India-Australia’s growing partnership built on military ties and concerns about China’s rise

The following article, an excerpt from a report for the Lowy Institute, was republished by The Print on September 28, 2020. 

After five decades of testy or distant strategic relations, India and Australia began in the early 2000s to forge an increasingly cooperative defence and security partnership. The primary drivers were similar concerns about China’s rise, behaviour, and assertiveness, as well as converging views about the regional strategic landscape.

Today, the bilateral relationship between India and Australia is far broader and more cooperative than it has been at any time in history. India has become Australia’s fifth-largest export destination (up from twelfth at the turn of the century), and Australia is now a top-20 trade partner for India. There is also growing political cooperation, including in multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth, G20, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). For example, in IORA, India and Australia coordinated closely in establishing the secretariat in Mauritius, and in working with Indonesia during its chairmanship of the organisation in 2015–2016. India’s nuclear status is now a non-issue following the mainstreaming of its program, the lifting by Australia of its uranium ban, and the India–Australia civilian nuclear agreement. And people-to-people contacts have widened, with large numbers of Indian tourists, students, and immigrants contributing to Australia’s economy and society.

The Australia–India defence relationship now encompasses almost every major area of military partnership, namely (i) strategic dialogues, coordination, and intelligence exchanges, including those involving third countries; (ii) military exercises involving ground, air, and especially maritime forces that reflect a growing degree of interoperability; (iii) military-to-military exchanges and training; and (iv) defence commerce and technological cooperation. However, all four areas, and especially the last, are at a nascent stage of partnership with considerable room for improvement.

Defence policy planning and dialogues are at the senior-most level, represented by regular meetings of the two countries’ defence ministers, as well as annual meetings of the foreign ministers. Defence policy talks, which “used to be hard going” according to a senior Australian defence official, have become easier. Additionally, the 2+2 dialogue, initiated in 2017 involving the foreign and defence secretaries of the two countries, has subsequently been upgraded to the ministerial level. This mirrors a format that India and Australia have with both the United States and Japan. In terms of military dialogues, staff talks involving all three services take place regularly. A maritime security operations working group has also been established. At a more tactical level, improvements have been made in maritime domain awareness (MDA) following the two countries’ White Shipping Agreement. This has resulted in inputs six times each day into India’s maritime ‘information fusion centre’ tracking merchant vessels.

There is also enthusiasm for greater minilateral cooperation, such as the Australia–India–Japan and Australia–India–Indonesia trilateral dialogues (recently upgraded to a ministerial conversation). These represent what an Australian defence official has described as the region’s “thickening architecture”. India–Australia–Japan trilateral engagement represents the growth of a complementary middle power-led strategic architecture that hedges against US retrenchment from the Indo–Pacific. In September 2020, an India-France-Australia dialogue was also initiated, involving three capable resident maritime states in the Indian Ocean, at the level of foreign secretaries. Both India and Australia also take part jointly, with occasional coordination, in a host of regional and global forums. These include IORA, the G20, and the ASEAN-led groups — the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Newer, issue-based groupings involving both India and Australia have also emerged in 2020, including on 5G telecommunications, artificial intelligence, and supply chain resilience. The latter is an issue on which the governments of India and Australia, along with Japan, have taken a lead.

The Quad has been the subject of significant attention. Having met once in 2007 and several times after being resurrected in 2017, the dialogue was a low-level foreign ministry mechanism that served the purpose of political signalling in the region and was meant to improve coordination among these like-minded states. It was later elevated to a foreign minister-level engagement, although a proposed defence minister-led quadrilateral dialogue has yet to take place. While India made it clear that it wanted to de-link this dialogue from the Malabar naval exercises (nominally a bilateral India–US naval exercise to which Japan is a permanent invitee), Australia has made repeated requests to participate in Malabar as an observer. While Indian concerns related primarily to efforts at strengthening two parallel initiatives — the quadrilateral dialogue among the foreign ministries and the Malabar naval exercise — growing signs of Australia’s commitment have increased the prospect of a return to quadrilateral naval exercises in the near future. In the meantime, the Quad has formed the basis for other avenues of official consultation, especially following the global coronavirus pandemic. These have included a foreign secretary-level dialogue involving the United States, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam (as chair of ASEAN) and a ministerial conversation involving the United States, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, and Israel.

