Security Alert: Pakistan's Playbook against India Has Started to Unwind

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times magazine on February 24, 2018. 

On Friday, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued a strong statement on the suicide bombing in Pulwama, which identified Jaish-e-Mohammed as the party claiming responsibility, described the act as unjustified terrorism and reminded states of their obligations under international law to combat terrorism and cooperate with India. The statement fell short of naming Pakistan, reportedly at the insistence of China, a permanent UNSC member. Nonetheless, it reflects a gradual shift in international opinion, and begins to call into question the viability of Pakistan’s traditional approach to competition with India. From 1947 onwards, Pakistan has used a rather consistent game plan.

The first step involves provoking India with unconventional military action while ensuring a degree of plausible deniability. Second, Pakistan projects India as the belligerent actor. And, third, it leverages the results to invite third-party mediation to tip the scales in its favour. The fact that the power disparity between India and Pakistan has increased — first after the bifurcation of Pakistan following the 1971 Bangladesh War and subsequently after the economic rise of India after liberalisation in 1991 — has made Pakistan all the more reliant on this three-step formula.  But with time, the play-book has started to unwind.

Consider the first step: after each major provocation Pakistan has pleaded innocence. In 1947, tribal militia were used to invade Jammu and Kashmir before the Pakistan Army became formally involved. Operation Gibraltar — the August 1965 infiltration of guerrilla forces into J&K to stage an uprising — failed before Operation Grand Slam marked the widening of war. In 1999, Pakistan denied the role of its military in the Kargil incursion until India released a voice recording of Pakistan Army chief General Pervez Musharraf demonstrating his full involvement. While Pakistan denied any role in the 1993 Mumbai bombings, the 2001 Parliament attack, and the 26/11 attacks in 2008, the prime perpetrators — Dawood Ibrahim, Masood Azhar, and Hafiz Saeed — made Pakistan their home. It is little wonder that Pakistan’s plausible deniability is becoming increasingly implausible.

The second step is to portray India as the belligerent actor. But India did not initiate conflict in 1947, 1965, or 1999, nor in the series of terrorist attacks that resulted in crises in the 1990s and 2000s. The one partial exception, the 1971 Bangladesh War, was a consequence of Pakistan’s unwillingness to recognise the election results of 1970, the resulting mass killings in East Pakistan and a man-made refugee crisis, of which India took advantage. Moreover, it was Pakistan that pre-emptively widened that conflict and initiated war with air strikes in the western sector.

The notion of Indian belligerence is questionable for other reasons. In January 1948, the Indian government released central bank funds it owed Pakistan as part of Partition, despite the ongoing Kashmir war. In 1960, as part of the Indus Waters Treaty, India paid Pakistan a sizeable sum for replacement irrigation works, despite objections by several Indian cabinet ministers. In 1965, India returned the Haji Pir Pass, captured after having been used by Pakistan for infiltration. In the 1970s, India repatriated 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war without achieving a resolution to Jammu and Kashmir at Shimla. In 1996, India recognised Most Favoured Nation status for Pakistan, despite a lack of reciprocity.

India has continued its attempts at engagement under successive recent governments. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bus trip and the Lahore Declaration of 1999 was met with the Kargil incursion. Manmohan Singh’s resolve in continuing the Composite Dialogue was tested by regular terrorist attacks culminating in 26/11. Between 2014 and 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted his former Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif in New Delhi, resumed National Security Adviser talks, visited Lahore, and invited a Joint Investigative Team from Pakistan. Pakistan responded to these initiatives with, respectively, intensified firing on the Line of Control, scheduling meetings with the Hurriyat, the Pathankot attack, and the detention and kangaroo court trial of Kulbhushan Jadhav. Flimsy claims of water wars, Afghan consulates and nuclear and military aggression have been made to exaggerate Indian assertiveness.

All of this has justifiably increased frustration in India with Pakistan, but engagement has helped minimise the need for the third element of Pakistan’s approach: external mediation. Whether the United Nations in 1947-48, the Soviet Union in 1965, or the United States in the 1990s, Pakistan has long believed that international diplomatic intervention would play in its favour.

India, by contrast, has been insistent on resolving issues bilaterally, as the power disparity would play to its advantage. It is for this reason that India bristles at talk of mediation, however tentative or well-intentioned, whether by US diplomats, the Saudi foreign minister, the Norwegian prime minister, or Russia via the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Furthermore, such offers inadvertently justify Pakistan’s support for terrorism: if India concedes to mediation by a third party, Pakistan-backed terrorism will have served its purpose.

