Recalibrating the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

The following article appeared as a GMF 'Transatlantic Take' on March 1, 2012, and was reproduced on RealClearWorld as 'A New Strategy for the U.S. in Afghanistan' on March 2, 2012.

The protests in Afghanistan over the burning of copies of the Quran confiscated from detainees at Bagram Airfield have led to more than two dozen deaths, and have severely — perhaps even permanently — undermined the United States’ determined efforts to win hearts and minds in the country. The killing of NATO troops by members of Afghanistan’s security forces, or militants in their uniforms, is a dangerous new trend, and one that severely complicates relations between international security forces and their local hosts. It may now be time to consider new strategies by which to achieve U.S. and Western goals in Afghanistan.

Ever since the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001 in retaliation for the 9-11 attacks, the Western alliance in Afghanistan had two broad objectives: to defeat al-Qaeda, and to establish a viable non-Taliban alternative government to ensure that neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban resumed their prior positions. These objectives remain the foundation for the United States’ base lines for engagement with its adversaries: renouncing violence, breaking ties to al-Qaeda, and accepting the Afghan constitution.

In recent years, the United States has largely pursued a classical counterinsurgency strategy, similar to that employed in the later stages of the Iraq War. This has involved a focus on population security, capacity building, and the eventual transfer of authority to the local government and security forces. The military and civilian surges, efforts to accelerate the recruitment and training of Afghan security forces, and the reintegration of the Taliban, were all essential elements of this strategy.

But Afghanistan has been beset by at least three major challenges that distinguish it from Iraq. First, the Afghan leadership under President Hamid Karzai has as yet failed to establish itself as an effective and popularly mandated government, and it remains unable to provide adequate governance and security on its own. Moreover, given the endemic corruption, the absence of political reform, and the feeble state of the Afghan security forces, there is little hope for meaningful improvements soon. By contrast, at a similar stage in its conflict in 2007 and 2008, Iraq had held successful national legislative elections, thus ensuring that established political parties represented every sectarian group in its legislature and that the government could exercise its authority over a larger proportion of the population. But without the promise of improved governance, Kabul’s demands for greater development assistance and a long-term security guarantee from the United States are beginning to look like a moral hazard. Karzai’s increasing recklessness may well be based on the conviction that his government is too important for the West to let fail.

Second, an intransigent Pakistan military continues to play the role of spoiler, providing safe havens and other forms of support to various Taliban factions that target Afghan and Western interests in the country, including the particularly aggressive Haqqani Network. Yet the United States’ ability to respond to Pakistani transgressions is limited by the leverage Pakistan exercises as a conduit for essential supplies to Afghanistan, as a provider of occasional intelligence, and as a possessor of nuclear weapons.

Lastly, the United States’ has been ambiguous about its own intentions, as evidenced by a rather arbitrary deadline for concluding combat operations, and public vacillating over its strategic goals in the region. This enables various actors in South Asia to cherry-pick from a variety of official U.S. statements to justify their own agendas or reinforce preconceived notions.

The United States and its allies must now consider whether their strategic objectives — which are no less important today than they were on September 12, 2001 — can be achieved with a lighter military presence, possibly one relegated to bases in Bagram and Jalalabad, and some of Afghanistan’s more stable northern and western provinces. This can only be seriously contemplated if there is certainty that violence will decrease, if relations with local stakeholders improve, and if the Afghan government and security forces behave more responsibly. At the same time, a lighter footprint may help address the challenges presented by inadequate Afghan governance, Pakistan’s leverage and duplicity, and the United States’ own strategic ambiguity by forcing Kabul to become more self-reliant, freeing NATO from its dependence on Pakistan for supplies, and reducing uncertainty about the United States’ long-term strategy. Such a strategy should not be misconstrued as withdrawal or abandonment, which is what the United States’ partners fear and its adversaries hope for. In fact, it will be a means of sustaining and prolonging the West’s presence in the region. At the same time, the only viable way forward in Afghanistan may require taking better advantage of the United States’ inherent strengths in dealing with an asymmetric threat: intelligence gathering, special operations, and drone capabilities.

For Pakistan, the West Remains a Scapegoat

The following article appeared originally as a GMF Transatlantic Take on October 6, 2010. It was also reproduced on October 7 in Today's Zaman and on RealClearWorld ('For Pakistan, the West Is a Scapegoat') and on October 11 on Boulevard Exterieur ('L'Occident reste un bouc emissaire').