Enhanced military engagement

Beyond consultations and institutional collaboration, military exercises and engagements have proliferated. Overall, by the reckoning of the Australian government, there has been an increase from 11 defence exercises, meetings, and activities in 2014 to 29 in 2017, and 38 in 2018. Naval engagement has been the most advanced, as is to be expected. The main bilateral exercise, AUSINDEX, was held every two years between 2015 and 2019. The 2019 edition of the exercise was particularly significant, representing a great degree of complexity and Australia’s largest ever defence deployment to India. Linked to Australia’s largest naval deployment, Indo–Pacific Endeavour 2019 (IPE 19), the exercise involved four ships, Australian Army forces, and support personnel from all three services, with a total involvement of more than 1000 Australian personnel. The ships visited Chennai and Visakhapatnam and included both Indian and Australian P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, as well as submarines from the two countries in sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises. Of additional significance was the fact that US military personnel were observers in this exercise.

While AUSINDEX remains the mainstay of naval engagement, other efforts have been complementary. The Royal Australian Navy has been a regular participant (initially as an observer) in the Milan exercises since the early 2000s, including in the 2018 edition off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In 2018, for the first time, the Indian Navy took part in Australia’s multilateral Kakadu exercise in Darwin. And the same year, India took part as an observer in a submarine rescue exercise Black Carillon off Western Australia. Both countries have also been involved in third country-led exercises, notably the United States’ Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium Multilateral Sea Exercise (WMSX) in the Singapore Strait and South China Sea. Australia’s involvement in allied operations in the Middle East and counter-piracy operations in the western Indian Ocean as part of Combined Task Force 150 have also provided opportunities for engagement with India, including regular port visits.

While not at the same frequency of contact, air force engagement has also increased. A major threshold was crossed with the Indian Air Force’s first involvement as a full participant (rather than an observer) in the Pitch Black exercise in Darwin in 2018. A multilateral exercise involving air forces from several Australian ally and partner countries, India deployed four Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters, a C-17 heavy transport, and a C-130 tactical transport aircraft. The exercise was additionally significant for staging the first mid-air refuelling of an Indian combat aircraft (Su-30MKI) by an Australian aircraft (KC-30A), revealing a much greater degree of coordination than had been demonstrated previously. Beyond exercises, subject matter expert exchanges involving flight controllers and safety and security have also taken place.

Army-to-army engagement is perhaps the least developed between the two countries. In 2017 and 2018, the second and third editions of AUSTRA HIND, a Special Forces exercise, were held. Additionally, efforts at countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) involving the two armies was jointly organised in India in 2018. The possibility of desert warfare exercises, as well as Indian participation in a longstanding Australian jungle warfare school, have also been proposed.

Going beyond exercises

Exercises are not the only reflection of interoperability, and a number of agreements have been finalised to improve the ability of the two militaries to work together. This began with an agreement on the protection of classified information. A mutual logistics supply agreement (MLSA) — a “high priority” according to Australian officials — was postponed due to changes in ministerial positions but eventually concluded in 2020 during the virtual summit between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Scott John Morrison. The agreement facilitates opportunities for both militaries to resupply each other, potentially extending their operational reach. A secure communications agreement would represent the next logical step in bilateral security cooperation, particularly following the conclusion of a similar agreement between India and the United States.

Military-to-military contacts have also increased. Senior Australian military officers take part in the year-long course at the National Defence College in New Delhi, as well as at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) in Tamil Nadu, and the Indian Navy’s National Institute of Hydrography. The number of Indian participants in the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra has been increased from two to three, along with an Indian student at the Australian Defence College in Canberra. Australia’s National Security College has also made a concerted bid to attract Indian public servants for courses. Cadet exchanges have become more routine.

The two militaries also benefit from a growing number of shared platforms, increasing the opportunities for joint training and interoperability. These include C-17 strategic transport aircraft, C-130 tactical aircraft, P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters. Australian armed services have also provided classified briefings to the Indian military of potential future platforms, such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.

Defence industrial cooperation — an area that India prioritises given its own equipment requirements — offers limited potential. A Joint Working Group on Defence Research and Materiel Cooperation meeting between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) met in 2018. Among other issues, India has expressed interest in certain Australian defence products, including the Bushmaster and Hawkei armoured mobility vehicles, maritime training simulators, mobile health stations, and water purifiers. Australia also has considerable expertise in radar and undersea technologies. The acquisition of diesel submarines from France by both India and Australia offers some opportunities for long-term technical collaboration between the three countries in that domain.