For India and the United States, 2+2 equals more

The following article originally appeared in The Economic Times on 9 September 2018.

Less than three months ago, after the second postponement of the inaugural 2+2 dialogue between the foreign and defence ministers of India and the United States, several strategic commentators in India decried the “deepening disconnect” in the India-US relationship. Some articles declared that enhanced ties between the two countries were failing to take off, and that the two were no longer seeing eye-toeye. Many others perceived the thaw in India-China relations encapsulated in this year’s summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping as indicative of a reversal in India’s deepening strategic coordination with the US and others.

However, the past few months have witnessed some rather clear trends. India has attempted to shore up relations with Russia, in part out of concern about the direction of Moscow-Beijing relations. Strategic coordination with Japan has continued, with a logistics agreement reportedly under negotiations and breakthrough ground and air exercises now being considered. India’s defence ties with Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam have intensified, manifested in new exercises, training efforts and exchanges. A quadrilateral dialogue involving India, the US, Japan and Australia took place for the second time in two years. And over the past 12 months, India has signed new agreements for port access and logistic support with the likes of France, Oman, Singapore and Indonesia, giving the Indian Navy far greater operational reach in the Indian Ocean.

But the most significant strategic developments during this period have concerned India’s ties with the US. Defence relations have been upgraded now to a 2+2 dialogue — the highest level of institutionalised security engagement between the two countries ever — and a number of advancements have taken place in terms of security cooperation.

The outcomes of the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue — which finally took place when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defence James Mattis visited New Delhi past week — was largely predictable and included few surprises. A secure communications agreement known as COMCASA was signed, having been under negotiation for several years, meaning that the two militaries no longer have to communicate over WhatsApp. Tri-service military exercises, which have been under discussion for months, were agreed. These would mark only the second such joint exercises for India after one with Russia. Steps have also been announced to improve India’s coordination with US Central Command — particularly on maritime matters —and liaising with the US defence innovation ecosystem, addressing two of the better-known weaknesses in the relationship. The two sides agreed to common language on the Indo-Pacific, Afghanistan and North Korea, among other matters, reflecting greater alignment in strategic worldviews. And of considerable significance, India and the US identified several steps to further deepen cooperation on counterterrorism.

That these developments are so much at odds with Indian strategic commentary reflects the growing disparity between Indian policymakers and the analytical community. The latter has inherited a legacy of insecurity and is deeply wedded to a strategic outlook that veers away from circumstances facing India today. Despite the uncertainty of Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States, the steady improvement in bilateral ties with India suggests greater clarity and less hesitation on India’s part even as it reflects broad support for strategic engagement with India in the United States.

Of course, important differences remain, both on bilateral issues such as trade and immigration, and strategic perspectives on Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. This is only natural given the different geographies, histories and priorities of the two countries. But it is also increasingly clear that India and the US are willing to find ways to mitigate those differences. Indeed, in New Delhi, Mattis and Pompeo demonstrated an eagerness to work with India to the extent possible to reach certain outcomes on Russia and Iran. The fact that the 2+2 Dialogue finally materialised and included some noticeable deliverables, in contrast to the dire circumstances in which India-US relations are regularly characterised, requires a stark assessment of where India lies in the US political landscape.

On the plus side, India is neither a primary target of US antagonism, unlike Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, nor is it a politically problematic ally like Germany or Mexico that has been in the cross-hairs of the Trump Administration. Despite occasionally sharp differences, India simply does not colour US political considerations to quite the same degree. At the same time, the fact that India is often important but rarely urgent means that — as with past US administrations — it does not always receive top priority. That Pompeo should have prioritised a visit to North Korea over a 2+2 Dialogue was regrettable but also a realistic reflections of the Trump Administration’s priorities. As India and the United States attempt to build upon the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue, Indian observers would do well to keep these realities in mind. 

Even as India attempts to ‘Act East’, it is ‘Thinking West’

The following article, co-authored with Shruti Godbole, originally appeared in the Economic Times on July 5, 2017. An excerpt is below, and the full text can be accessed here.

India has long had vital interests in the region. The first involves the safety and well-being of the almost nine million-strong Indian diaspora in West Asia, who contribute remittances of around $40 billion annually. Their security is also a politically sensitive issue for the Indian government, and has necessitated evacuations of Indian nationals, whether from Kuwait in 1990, Lebanon in 2006, Libya in 2011or Yemen in 2015.

