Actualising East: India in a Multipolar Asia

The following paper originally appeared as ISAS Insights No. 412, published by the Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore on 23 May 2017. The full text can be found here. It is adapted from a presentation made at the 11th ISAS International Conference on South Asia on 3 March 2017. 

After years of a ‘Look East’ policy that recognised the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for Indian interests, the Indian government decided to upgrade it rhetorically to ‘Act East’. The objective of the ‘Act East’ policy is to ensure a multipolar Asia, through deeper institutional engagement, land and maritime connectivity, and security partnerships with Southeast and East Asia. While institutional engagement and security cooperation have improved considerably over the past two decades, connectivity remains a work in progress. For New Delhi to ‘Actualise East,’ it will require a rethinking of the country’s China policy in the light of developments there, putting nuts and bolts to improving India’s connectivity with Bangladesh and Southeast Asia, and prioritising Indian Ocean security.

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India doesn't have a lot to lose by boycotting OBOR

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on 21 May 2017. The full text can be found here.

What does India want from the world? It’s quite clear, really: international partnerships to accelerate its domestic development, a stable and conducive periphery, a multi-polar Asia, an end to cross-border terrorism and a sufficient role in global governance to enable it to meet these goals. Today, each of these objectives relates in some way to India’s relations with China.

Until recently, India’s aspirations required it to forge a complex and somewhat contradictory relationship with Beijing. From the early 2000s, India deepened trade and economic relations with its northern neighbour and collaborated with China in creating space for rising powers on global governance – including through the BRICS, the BASIC coalition on climate change and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

At the same time, India took measures to address the military imbalance along its disputed border with China, and kept a wary eye on Beijing’s political and military relations in its neighbourhood, especially its support for Pakistan (which extended to the transfer of nuclear and missile technology).

But things have now changed, and faster than many believed possible. The 2008 financial crisis, the half-heartedness of former US president Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and now Donald Trump’s “America First” policy have accelerated China’s relative rise in the international system. And that rise has been accompanied in China by stronger centralised governance, enduring mercantilism, more assertive territorial revisionism with neighbours and a continued disregard for certain international norms, including on cyber security and freedom of navigation.

For India, China now factors everywhere. A balanced and sustainable economic partnership is still necessary for India’s development. At the same time, China plays a more active economic, political and military role in India’s near abroad and Beijing provides cover for Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism. Under President Xi Jinping, China projects itself as ascendant, leaving little space either in Asia or on the world stage for a rising India, whose transition into a middle-income country will take place over the next two decades.

China’s ascendance is most evidently on display in its plans for One Belt, One Road (OBOR) or the Belt & Road Initiative, the subject of a major summit in Beijing this month. While many of its neighbours sent heads of state or government, or ministerial delegations, India was notably absent. India’s public rationale for its opposition to OBOR has long been that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ran through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and was thus a violation of Indian sovereignty. But New Delhi’s concerns have long run deeper, and extended both to CPEC and to the Maritime Silk Route.

India’s response to OBOR, by necessity, rests on a set of assessments. Is OBOR a commercial project, with viable financing intended to benefit both China and host countries? The evidence for this is weak. Sri Lanka is but the starkest example. Chinese support to its former leader Mahinda Rajapaksa led to the building of white elephant infrastructure projects (including what has been described as “the most underused international airport on the planet”), massive national debt and the translation of that debt into political influence – which in turn had security implications. The gradual development of Chinese military or “dual use” facilities in Djibouti and Gwadar, and the creeping militarisation of the South China Sea, offer clear indications of long-term Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region.

While India’s reservations about OBOR have been hinted at for years, including by the prime minister, China’s public exhortations for Indian participation at the May summit required a clearer articulation of Indian concerns. This came in the form of a statement last week that stressed India’s desire for greater regional connectivity, but laid out specific criteria. Connectivity projects must be financially responsible and not create an “unsustainable debt burden”. Additionally, they must reflect environmental considerations, be based upon a “transparent assessment” of costs, and involve the transfer of skills and technology to ensure their long-term maintenance by local communities. And, of course, they must respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a clear set of normative standards, one that China, recipients of OBOR-linked largesse and other actors — including in Europe, Japan, and the United States — would do well to heed. In fact, EU participants echoed these sentiments by blocking a statement at the Belt and Road Summit on trade, on the grounds that it was not based on “transparency and co-ownership”.