A new survey reveals what India’s strategic community thinks about Pakistan, China and US

The following article originally appeared in The Print on March 8, 2019.

It is commonplace for foreign officials, journalists, and academics to visit India for a few days, meet with a handful of Indian policymakers, and try to derive from these conversations a sense of Indian views on contemporary international affairs. The end result is often impressionistic, and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Indian commentators are often guilty of the same phenomenon, frequently projecting an imagined Indian consensus around a certain issue when one may not exist.

In the Survey of India’s Strategic Community, undertaken in December last year, 127 members of India’s strategic community – ranging from current and former politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, military officers, and spies to members of the media, scholarly and business communities – anonymously answered questions related to India’s relations with the United States, China, Pakistan, Russia, and West Asia, as well as strategic challenges and policy priorities.

The results reflected some clear areas of consensus. Domestically, respondents perceived inequality and lack of opportunity (42 per cent) and the absence of education, skills, and employment (29 per cent) to be India’s biggest challenges. These economic issues overshadowed matters of governance and security, such as sectarianism and identity politics (11 per cent), law and justice (6 per cent), and separatism and insurgencies (3 per cent). Addressing these economic challenges, it was believed, would require sourcing investment and financing (31 per cent), technology (29 per cent) and education and skills (11 per cent) from abroad.

Externally, China’s assertiveness (54 per cent) was widely seen as the biggest challenge facing India, ahead of cyber and new military technologies (14 per cent), economic protectionism (12 per cent), and state-backed terrorism from Pakistan (11 per cent). The boundary dispute and China’s ties with Pakistan were perceived to be the main causes of difference between New Delhi and Beijing, rather than trade and economic ties. Seventy-three per cent believed that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) constituted a major security challenge for India, while 63 per cent worried about Chinese investment in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. However, relatively few Indians believed that China would dominate the world (6 per cent) by 2035 and only 5 per cent thought that India would next use overseas military force in a limited conflict with China.

A third major conclusion to draw, is that the United States was widely seen as India’s most important partner on global issues (75 per cent), well ahead of Russia (12 per cent), Japan (6 per cent), China (2 per cent), and France (2 per cent). While a majority believed that India should remain equidistant between the United States and China in the event of greater competition between the two, a large minority (43 per cent) said that India should collaborate more closely with the United States and only 2 per cent thought India should work more closely with China in those circumstances. The US relations with Pakistan (31 per cent) and trade disputes (31 per cent) were believed to be the primary obstacles to better Indian relations with Washington.

Finally, the Indo-Pacific (74 per cent) – with an emphasis on the maritime domain, and collaboration with the United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Australia – was seen as the best definition of India’s extended region, over the Asia-Pacific (17 per cent), Asia (8 per cent), and Eurasia (1 per cent). This is reinforced by the fact that 74 per cent saw Southeast Asia as a very important region for Indian interests (the highest outside South Asia), and eastward-leaning institutions such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN (73 per cent) and BIMSTEC (61 per cent) featured prominently among institutional priorities. Further consistency could be seen in policy areas, where cross-border connectivity (52 per cent) and naval and maritime capabilities (49 per cent) were perceived to be top priorities.

But despite these areas of broad consensus, there were also important differences reflected in the survey. When asked about whether India should contain or isolate Pakistan’s military, civilian government, and civil society, or engage these actors, opinion was divided. While a majority (87 per cent) favoured engagement with Pakistani civil society, a majority (54 per cent) also favoured containing or isolating the military. Similar differences emerged over West Asia, with large numbers identifying Israel (31 per cent), the UAE (31 per cent), Iran (18 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (13 per cent) as India’s most important partners in the region.

Other differences were apparent. Decision-makers – those who currently or formerly served in politics, the civil services, or the military – tended to be slightly more in favour of military interventionism, containing or isolating Pakistan, seeking technology from abroad over investment, and investing in Indian military rather than diplomatic capabilities. Generational divides also made themselves felt: those over 60 placed a greater emphasis on the United Nations, those between 40 and 60 were more in favour of trade and the partnership with the United States, and those under 40 expressed greater interest in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Overall, the strategic community reflected somewhat similar views to the Indian public, when compared to a 2017 survey that asked questions of average Indians. The public too saw the US as India’s most important partner (53 per cent), followed by Russia, Japan and China. The Indian public was also more supportive of closer collaboration with the United States (48 per cent), but also saw China as less of a challenge, with 14 per cent in favour of greater collaboration with Beijing in the event of great Sino-American competition. And while the questions posed were different, there are suggestions that the Indian public is overwhelmingly more critical of Pakistan than India’s strategic community.