The second interest concerns energy security, which is vital for the health and well-being of the Indian economy. About 60% of all Indian oil imports — and even more of its natural gas — come from West Asia, making India one of the major economies that is most dependent on the region for its energy needs.

A third consideration is security, including cooperation on counterterrorism. This has required India to develop important, if sometime tacit, security- and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, as well as broader defence partnerships across the region. These critical Indian interests concerning the diaspora, energy and security have required India to maintain a delicate balancing act in the region between its major players, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and others.

But the situation in West Asia is fluid and ever-changing. There are indications that the US might play a less active role as a security guarantor in the region. This was implied previously in Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia, and more recently by Donald Trump’s general wariness about the US’ international military involvement.

The Arab Spring, instead of resulting in mass democratisation across the region, witnessed the breakdown of governance in Egypt and triggered civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. The 2015 Iran nuclear agreement may have dealt with the immediate challenges posed by that country’s nuclear programme. But it has generated fears in other regional capitals, who worry that the removal of international sanctions against Iran may have emboldened Tehran and upset the balance of power.

Meanwhile, as oil prices remain low, several Gulf Arab countries are beginning to plan for a post-oil future. The Saudi Vision 2030, a signature project of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, marks an ambitious plan to reorient and modernise the Saudi economy.

While preserving ties with Iran, a vital conduit into Afghanistan and Central Asia, India has tried to seize the opportunities presented by this changing landscape to strengthen ties with the likes of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Modi has reportedly noticeably increased the proportion of the prime minister’s time spent abroad in West Asia relative to his predecessor. It’s a reflection of the increased political importance India accords to the region.

Even as India attempts to ‘Act East’, it is increasingly ‘Thinking West’. This is where Israel’s importance becomes apparent: looking west from India, it is an island of stability amid a region beset by considerable political, military, economic and social upheaval.

Brexit, Beans and Crumpets

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times's ET Magazine on June 11. 

By Bertie Wooster

I rather fancy it is Shakespeare who says that when a prime minister is feeling particularly braced with things, Fate sneaks up behind her with a bit of lead piping. I recalled the Bard’s musings on Friday morning after Jeeves trickled in with the Fleet Street rags and the tall glass that heals. The news left me speechless. 

Eventually I found speech. Not much of it, but some. 

“Eh,” I said. 

“Yes, sir?” 

“The elections haven’t gone so dashed well for Theresa, what, what?” 

“No, sir.” 

“And this Corbyn chap. He ought to be pleased as punch.” 

“Tolerably so, sir.” 

It required the better part of the day for me to get the gist of the situ. By sundowners, tucked away in a quiet corner of the Drones Club, I was able to muster the facts. Theresa May is a steely lady who bears an alarming resemblance to my Aunt Agatha, the one who chews broken bottles and kills rats with her teeth. She would normally be a beastly sort to face over a negotiating table, or breakfast for that matter. But now only a wet cat in a strange backyard bears itself with less jauntiness. The old girl’s not much of a gambler. Besides snap elections, she could only have done worse by betting two-to-one on Gussie Fink-Nottle pinching a policeman’s helmet. Now she’s had to throw in her lot with the Democratic Unionists, a queer tribe composed of dour Northern Irish types. They’re the sort to strike the fear of God in God. 

Meanwhile, Corbyn and his comrades have cast off their gloom and stiffened their spines. I threw the mind back to the days when even the Morning Star said old Jeremy was too Bolshie for Downing Street. He normally looks like one of those things that come out of dead trees after the rain, but the whiff of victory has bucked him up like a tonic. 

The rest appears to be out, if not yet for the count. The Scottish Nationalists find themselves a little less Scottish and little less Nationalist. I imagine they’re all skulking around Glasgow with shifty, hangdog expressions. It is never difficult to distinguish Scottish grievances from rays of sunshine. 

Then there’s UKIP. The trouble with UKIP is that just because they succeeded in inducing a handful of half¬wits to permanently disfigure British politics, they thought they were somebody. They heard “Leave!” and imagined it was the Voice of the People. When what the Voice of the People actually said this week was: “Vote for anyone but those frightful asses.” 