Does India have a lot to lose from boycotting OBOR? Not necessarily. China’s investment into India has risen considerably since 2014. According to Indian government figures, $800 million in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) came into India in just 17 months between April 2014 and September 2015, more than double all previous Chinese FDI to India. This is on a similar scale to estimates of Chinese FDI into Pakistan under CPEC, and is simply indicative of the immense push factor of excess Chinese capital. If it can be invested in India in a manner that meets New Delhi’s stated criteria, it would naturally be mutually beneficial. However, drawing lines upon a map in a unilateral fashion, not just in India, but across Asia and the Indian Ocean region, is a far more sinister matter.

One Belt, One Road will only be a success if it is pursued in a more transparent, status quo-oriented, market-driven and responsible manner. That would be welcome. India has staked out a clear position. Others may arrive at the same conclusions the hard way.

A Long Battle Ahead

The following article originally appeared in The Times of India on 20 May 2017. The full text can be found here.

On May 18, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – the principal judicial arm of the United Nations – ruled on the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, whom Pakistan alleges is an Indian spy. The court unanimously declared that Pakistan must take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Jadhav is not executed, pending a final judgment of the court. What are we to make of this ICJ decision?

First, the matter is far from over. The court simply determined that it had jurisdiction in this case, despite Pakistan’s arguments to the contrary. It also stated that the rights alleged by India were plausible, that there was a clear link with the measures being sought by India, and that the matter was urgent as Jadhav faced a death sentence which – if carried through – could not be reversed.

Second, India’s case concerns Pakistan’s violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, not so much the merits or circumstances of Jadhav’s death sentence. Since his Indian citizenship was not in question, Pakistan should have allowed Jadhav to meet with Indian government representatives. The recent ICJ ruling should thus be seen as a reprieve that buys India time, and has little direct bearing on the overall circumstances of Jadhav’s arrest and sentencing.

The indirect implications are, however, far more significant, as they raise questions about why Pakistan denied Jadhav consular access in the first place. The element of irreparable prejudice and urgency in ICJ proceedings also highlight just how incredibly unusual it is for any country to execute an alleged foreign spy in peacetime, when life imprisonment is usually the harshest sentence. Moreover, the entire episode portrays the rule of law in Pakistan in an incredibly poor light. Questions remain about the circumstances of Jadhav’s arrest and detention (India believes that he was kidnapped from Iran). A video released by Pakistan in which Jadhav appears to admit his guilt is suspicious, and suggests that it was forced or done under duress. And the opacity of the legal process – in a Pakistani military court, no less – that resulted in his death sentence is very disturbing.

Third, we must look upon this as a political victory for India as much as a legal one. ICJ is an international court, and like much international law, the court lacks appropriate enforcement mechanisms. In the past, parties – including the United States – have ignored ICJ rulings concerning the Vienna Convention and executed citizens of other countries, although not for alleged espionage. Yet should Pakistan now ignore ICJ and execute Jadhav, it will clearly be an act of bad faith.

Two other criticisms that have been made in India concerning the decision to go to ICJ should be addressed. First, concerns have been expressed that India might be unnecessarily internationalising relations with Pakistan by taking this case to ICJ. This should not be a major concern. India’s position on ICJ’s jurisdiction is clearly stated, and based on its declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the court as mandatory, which were submitted in 1974. India’s determination, however, was that a matter related to the Vienna Convention overrode its own stated objections to the jurisdiction of the court, specifically that such jurisdiction would not extend to disputes between two current or former Commonwealth members.

Finally, questions have been raised as to whether this was a necessary step, or the best recourse. For this, the answer must be found in ICJ’s statement. Given that this is a death sentence and that the circumstance of Jadhav’s trial and detention are suspect, it was necessary to do everything possible to delay his execution. Going to the ICJ and thus overriding prior concerns about internationalisation was one way of doing so, and given the court’s stay order, has proved successful for that limited purpose.

Overall, the ICJ stay on Jadhav’s execution is a political victory for India, one that casts aspersions on Pakistan’s goodwill and the rule of law in that country. But it should be seen for what it is: the start of what may still be a long and messy process to bring Jadhav home.