This is just the beginning of an attempt at systematically understanding how the Indian foreign policy and security community perceives developments in international affairs. A wider or more detailed study conducted on an annual basis would provide a more accurate reflection of Indian strategic perspectives, as well as changes over time.

India has been squeezing Pakistan economically even before Pulwama

The following article originally appeared in The Print on February 18, 2019. 

In the aftermath of the Pulwama tragedy – the worst Islamist terror attack in India since 2008 – what can and should India do? In this instance, Pakistan’s role is certain, with its continued support to the Jaish-e-Mohammed to recruit, expand its financial network and training infrastructure. There are a number of kinetic options for retaliation, through military force or covert action, and these are undoubtedly being contemplated. Such retaliation may or may not deter Pakistan from future attacks, but they will certainly be retributive. In the meantime, what are the economic costs that India can bring to bear?

At Friday’s Cabinet Committee on Security meeting, India announced that it would withdraw the Most Favoured Nation trading status, in place since 1996 despite Pakistan’s lack of reciprocity. This imposes high customs duty on Pakistani imports to India and, as a targeted discriminatory economic measure, represents the formalisation of Indian sanctions against Pakistan.

But perhaps, there is little appreciation for how India has been making a sustained effort for many years to isolate Pakistan economically, in a bid to compel it to stop its state support for terrorism. For a variety of reasons – largely due to Pakistan’s own behaviour – these efforts have only recently become effective. But mostly due to the pathologies of Pakistan’s security state, these have not had the effect of compelling Pakistan to overturn its support for terrorism – yet.

Indian attempts at isolating Pakistan date back to the Cold War, even when India had a much weaker hand. In the 1980s, for example, India successfully lobbied the United States to refrain from extending certain military assistance to Pakistan. Efforts at isolating Pakistan continued after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, when India felt the international mood shift against cross-border terrorism.

But as during the early Cold War years and the Afghan War of the 1980s, the post-9/11 climate found Pakistan proving itself useful to the United States and others. India found commiseration, even sympathy, in many international capitals, but its concerns about Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism were ultimately ignored in favour of larger political considerations, namely: paranoia about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, ground lines of communication to Afghanistan, and limited counter-terrorism support that Pakistan provided under duress.

Indian efforts finally began to bear fruit only after 2007-2012. These years saw a number of developments – the Lal Masjid raid in Islamabad at China’s insistence, the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, the Raymond Davis incident, the 2011 Salala skirmish between NATO and Pakistani forces, the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, and the Haqqani Network siege of the US Embassy compound in Kabul – that collectively tarnished Pakistan’s reputation. Subsequently, India was able to include condemnation of Pakistan-based terrorist groups – from Lashkar-e-Taiba to D-Company – in joint statements with foreign leaders. And such steps started having real economic implications, as they filtered into economic, trade, and financial policy.

Last year’s downgrading of Pakistan by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental body that coordinates efforts against money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes – is a good example. Pakistan’s ‘grey listing’ was being pushed by India and the United States, among others, but was being blocked by China. India supported China’s elevation to the Vice Presidency of FATF in exchange for Beijing lifting its hold on Pakistan. This move is not simply a rhetorical rap on the knuckles: it has raised the costs of financial transactions involving Pakistan, with repercussions for its credit rating, stock market, banking sector, and currency inflows.

Another good example is US aid to Pakistan. For many years, the United States provided military and economic support to Pakistan to buy logistic cooperation for the war in Afghanistan, get information about its nuclear programme, and receive occasional counter-terrorism intelligence. In 2009-2010, the US Congress – in a misguided attempt at buying long-term goodwill from the Pakistani people – passed the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act to boost non-military aid over five years.