We now find ourselves in a rum situation without the foggiest idea as to what to do. The crumpets on the Continent are apt to look with a somewhat jaundiced eye on the Home Counties, and eager to shut the door on Queen and Country. They’re a vindictive lot. Across the pond, the Yanks remain in thrall to a bovine chappie the colour of turmeric who’s busy applying the scorched earth policy to human dignity. Theresa & Co thought the best thing under the circumstances was to run around the old colonies, waving the flag and fizzing with excitement. A fat lot of good that’ll do. 

I left the Drones, scratching the old bean. “It’s a fairly rummy matter, Jeeves, this Brexit,” I said upon my return. 

“Indeed, sir.” 

“There seems to be a lot of low-spiritedness kicking about these days.” 

“We live in difficult times, sir.” 

I took to an early bed, not wanting to miss my beauty sleep. Conceive my astonishment, therefore, when waking on the morrow and sitting up to dig into the morning teacup, I beheld a card on the tray. 

“Jeeves, who the devil wants to see me so early in the morning?” 

“Lord Buckethead, sir. He was a candidate from Maidenhead.” 

“And what sort of a specimen is he?” 

“I could not say, sir, on such short acquaintance.” 

“He’s not a chum of Spode’s, by any chance?” 

“No, sir. Lord Sidcup is presently in America, where he is enjoying the hospitality of a Mr Richard Spencer.” 

In the sitting-room, I found a breathtaking cove. About seven feet in height, and swathed in black, he caught the eye and arrested it. It was as if nature had intended to make a human howitzer, but had changed its mind at the last minute. 

“I say, old chap. What are we to do about this dashed Brexit business?” 

“That’s a philosophical question for a Saturday morning,” he said. “I’m here to solicit your support for the legalisation of the hunting of fox¬hunters.” 

He was not the chump I took him for. I lent the good Wooster name to the cause, and for a second I was able to regard the world with some sunny cheeriness. 

(Bertram Wilberforce Wooster has stepped in for Dhruva Jaishankar, who thought it a brainy scheme at the time)

India doesn't have a lot to lose by boycotting OBOR

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on 21 May 2017. The full text can be found here.

What does India want from the world? It’s quite clear, really: international partnerships to accelerate its domestic development, a stable and conducive periphery, a multi-polar Asia, an end to cross-border terrorism and a sufficient role in global governance to enable it to meet these goals. Today, each of these objectives relates in some way to India’s relations with China.

Until recently, India’s aspirations required it to forge a complex and somewhat contradictory relationship with Beijing. From the early 2000s, India deepened trade and economic relations with its northern neighbour and collaborated with China in creating space for rising powers on global governance – including through the BRICS, the BASIC coalition on climate change and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

At the same time, India took measures to address the military imbalance along its disputed border with China, and kept a wary eye on Beijing’s political and military relations in its neighbourhood, especially its support for Pakistan (which extended to the transfer of nuclear and missile technology).

But things have now changed, and faster than many believed possible. The 2008 financial crisis, the half-heartedness of former US president Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and now Donald Trump’s “America First” policy have accelerated China’s relative rise in the international system. And that rise has been accompanied in China by stronger centralised governance, enduring mercantilism, more assertive territorial revisionism with neighbours and a continued disregard for certain international norms, including on cyber security and freedom of navigation.

For India, China now factors everywhere. A balanced and sustainable economic partnership is still necessary for India’s development. At the same time, China plays a more active economic, political and military role in India’s near abroad and Beijing provides cover for Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism. Under President Xi Jinping, China projects itself as ascendant, leaving little space either in Asia or on the world stage for a rising India, whose transition into a middle-income country will take place over the next two decades.

China’s ascendance is most evidently on display in its plans for One Belt, One Road (OBOR) or the Belt & Road Initiative, the subject of a major summit in Beijing this month. While many of its neighbours sent heads of state or government, or ministerial delegations, India was notably absent. India’s public rationale for its opposition to OBOR has long been that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ran through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and was thus a violation of Indian sovereignty. But New Delhi’s concerns have long run deeper, and extended both to CPEC and to the Maritime Silk Route.

India’s response to OBOR, by necessity, rests on a set of assessments. Is OBOR a commercial project, with viable financing intended to benefit both China and host countries? The evidence for this is weak. Sri Lanka is but the starkest example. Chinese support to its former leader Mahinda Rajapaksa led to the building of white elephant infrastructure projects (including what has been described as “the most underused international airport on the planet”), massive national debt and the translation of that debt into political influence – which in turn had security implications. The gradual development of Chinese military or “dual use” facilities in Djibouti and Gwadar, and the creeping militarisation of the South China Sea, offer clear indications of long-term Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region.

