the US Department of State has begun to raise morale among American diplomats. President Donald Trump's reception of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also gone well, injecting a certain predictability and stability to the United States' Asia policy.

But what about India? For over a decade, the approach of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations to India was informed by a certain logic. The underlying principle of their engagement was - to use Ashley Tellis's words - that "a strong, democratic, (even if perpetually) independent India [is] in American national interest." To be sure, not everyone in either administration bought into that notion wholeheartedly. In fact, many did so reluctantly, leading to periodic complaints by American officials about India not being more "cooperative" on certain matters such as Iran, trade, or climate change. Successive Indian governments wisely resisted a subordinate position to the United States on some of these key matters of Indian interest, knowing in part that they could afford to do so.

But there is no indication yet that Trump fully appreciates the value of a strong but independent India for preserving America's place in the world. Certainly, the logic of facilitating India's rise because its very strength advances American strategic interests seems fundamentally incompatible with the narrowest Trumpian conceptions of "America First." Unless that changes, we will see its effects play out on Indo-U.S. relations in a number of ways: on trade, immigration, investment, capacity building, and technology transfers (including, but not limited to, defence).

India must therefore prepare for a more transactional approach to the United States over the short term, while continuing to extol the virtues of a stronger India for American interests. Both are possible. In the short run, deeper thought must be given as to what India can put on the table. There are some easy answers: questions of market access, existing Indian investment in the United States, and - when necessary for Indian defence requirements - arms purchases. But more creative thinking may yet be required along these lines.

This is doubly so because Washington's transactional attitude will likely extend to two areas where there appears - at first glance - to be greater convergence between Washington and New Delhi. On international terrorism, India will likely find a stronger, more visceral response from the new White House, but will soon have to confront issues of differing means and priorities. The US will focus on the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (and what specifically India can bring to that fight), as well as Iran (which could affect India's own equities with Tehran). For India, of course, the focus is closer to home, on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A second area that may appear ripe for closer convergence between New Delhi and Washington, but could be beset by practical complications, is in preserving a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. In some issues that matter most to India, such as improving regional connectivity, the United States is incapable of playing a much larger role. On defence technology transfers, India will have to tread more carefully under the new administration. Other aspects of security cooperation - including military exercises and dialogue - are more promising. But even they will lead to questions of timing, signalling, and proportionality, where Washington and New Delhi are liable to disagree.

The various overlapping political situations involving Washington - individual personalities, national dynamics, and international developments - are all still fluid. But while continuing to advocate India's traditional positions, New Delhi will need a Plan B for a more transactional America. In these times, we must always be prepared for stranger things.

What Trump's TPP Withdrawal Means For India

The following article originally appeared in NDTV on January 24, 2017. 

In one of his first acts upon assuming office, Donald Trump signed a presidential memorandum confirming the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This move did not come as a surprise. As a presidential candidate, Trump had vociferously campaigned against what he described as bad or unfair trade agreements that the United States had signed onto, claiming that they had led to the loss of American jobs. Among his targets of criticism were the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 and the United States accepting China into the World Trade Organisation in 2001. But Trump had reserved particular opprobrium for TPP, which was successfully agreed only last February and was awaiting ratification.

TPP is a weighty and complex agreement negotiated painstakingly by 12 countries: the United States, Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Chile in the Americas, and Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific. Together, they comprise almost 40 percent of the world's gross domestic product. The rationale for many negotiating members was to re-engage the United States as a trading partner and - by collectively raising standards - balance what were sometimes one-sided trade relationships with China. A TPP minus America, even if that were possible (ratification by the United States was necessary for its entry into force), makes it far less attractive for most members.

There are several common misconceptions about TPP. One is that it is simply a trade agreement, when it is actually much more than that. Not only does TPP slash tariffs, it contains anti-corruption measures, intellectual property obligations, human rights and child labour conditions, and environmental commitments. As a result, neither India nor China would have been ready to sign on. Comparisons that are often drawn in India with the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) - which includes China and India, but excludes the United States - are not entirely apt. Countries that are party to both negotiations - Japan, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, and New Zealand - do not see one as a replacement for the other.

A second misconception is that TPP is directed against China and India. This is only partly true. Officials from TPP countries would often reiterate that China and India were hypothetically welcome to join TPP at a later stage, as long as they met its conditions, knowing full well that this could not happen in the short-term, if ever. China's entry would offset many of its comparative advantages, while India's would probably have required (among other things) a much higher stage of development. While TPP is anti-China only in that it made the United States and Japan much more competitive with fellow members, it was anti-India only in that it reflected a frustration with New Delhi's obduracy on trade negotiations at the WTO. While many in New Delhi portrayed TPP as a punitive measure, India's exclusion was, at most, collateral damage.

That said, both China and India would have been disadvantaged by TPP's entry into force, although not significantly. According to projections made in a working paper by the Petersen Institute for International Economics, the impact of TPP for both China ($9-20 billion) and India ($2-6 billion) would have been about 0.1% of GDP by 2030. South Korea and Thailand, by contrast, would have been much more significantly affected, by as much as 0.4% and 0.8% of GDP, respectively.

A third misconception, and one that Trump exploited, is that TPP would lead to a loss of U.S. jobs. The rationale Trump has given for withdrawing from TPP is that it disadvantaged American industry, workers, and wages, and that he believes in dealing "directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (bilateral) basis in negotiating future trade deals."

This is not entirely convincing. American industry has disagreed with Trump's assessment, calling TPP  "America's best chance to ensure the United States isn't stuck on the outside - looking in - as Asia-Pacific nations pursue new trade accords among themselves." Moreover, according to the Petersen Institute study, TPP would have led to only a 0.1% increase in U.S. labour market churn and added 9% to U.S. exports by 2030. But rather than try to sell the economic benefits in a less-than-conducive American political environment, the administration of Barack Obama tried to project it as a national security imperative, with  U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter saying that "passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier." Trump's advisors argued, convincingly, that TPP did nothing to curb China's assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific.

It is hard to see who exactly benefits from the United States' withdrawal from TPP. Certainly, U.S. industry and other TPP members will be disappointed. Indeed, this could be seen as a massive self-goal for the United States. Trump's decision has already been criticized by some American political leaders, including fellow members of the Republican Party. Trump will gain credibility with some of his base by actually fulfilling one of his more contentious campaign promises, but that base is weak to begin with, and unless there are tangible gains in manufacturing jobs (due to other factors), the electoral impact is likely to be negligible.

Nor will China or India derive significant benefits from the demise of TPP, other than a short-term respite. The urgency to complete RCEP will now diminish, and it is possible that greater complacency will set in regarding the need to rethink trade in a more protectionist global environment. TPP - while no boon for India - offered the best hope for a more openly competitive international trade order from which India, with its competitive wages and underutilized potential, still has possibly the most to gain. This sentiment was echoed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi only last week. "Walls within nations, a sentiment against trade and migration, and rising parochial and protectionist attitudes across the globe are...in stark evidence," he said. "The result: globalization gains are at risk and economic gains are no longer easy to come by." All in all, Trump's withdrawal from TPP will likely be remembered as a significant step in the slide towards a more protectionist world.