But sustained efforts to present India’s case to the US lawmakers coupled with growing frustration in Washington meant that such financing was not renewed, in contrast to consistent long-term US aid packages to the likes of Egypt. Total US aid to Pakistan, including military reimbursements, fell from $2.6 billion in 2012 to $345 million in 2018. There were many reasons for this, primarily US anger with Pakistan’s duplicity. But as attested to by the overwhelming support for India from the US Congress, India’s advocacy also played an important role.

If Pakistan believes that none of this will matter because of continued economic assistance from China, it is somewhat mistaken. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – a major prong of China’s Belt and Road Initiative – is certainly underway, with a host of port, road, rail, and power projects. But its economic value is grossly overstated. Chinese officials have privately admitted that they do not expect it to cross $19 billion in total investment, rather than the $60 billion or more pronounced by Pakistan. They also believe that “China’s maximum annual direct investment in Pakistan should be around US$1 billion.” Moreover, these investments are not necessary productive. Many projects have been beset with problems – including imported Chinese labour – and the one area of some success, power generation, has not been accompanied by necessary reforms to make them sustainable. This means that Pakistan will be slammed with debt to China when repayments of these loans are due in the coming few years. By contrast, despite latent security concerns and India’s boycott of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese direct and portfolio investment in India has continued. It may well be that total Chinese investment into Pakistan will only be marginally more, and possibly even less, than total Chinese investment into India.

India is still a long way from economically isolating Pakistan. In addition to Chinese support, financing from the Gulf Arab states is ongoing, and Pakistan continues to derive trading benefits from the European Union and the United States. But India’s efforts, coupled with Pakistan’s own disastrous policies, have already had a major impact on Pakistan’s economy. In 2008, when the 26/11 attacks took place in Mumbai, the per capita GDPs of India ($1049) and Pakistan ($1038) were almost identical in dollar terms. In the decade since, India’s has almost doubled ($2016) while Pakistan’s has grown only by about 50 per cent ($1527) and has been surpassed by Bangladesh ($1736). As another point of comparison, Pakistan’s GDP today ($307 billion) is less than that of Maharashtra, a single Indian state (about $390-$400 billion). The instability of Pakistan’s economic situation is best represented by its paltry foreign exchange reserves – $8 billion – which when combined with its overall debt, put it on the brink of defaulting.

If India’s efforts, combined with growing international frustrations and Pakistan’s misguided policies, have put Pakistan in such an economically precarious situation, why has that not stopped its support for terrorism against India? The answer lies, in large part, with the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army, best captured in American scholar Christine Fair’s book Fighting to the End. After assessing the Pakistan Army’s own literature, Fair argues that the army will see itself victorious as long as it continues to resist a supposedly belligerent India. Its revisionist policies – including cross-border terrorism – will therefore endure even at the cost of weakening the fundamentals of the country, including its economy. “Pakistan will suffer any number of military defeats… but it will not acquiesce to India,” Fair concludes. “This, for the Pakistan Army, is genuine and total defeat.”

Reports of India’s Demise as a Regional Power Are Greatly Exaggerated

The following article originally appeared in The Print on February 20, 2018. 

A great churning appears to be underway within India’s smaller neighbours. In Bangladesh, opposition leader Khaleda Zia has been sentenced to five years in jail for corruption. In Sri Lanka, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s party scored a big victory in local elections. In Nepal, K.P. Oli – who has a difficult history with India – has returned as prime minister. In the Maldives, a state of emergency has been declared by an embattled president Abdulla Yameen. In Bhutan, local elections are around the corner, amid calls from some politicians to decrease the country’s dependence on India.

The Indian press – print, television, and online – has noted these developments and adopted a familiar refrain: India is losing the neighbourhood. It feeds a well-worn narrative, in which China is ascendant and India is surrounded, isolated, and helpless. But if one were to step back just a little, look at longer trends and the stark realities of India’s relationships with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives, the picture looks rather different. The political, economic, and military interdependence between India and its smaller neighbours (not counting Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Myanmar) is far too great, and is in fact deepening. India can certainly do a better job in building consent, trust, and goodwill with these countries. But reports of India’s demise as a regional power are greatly exaggerated.

There are four important points to consider in assessing India’s relations with these neighbours.