While India’s reservations about OBOR have been hinted at for years, including by the prime minister, China’s public exhortations for Indian participation at the May summit required a clearer articulation of Indian concerns. This came in the form of a statement last week that stressed India’s desire for greater regional connectivity, but laid out specific criteria. Connectivity projects must be financially responsible and not create an “unsustainable debt burden”. Additionally, they must reflect environmental considerations, be based upon a “transparent assessment” of costs, and involve the transfer of skills and technology to ensure their long-term maintenance by local communities. And, of course, they must respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a clear set of normative standards, one that China, recipients of OBOR-linked largesse and other actors — including in Europe, Japan, and the United States — would do well to heed. In fact, EU participants echoed these sentiments by blocking a statement at the Belt and Road Summit on trade, on the grounds that it was not based on “transparency and co-ownership”.

Does India have a lot to lose from boycotting OBOR? Not necessarily. China’s investment into India has risen considerably since 2014. According to Indian government figures, $800 million in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) came into India in just 17 months between April 2014 and September 2015, more than double all previous Chinese FDI to India. This is on a similar scale to estimates of Chinese FDI into Pakistan under CPEC, and is simply indicative of the immense push factor of excess Chinese capital. If it can be invested in India in a manner that meets New Delhi’s stated criteria, it would naturally be mutually beneficial. However, drawing lines upon a map in a unilateral fashion, not just in India, but across Asia and the Indian Ocean region, is a far more sinister matter.

One Belt, One Road will only be a success if it is pursued in a more transparent, status quo-oriented, market-driven and responsible manner. That would be welcome. India has staked out a clear position. Others may arrive at the same conclusions the hard way.

Barack Obama Leaves a Mixed Legacy

The following article appeared in the Economic Times on January 15, 2017.

Eight years ago, on a freezing January morning, I stood with over a million people on the National Mall in Washington DC to watch a 47-year-old African-American senator become the 44th US president. There was a pervasive sense at the time, particularly among young, highly educated and urban Americans, that Barack Obama could do no wrong. He campaigned on the lofty themes of hope and unity and in opposition to the economic and foreign policy overreach of the George W Bush years. He would fix the economy, heal deep societal wounds once and for all and burnish America’s image around the world. Yes, he could.

Today, as Obama’s tenure comes to an end, one can’t help but wonder the extent to which his legacy will be shaped by the election of his successor, Donald Trump. Trump campaigned on fear, outrage and grievances, and he successfully exploited fissures in American society. Even critics will accept that Obama brought a certain dignity to his office, something Trump has tarnished even before his inauguration. But however much supporters of both men will bristle at the notion, there is also a considerable degree of commonality between the two. It is possible to see Trump not just as a counterpoise but also a continuation of Obama.

It is helpful to look at Obama’s legacy along three dimensions. The first, and one he gets too little credit for, is in his handling of the economy. Obama inherited an America coming off its worst financial crisis in 70 years. The recovery has been gradual and steady; certainly not eye-catching but nonetheless impressive. The economy has grown 26% in dollar terms since 2008, it has experienced a second dotcom boom, and the US for the first time became a serious energy exporter with the shale revolution.

Unemployment, which peaked at about 10%, is now back to pre-crisis levels. This is not at all an accident or good fortune. Bailing out and restructuring the automotive industry was only one of the bolder, and more unpopular, decisions that had to be made. A lot of this gets overshadowed by the not-so-good news: growing inequality and a lower labour participation rate. Nonetheless, the foundational strength of the United States is immense; its latent power should not be underestimated.

Not Much Hope and Change

If Obama gets insufficient credit for his handling of the economy, his domestic political and social legacy is much more mixed. His eight years were marked by a difficult relationship with a Republican-dominated Congress. Obama also had few friends and allies on the Democratic side of Congress, making it more difficult for him to push his domestic agenda. Healthcare reform, his cardinal domestic policy legacy, was watered down, becoming a messy behemoth that did not sufficiently address the central issue of rising healthcare costs. Obama himself admits his failure to do anything on other matters that were dear to him, such as gun control.

And certain African-American commentators wonder exactly what his presidency accomplished to improve the standing of minorities, particularly given the large number of police killings of African-Americans. Hope and change, it turned out, proved far better slogans than governing principles.