Making Sense of Uncertain India-US Relations

The following article originally appeared in the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2017. The full text can be accessed here.

What does the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA mean for India? The short answer is that no one knows, not even Trump himself. India was fortunate not to feature prominently during the heated and divisive 2016 US election season. The occasional statements concerning India by President Trump and his advisors during and after the campaign sent mixed and sometimes contradictory signals. Additionally, the belated appointment of senior officials to key government positions after his inauguration (and the profiles of those currently in place) suggest that some of the bigger questions about US engagement with the rest of the world remain unsettled.

In an era of greater flux and uncertainty, it is nonetheless important for India to identify the key variables triggered by President Trump’s election, and their implications. They relate, essentially, to four broad areas: bilateral relations; the Asian balance of power; terrorism; and global governance.

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Assessing the Islamic State Threat to India

The following article, coauthored with Sara Perlangeli, originally appeared in The Times of India on 6 May 2017. The full text can be accessed here.

The so-called Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, is back in the news in India. Recent reports suggest that Indian IS fighters were killed by US forces in Afghanistan, and the Telangana police has been accused of trying to lure and entrap potential IS sympathisers. This raises the question of how big a challenge IS poses to Indian interests and national security.

To investigate, we assessed all Indian citizens confirmed to have affiliated themselves with IS. This includes those who attempted or succeeded in travelling to Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan as recruits, as well as propagandists, recruiters, funders, conspirators and other sympathisers. While acknowledging that this comprises only a sample of actual IS affiliates in India, a few tentative conclusions can nonetheless be drawn.

First, only 142 Indian citizens (132 named) can be confirmed to have affiliated with IS in some way. This suggests that IS has made only scant inroads in India, relative to Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Australia – let alone West Asia and North Africa. In fact, some of these Indians were radicalised abroad, including in the US, UK, Singapore and Australia.

That said, the numbers of Indians linked to IS has steadily grown. From only one confirmed individual in 2013, the numbers grew to six in 2014, 35 in 2015 and 75 in 2016. The trend may now be plateauing, with 25 in the first four months of 2017. The IS challenge is a serious one, but does not yet appear to be on par with other countries or with other terrorist challenges facing India.

Second, certain states in the south and west appear particularly prone to IS-inspired radicalism. We identified 37 recruits or sympathisers from Kerala, 21 from Telangana, 19 from Maharashtra, 16 from Karnataka, 15 from UP, six from MP, five from Tamil Nadu, four from Gujarat, three each from Uttarakhand and Bengal, two from Jammu & Kashmir, and one each from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and Rajasthan.

The fact that over three-quarters come from just five states suggests that localised responses may be more beneficial than any national policy. Additionally, with the exception of UP, these states represent among the most prosperous and best-networked parts of the country. This is in line with similar trends elsewhere, with more liberal or developed countries (such as Tunisia and Morocco among Arab states, or Australia, the Nordic nations, France and Belgium globally) among the most vulnerable to IS-inspired radicalisation.

Third, India appears to have a relatively good track record of countering the IS threat. 85 of 142 known IS sympathisers from India (60%) have been arrested or interrogated, while two returned home, although successful cases are probably overrepresented. A significant number of those Indians who have been arrested were intercepted at Indian airports, and several were caught in transit before being deported back to India. Of those that were not arrested or apprehended, 11 have been confirmed killed: six in Syria, three in Afghanistan, one in a police encounter in India, and one in either Iraq or Syria. This means at least 43 are active or at large, although many of these have been reported (but not confirmed) killed.

Finally, despite many cases of self-radicalisation, IS often tends to graft onto pre-existing organisations. About one-third of the reported Indian IS sympathisers have affiliations with other groups, including the Indian Mujahideen (IM), Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), or IS-inspired groups such as Junood ul Khalifa fil Hind (JKH). IS radicalisation also tends to spread through family, school or neighbourhood ties, often coalescing into cells, such as Ansarul Khilafa Kerala.

As IS is defeated as a state – a self-proclaimed Caliphate with defined territory and a military – it could very well morph into a global network, akin to al-Qaida. This presents a new kind of challenge for India and the world. Without unnecessarily exaggerating the threat, details available in public about IS recruitment and propaganda can be a valuable way of anticipating its future challenge to India’s national security.