One, all are steadily democratising in practice or in spirit, although at different rates and with occasional setbacks. In the long term, this is a positive development. In the short run, this presents new kinds of challenges. Although the King retains significant powers, Bhutan has begun its evolution into a constitutional monarchy. Nepal has gone farther, becoming a republic. Bangladesh has transitioned away from years of military dictatorship to democratic rule, however flawed. And the Maldives had its first glimmer of democracy before Yameen established his stranglehold on power. Even Sri Lanka, which has a longer democratic tradition than the others, managed to end its civil war and a period of politics marked by regular assassinations of opposition leaders. Today, there are new, dissenting voices in all these states.

Two, identity politics is on the rise everywhere. It is only natural, given India’s size and the fact that ethnicities traverse borders, that India would be dragged into the identity politics of its smaller neighbours. Thus, certain political forces in each of the neighbours find utility in anti-India rhetoric and actions, while their political opponents often seek advantage in closer ties with India. Minority groups and dissidents often seek Indian assistance, as recent events in the Maldives have shown. Nationalism and anti-Indianism have been constants over the past seventy years, although the factions have changed over time and the fault lines have sharpened.

Three, many Indian commentators ignore the fact that as sovereign states, these countries have agency, and make decisions in their own self-interest. At times, these choices – whether political or policy – align with Indian preferences. At other times, they do not. India’s ability to determine outcomes, especially political outcomes, will therefore always be limited. Intervention of any kind could easily prove counterproductive. Indeed, some of the same voices in India who lament Indian inaction are just as likely to criticise Indian intervention for being overbearing, hegemonic, and reckless.

Four, there is a tendency to exaggerate China’s footprint in India’s immediate neighbourhood. This is not to say that Chinese influence hasn’t increased—it has. Over the past few years, Beijing has played an unprecedented political role in Nepal. It benefits from strong military ties with Bangladesh dating back decades (Bangladesh is the second-largest recipient of Chinese arms after Pakistan). In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, China has become a major financier, especially of infrastructure, which it has tried to translate into political involvement.

But the idea that India is playing ‘catch up’ to China in these countries or that China is set to replace India as the primary external actor is grossly misleading. China’s military presence remains limited, although the bounds are constantly being tested. Meanwhile, India’s security role is often overlooked, whether the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation Initiative with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and unique arrangements with both Nepal and Bhutan. Although China is a major investor and exporter to these countries (just as it is to India), it does not rank among the top five importers for any of them, whereas India is the recipient of 94 per cent of Bhutanese and 63 per cent of Nepali exports.

A few other realities should be taken into consideration, especially with Nepal and Bhutan. Despite the many differences over the past few years, Nepal still enjoys an open border with India, and over a million (possibly many more) Nepalis work in India without requiring permits. Seven regiments of Nepali citizens – Gorkhas – are part of the Indian Army, and the Indian government still pays pensions to some 127,000 Nepali veterans. These are not functions that China can replicate. The Indian Army also bears considerable responsibility for training and equipping the Royal Bhutan Army, which also coordinates closely with the Indian Air Force. Bhutan is by far the largest recipient of Indian aid, with over Rs 3,700 crore in 2017-2018, or about 57 per cent of India’s total aid. By contrast, Bhutan does not yet maintain official diplomatic relations with China.

While of a different nature, India’s relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives also point to considerable interdependence. In addition to having finally resolved the land boundary dispute with Bangladesh, India is increasingly investing there, with $7.8 billion in approved lines of credit since 2003, equivalent to about one-third of India’s total. Not only has Sri Lanka been the fourth-largest recipient of Indian aid over the past five years (after Bhutan, Nepal, and Afghanistan), but it has become a significant transshipment hub for India. India has provided humanitarian assistance to all five of these countries during disasters, whether Sri Lankan cyclones, Nepali earthquakes, or Maldivian water crises.

Among other significant regional developments over the past several years are agreements for India to help develop Sri Lanka’s railways, a South Asian satellite for communications and meteorology launched last year by India, and increasing electrical grid connectivity with Nepal and Bangladesh.

Will there still be difficulties in India’s relations with its neighbours? Absolutely. India has to overcome a history of interventionism (particularly between 1971 and 1990) and long periods of neglect. But mistaking differences and grievances for enmity is neither accurate nor particularly useful. Today, Maithripala Sirisena, Sheikh Hasina, Oli and Yameen are in power in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives respectively. The first two are very crudely characterised as “pro-India” while the latter two are often described as “anti-India”. The reality is always more nuanced than such caricatures.