US and Them

Finally, foreign policy could well prove the area where we will look back upon the past eight years most critically. Obama often brought a professorial, Socratic approach to key meetings on foreign policy and national security, playing devil’s advocate and questioning truisms. But professors often make terrible decision-makers.

On Syria, Libya and Afghanistan, Obama adopted middle-path solutions, which turned out to combine the worst of every possible outcome rather than the best. The Afghanistan war — the “good fight” for Obama when he was a presidential candidate — is unresolved and likely to intensify. Syria could be the most costly conflict in lives and treasure since the end of the Cold War, a humanitarian crisis that the US both actively and passively fanned rather than dampened.

But those are only the most egregious examples. The administration waffled (not once, but twice) on its approach to China, the pivot or rebalance to Asia proving too little, too late. Osama bin Laden was killed in a risky, bold operation but the underlying reasons for his presence in Abbottabad were conveniently brushed aside. The Russia reset lies in tatters, as do the much vaunted outreach to the Muslim world and the nonproliferation spirit invoked in Prague. On India, after laying the groundwork for a transformed relationship, the administration stepped back — rather than stepped up — in its last six months, in contrast to both Bill Clinton and George W Bush. The prospects of a two-state solution in the Middle East seem bleaker than ever.

Even Obama’s signature foreign policy achievements — the Paris climate agreement, the Iran nuclear agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — all now face uncertain futures, given the opposition of Trump and the US Congress. If Franklin D Roosevelt and Harry Truman were, in the famous words of one of their top advisors, “present at the creation” of the post-World War II international order, we may look back upon the Obama-Trump years as being present at its destruction.

This is where the commonalities between Obama and Trump come into play. Both share a gift for storytelling, and a strong but sectional electoral appeal. Both have proved guilty of promising simple solutions when none necessarily exist. And both share an instinct of restraint, although motivated by very different impulses. “Don’t do stupid shit,” was Obama’s foreign policy mantra, and Trump might very well agree. But sometimes, that’s necessary. Presidential legacies take time to evolve.

Truman, John F Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and Clinton were incredibly unpopular and divisive in their times, but are now remembered more fondly. By contrast, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were far more popular than many now choose to remember. Obama leaves office with an approval rating of over 55%, comparable to both Reagan and Clinton. History, like with every other president, will judge him on subsequent events. 

Donald Trump as US President: For India, it's opportunistic, but concerns remain over his Asian policy

The following article originally appeared in The Economic Times magazine on November 13, 2016.

With the election of Donald Trump, we have seen the biggest shock to US politics in 70 years. Trump was given only a slim chance of victory. He had no previous experience as a public servant and few detailed policy positions. His nomination by the Republican Party came against the preferences of American big business. He alienated most leaders of his own party by making outrageous statements about minorities and women. And he had paid little attention to political organisation and had not performed particularly well in the presidential debates.

And yet, somehow, he pulled off an improbable victory, with wins in the states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan proving decisive. His victory has exposed deep divisions in American society, galvanised anti-establishment sentiments and injected a great deal of policy uncertainty at home and abroad. But Trump was remarkably consistent in his message. On the campaign trail, he focused primarily on domestic issues: jobs, healthcare, immigration and terrorism. Anti-globalisation feelings — a general retreat of America from international affairs — may be here to stay. So will strains of xenophobia, which should not be overlooked.

What does this now mean for India and the rest of the world? Trump has actually been consistent on a few points of foreign policy, including well before his run for the presidency. He believes, for example, that US allies — including in Western Europe and East Asia — need to pay more to preserve a US military presence in their regions.  "It is time for us to end our vast deficits by making Japan and others who can afford it pay," he wrote as far back as 1987.

He has promised to defeat the Islamic State, but has also talked tough about China. "Despite all the happy talk in Washington, the Chinese leaders are not our friends," he wrote in 2011. "I’ve been criticised for calling them our enemy. But what else do you call the people who are destroying your children’s and grandchildren’s future?"

More recently, some of his foreign policy advisors have promised a stronger military presence in Asia but a drawdown in US trade with the region. There are questions about a Trump administration’s ability to see such policies through, given budgetary and bureaucratic constraints.

Much will also depend on who occupies the relevant positions in the US government in his administration. For India, there are naturally opportunities in Trump’s election. On the plus side, India would benefit from a possible thaw in relations between Washington and Moscow. A continued commitment to a US military presence in Asia would also be welcome. A strong US counter-terrorism policy, should it be tied to a crackdown on global networks, could also advance India’s objectives.