WASHINGTON -- In recent days, the world’s attention has turned once again to the terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan. Last week, the American and British governments issued heightened travel alerts for continental Europe following revelations of an extremist plot hatched in Waziristan. The operationalization of this plot, which reportedly involved coordinated raids on European cities in the vein of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, resulted in a dramatic increase in U.S. drone strikes in northwestern Pakistan over the past month. On Monday, one such attack killed several German militants training in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Also last week, a cross-border strike by NATO forces resulted in three Pakistani military deaths and the subsequent closure by Pakistan of vital supply routes to Afghanistan. This was followed by multiple militant raids on depots in Pakistan and the destruction of fuel and other supplies intended for NATO forces. And on Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal reported the presence of a critical White House assessment that bluntly accused Pakistan of being unwilling to take action against militants on its soil.

The centrality of Pakistan has long been acknowledged by members of the counterterrorism community in the West. But Pakistan’s approach to the festering terror threat at home -- alternatively defensive and lackadaisical -- has, due to the incapability or unwillingness of its government and security forces to take further action, ultimately been ineffective. For several reasons, the international community has demonstrated a high level of tolerance for Pakistan’s apparent ambivalence. As underscored by the recent standoff, the United States and NATO remain dependent on Pakistan as a conduit for supplies to Afghanistan. The United States also lacks an adequate intelligence infrastructure in northwestern Pakistan and consequently relies on Pakistani agencies for their support. Additionally, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons -- and the risks they pose both in terms of proliferation and escalation -- further limit the leverage of the United States and its partners.

The dominant Pakistani narrative is colored by several claims: that Western interests in South Asia are short-term and fickle, that Pakistan is limited in its capacity to act due to the threat to its east posed by India, and that the U.S. and NATO military presence in its region is fundamentally destabilizing. That these assessments are often based on selective facts, disavowals of responsibility, and conspiracy theories suggest a state in deep denial about the many problems it faces. It behooves the West to refute such views and instead advance the wider international community’s assessment of the problems afflicting the region.

First, the West must make clear that it has a long-term interest in the region due to the nexus of challenges present there, from terrorism and WMD proliferation to political instability and energy security. Despite the announced July 2011 withdrawal date from Afghanistan, the United States underscored its commitment to Pakistan by agreeing last year to a long-term program of development aid.

For its part, India, appreciative of the potentially destabilizing consequences of assertiveness on its part, has to persevere with its admirable restraint in the face of acts of terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil with the connivance of elements of the Pakistani security community. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has risked domestic political support in his effort to forge a lasting peace with Pakistan, even though these efforts have been repeatedly undermined by the Pakistani foreign minister. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, developed at considerable cost to the country, ought to be another source of security, but is rarely considered in discussions of the perceived Indian threat. The extent of Pakistani paranoia was made evident in a 56-page dossier presented to the United States by Pakistan in April, a dossier that contained a litany of unproven accusations against India.

Finally, the West’s objective of a stable, pluralistic, and democratic Afghanistan at peace with itself and in its region must come to be shared by members of the Pakistani ruling elite, many of whom blame the United States and NATO for pushing militancy eastward and view the Karzai government in Kabul as inherently pro-Indian and anti-Pakistani. The United States’ drone strikes, while much-maligned and used by Pakistani leaders and opinion-shapers to perpetuate anti-American sentiments, are in fact privately welcomed by the Pakistani leadership, with some reports even indicating active Pakistani collusion in drone operations. While by no means an adequate replacement for a counterinsurgency strategy, the strikes have been successful in decapitating the leadership of Pakistan-based terror groups, including groups bent on destabilizing Pakistan. As long as a full counterinsurgency campaign remains an unrealistic possibility, the drone strikes will continue to be employed out of necessity.

The exploitation of the United States’ supposed vacillation and India’s alleged belligerence against Pakistan, as well as popular outrage against the military endeavors of the United States and NATO, however justified, suggest a consistent strategy of Pakistani scapegoating that is unlikely to diminish despite the best efforts at the United States and its partners. U.S. officials have vented in private about the reluctance of Pakistani leaders to shape public opinion in the United States’ favor. Rather than continue with a regional policy held hostage to Pakistan’s whims, the United States and the West should consider alternatives that draw an end to its long-running charade. A necessary step may yet be a finely calibrated and targeted package of incentives and sanctions, for it seems that nothing less than such drastic coercive measures can align Pakistan’s objectives with the West’s, to the benefit of the long-suffering Pakistani people and regional and global security.