It is in this political context, that many Indians have arrived at the conclusion that the neighbourhood is hostile to India. However, should the four be replaced by Rajapaksa, Khaleda Zia, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Mohamed Nasheed, many commentators would likely draw the exact same conclusion, which reveals just how meaningless such assessments are.

A final point. With the possible exception of the United States, which resolved its land disputes with Canada and Mexico in the 1840s and 1850s, no global power has settled its neighbourhood before seeking wider aspirations. None of the European colonial powers did, not even Britain, which saw insurrections in Scotland and Ireland even as it was building a global empire. Nor did the Soviet Union, Japan, or China. Those who believe that India cannot have larger ambitions until every one of its regional differences is resolved would do well to reflect on this history.

India’s traditional refugee policy shows why it’s unlikely to give Rohingyas sanctuary

The following article, co-authored with Tushita Saraf, originally appeared in The Print on September 30, 2017.

The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar has attracted global attention, concern, and condemnation over the past several weeks. India, while being both critical and supportive of the government of Myanmar, has been quick to respond with assistance to displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh.

But the crisis has also raised questions about India’s approach to refugees, specifically the 40,000 Rohingya that have entered the country in recent years. Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju has called them “illegal immigrants” who “stand to be deported,” but he subsequently clarified that there was not yet a plan for their removal. Such attempts might be complicated by a Supreme Court ruling against the deportation of asylum-seekers on the basis of the right to life and personal liberty. Moreover, because many Rohingya are effectively stateless, and not recognized as citizens by Myanmar, their forced repatriation could become problematic.

Although some 200,000 refugees reside in India, the central government lacks a national legal or policy regime concerning refugees. India is also not a signatory to either the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or the 1967 UN Protocol on Refugees. In the absence of international obligations or a national policy, the law that applies to asylum-seekers is the Foreigner’s Act of 1946, which gives the government the power to restrict the movement of non-Indian citizens not just into India but also within the country. The Foreigner’s Act – which defines a foreigner broadly as any person “who is not a citizen of India” – is vague about the differences between temporary residents, tourists, travelers, economic migrants, and refugees.

At present, the Indian government only recognizes about 110,000 Tibetans and 102,000 Sri Lankans as refugees. This may appear arbitrary, but is the product of political considerations. Tibetans who accompanied the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 were allowed to remain as refugees on the grounds that they were fleeing persecution by Chinese forces. They have been provided assistance and protection by the Indian government, and have freedom of movement and access to residence and work permits.

Sri Lankans began migrating to India in 1983 after the outbreak of a civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists. Over 67,000 Sri Lankan refugees remain in Indian camps, and a further 35,000 reside elsewhere in India, although some are in the process of returning. While provided with shelter, food, and allowances in designated camps and access to the informal labor market, their freedom of movement and employment opportunities are limited. Since 2012, India has also granted stay visas or long term visas to both Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees. These have proved more popular with Tibetans, while Sri Lankans have been more liable to opt for voluntary repatriation.

By contrast, groups from Bangladesh and Pakistan have generally been considered economic migrants by the Indian government. For example, the Indian government never formally regarded those fleeing Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971 as refugees, despite providing them with considerable aid and assistance. This may have helped ensure their return following the conclusion of the India-Pakistan War in late 1971 that resulted in Bangladesh’s independence.

India’s ambiguity concerning its refugee policy does confer certain advantages. Specifically, it grants discretionary powers to the government to designate refugees and offer them asylum and other benefits. Creating a national policy or joining an international convention would hold India to certain standards and possibly limit options. India’s ambiguity has also led to its developing a unique relationship with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). India allows the UNHCR to recognize, register, and protect certain groups of people as refugees after evaluating their claims on a case-by-case basis. So, for example, the UNHCR has registered refugees from Myanmar, Afghanistan and Somalia who continue to be treated as “foreign nationals” by the Indian government. More recently, the UNHCR has had to deal with Iraqi and Palestinian applicants seeking to reside in India temporarily, until they can be resettled in third countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia.

An Indian crackdown on illegal immigrants – including Rohingya – is consistent with its traditional hesitation about automatically designating asylum seekers as refugees. Over the years, the Indian government has provided assistance to the likes of Bangladeshis and Afghans fleeing war and persecution, but has created disincentives for them to stay on in India permanently. In the absence of a standard refugee policy, we can expect this approach to continue.