And the likely suspension of the recently concluded mega-trade agreement — the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — offers India breathing room on trade.

But there are also possible downsides. There is some concern that a Trump administration may become embroiled in a trade and currency war with China — a race to the bottom that will also severely affect India. As long as there is uncertainty, India will have to move quickly to further diversify its military partnerships in the region, including with Japan and Australia. A Trump administration may also be unwilling or unable to distinguish between low- and high-skilled immigration to the US, which may have important consequences for the Indian services sector.

Much has been made of Trump’s possible Pakistan policy, but on this front he has articulated mixed messages. He has said that he would keep aid to Pakistan steady, and that countries like India should pitch in (presumably to help stabilise Pakistan). Rather surprisingly, Afghanistan barely featured in the election campaign. On both countries, Trump’s policies will probably clarify further upon receiving intelligence briefings over the coming weeks, much as Barack Obama’s did when he first assumed office in 2008. Ultimately, India is perhaps the major country that will be least affected by a Trump presidency.

India is not economically or commercially dependent on the US, nor is it a military ally. However, India is certainly in a position to proactively shape the new administration’s policies. The Modi government had prudently reached out to members of Trump’s team over the course of the campaign during the past several months. India Inc will be keen to remind Washington of its contributions to the high-technology sector and the fact that Indian businesses actually create jobs in the US.

Similarly, the Indian government will be eager to remind a Trump administration about the common threat of transnational terrorism. Instability and uncertainty are never preferable in international affairs; but in every period of upheaval there are opportunities for progress. 

A Crimean Crisis for Delhi

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on March 28, 2014. 

Russia's virtually bloodless annexation of Crimea has shaken Europe. At the Brussels Forum, organised last weekend by the German Marshall Fund, leaders and diplomats — including from Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe — raised the worrying prospect of a new Cold War.

Many highlighted the need to enhance their military preparedness after two decades of relative neglect. For its part, India has adopted a more careful position on the Crimean crisis than the headlines have often projected.

While NSA Shivshankar Menon noted that there were "legitimate Russian and other interests involved" in Crimea, PM Manmohan Singh — according to a released statement — emphasised "issues of unity and territorial integrity" and the hope of "long term peace and stability in Europe" in a phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Crimean crisis has clearly presented India with a dilemma. On the one hand, Indian commentators are mindful of New Delhi's longstanding ties with Moscow, which manifest themselves primarily in defence sales and cooperation in international organisations. While the defence ties have come under strain, positive sentiments based on Russia's willingness to support India in less promising times still find resonance.

There is also an implicit understanding about realms of influence among great powers, which India finds relevant in its own neighbourhood, given its concerns about Chinese involvement in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Indian leadership is also wary of China being the prime beneficiary of the deteriorating relationship between Russia, on the one hand, and Europe and the US, on the other.

New Delhi, it is felt, must keep pace by ensuring as little daylight as possible between its position on Crimea and that of Beijing. But there are other aspects of this situation that complicate India's stance, and the balance to strike. The first is that this is not simply a case of India maintaining equidistance between Russia and the West. Russia's annexation of Crimea has engendered fears among its neighbours — including Kazakhstan and Belarus, hardly pro-Western states — that feel that they can no longer treat Moscow's assurances with any degree of seriousness, particularly when, like Ukraine, they are home to large Russian speaking minorities.

Crimea's annexation by Russia, in other words, sets a dangerous precedent by undermining the principle of pluralism, a value that is central to the idea of India, and one that it upheld at significant cost during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s.

There is also the small matter of sovereignty. While NATO enlargement has been employed by some commentators to justify Russia's annexation of Crimea, new NATO members — whether the Baltic states or most former Warsaw Pact members — joined the US-led alliance of their own accord. This is often forgotten, even by many American commentators, such as The New York Times' Thomas Friedman, who place the blame for Russia's aggression squarely on NATO's doorstep. 

The principle of sovereignty also extends to territorial claims based on arbitrary points of history, such as Moscow's 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Not only are some of India's territorial claims undermined by such justifications for revisionism, but so is any respect for treaties meant to guarantee the territorial status quo.

After all, by signing the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia agreed to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and "existing borders" (which included Crimea) and to refrain from threatening or using force against Ukraine.