In Talks, U.S. Meets Three Chinas

The following article, originally released as a GMF Transatlantic Take, also appeared on the GMF blog ('Lone Swordsman, Lumbering Simian, Confident Manufacturer') on May 28 and on RealClearWorld ('In Talks, the U.S. Meets Three Chinas') on May 29.

BEIJING—The 798 Art District, a trendy artists’ neighborhood on Beijing’s outskirts, far removed from the resplendence of the Great Wall and Forbidden City, offers visitors some curious insights into contemporary China. In the middle of a central plaza, an installation depicts a lone swordsman defending himself against an encircling pack of large, snarling wolves. Several streets away, the form of a huge vermillion ape appears both sinister and curiously vulnerable as it reflects viewers’ gazes in its stainless-steel eyes. Nearby, in front of a café reminiscent of Paris’ 6th arrondissement, sits a parody of Communist kitsch: two shiny red workers with oversized biceps exult as they raise aloft a giant wad of Chinese banknotes. Imaginative creations and social commentary they may be, but these three pieces are also represent aspects of contemporary Chinese policy on display at this week’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) with the United States.

On social values and freedoms, as well as sensitive issues close to home such as Taiwan and Tibet, Beijing acted very much as the lone swordsman surrounded by wolves. Chinese negotiators were unanimous in emphasizing the dangers of perceived slights to the country’s sovereignty. “To the Chinese people, nothing is more important than safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” President Hu Jintao said in his opening address. The state media was even more explicit, amplifying official Chinese warnings on Taiwan and Tibet.

On the security challenges at the top of the American agenda — Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan and Pakistan — China was the lumbering, ambivalent simian, sidestepping specifics by focusing upon consultative processes. This was, to put it charitably, unhelpful. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have flared once again following U.S. revelations that a South Korean vessel sunk in March was the victim of a North Korean torpedo. Yet China has warned only that actions by South Korea or the United States might further aggravate the crisis, thus setting a poor precedent for any future acts of North Korean aggression.

Moreover, in a move that has garnered far less international attention, China appeared to flaunt its non-proliferation commitments by agreeing to supply Pakistan with two civilian nuclear reactors. Ironically, this move has gone unchallenged by the Obama administration because it is still holding out for greater Chinese support in preventing Iran’s nuclearization. For an administration that has staked its reputation on upholding the global non-proliferation regime, this appears a poor tactical choice.

Only on the economic track did China behave like the confident, muscular manufacturing power that it is, with the Chinese leadership appearing marginally accommodating of U.S. objectives. President Hu, in his opening address, demonstrated a willingness — at least in principle — to increasing domestic spending, balancing trade, and reducing commercial barriers. More significantly, he made explicit mention of reconsidering the renminbi exchange rate “under the principle of independent decision-making, controllability, and gradual progress” — in other words, on China’s own terms.

This watered-down concession proved the only major takeaway for U.S. negotiators. At the dialogue’s close, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner welcomed these developments, including exchange rate evaluation, but China’s Assistant Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao was quick to emphasize that China would “independently decide on the specific steps of its exchange rate reforms, based on its own interests, taking into account world economic conditions and China’s own development trends.” China’s continuing hesitation appears to have been brought about in part by developments in Europe, specifically the recent devaluation of the euro.

For a dialogue that brought together one of the largest collections of senior U.S. officials outside the country, representative of the full range of U.S. government functions, the tangible products of the S&ED were underwhelming: a slew of relatively minor agreements on issues ranging from shale gas to energy security to infectious diseases. The absence of major breakthroughs at a long-planned forum of this stature suggests that the United States should make other efforts to complement its comprehensive engagement with China.

The first would be to explore alternatives. At the top of Washington’s strategic agenda are issues that need not dominate the bilateral relationship with Beijing, but are featured due to a combination of China’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its geographical position. The logic is that China’s presence inside the tent is far more helpful than its potentially counterbalancing role outside. However, this logic, when extended, has led to the undermining of U.S. relations with a host of more willing partners, from Japan, South Korea, and Australia to NATO allies and India. Shoring up these relationships will only strengthen Washington’s engagement with Beijing on the full range of strategic and economic issues on the bilateral agenda.

The second strategy would be to employ multilateral mechanisms that complement the S&ED, something that Washington has done more successfully, particularly on the economic side. Here, the absence of political alternatives to the UN Security Council — effective strategic analogues to the G20 and International Monetary Fund — remains a significant weakness. It may seem paradoxical, but a more fruitful bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing may only be possible if the United States looks elsewhere.