Like any decision which requires compromise between the logic of realpolitik and a defence of principles, Russia's annexation of Crimea presents India with an uncomfortable dilemma. Fortunately, India will not play a determinative role in the outcome of the Crimean crisis. But in its words and deeds, it will have to maintain a delicate balance between interests and values as relations between Russia and the West deteriorate. 

2014's Known Unknowns

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on January 1, 2014. 

The year 2013 certainly confounded many people’s expectations. Just 12 months ago, Kim Jong-Un’s avunculicidal urges were firmly in check, the face of the Catholic Church was that of a conservative German pontiff, and the Boston Marathon, Westgate Shopping Centre and Rana Plaza were untainted by their now-deadly associations. Hakimullah Mehsud was still a Grade A miscreant, Nelson Mandela a living legend, and Edward Snowden an unknown US government contractor. Mohamed Morsi was top dog in Cairo, the US-Iran cold war looked distinctly frostier, and Turkey was making Kanye West look like a paragon of restraint and humility.World trade talks and the Indian Test team were deemed lost causes, Malala Yousafzai had yet to become a darling of the Western media, and a lot fewer people could identify Depsang on a map or tell you what CHOGM stood for.

Much, however, has not changed, or at least not as significantly as many predicted. Bashar al-Assad still clings to power in Damascus as mounting deaths from the Syrian civil war look set to surpass the number of lives lost in the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. China — despite a far from seamless political transition — has staved off some of the more bearish predictions about its economic and political future (for now). The European economy and currency union, far from having collapsed, have puttered along and possibly emerged stronger. Meanwhile, amid its many domestic preoccupations, the US somehow forgot that it had announced a pivot to Asia.

2013 was also a year of elections, particularly in India’s neighbourhood. Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives all went to the polls, although in circumstances that did not necessarily do credit to Indian diplomatic tact. Pakistan, quite notably, saw a peaceful transition of power between two democratically elected governments for the first time in its history. And farther afield, important leadership changes took place in Beijing, Tehran and Canberra, all of which were closely watched in New Delhi — or ought to have been.

Rather remarkably, India’s foreign affairs over the past year were also closely tied to developments at home. Domestic politics was at least partly to blame for India’s inability to secure a beneficial agreement with Bangladesh. Regional party dynamics ensured a boycott of the Commonwealth summit in Sri Lanka. The phrase “dehati aurat” assumed a context and resonance that few could have imagined. And popular outrage around specific incidents coloured India’s relations with both China and the United States, albeit in somewhat more understandable circumstances.

What, then, does 2014 hold in store for India and the world? To use the Rumsfeldian epistemological glossary, a glance at the international calendar reveals several known unknowns. Should we expect national governments to make a power grab for control of the Web at April’s internet governance meeting in Sao Paulo? What will mid-term elections in November mean for US President Barack Obama’s last two years in office? Will we see two new countries emerge in the forms of Scotland and Catalonia, after planned referendums? Will the Winter Olympics in the Russian resort of Sochi and the FIFA World Cup in Brazil be overshadowed by political controversy? And might the climate summit in Lima become Copenhagen redux?

Closer to home, the unknowns are even more unknown. How will the US and NATO military withdrawal from Afghanistan affect that country’s precarious future and the stability of its neighbourhood? Might a volatile Bangladesh be plunged into an international crisis of the first order? What kind of army chief will Pakistani General Raheel Sharif turn out to be? And how significant will Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India prove in the long run?

It should go without saying that these questions will be answered amid a fascinating and uncertain political backdrop in India. The last two years have seen fresh doubts raised about the country’s economic prospects, much of it related to deficiencies in governance — real or perceived. Perhaps the biggest unknown related to India and its international interests will involve its ability to reverse that narrative.

Like US, can India ever take a tough stand on Syria, or any other global issue?

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on September 11, 2013.

As the US Congress debates the authorisation of force against Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, there is a rare point of consensus in hyperpartisan Washington. Hawks and doves, realists and liberals agree that there are no good choices. A US failure to punish Assad's forces for using chemical weapons risks encouraging their crackdown, undermines American leadership in the region and around the world, and weakens an international convention. Furthermore, the longer the delay, the less effective any future action will be.

At the same time, even limited US-led military intervention, such as cruise missile strikes, is likely to cause more civilian casualties, be perceived as illegal in the absence of Chinese and Russian support at the Security Council, strengthen the hands of Islamist extremists, and risk perpetuating the Syrian conflict by emboldening rebel forces.

The shadow of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars means that American leaders remain extremely sensitive to the unforeseen consequences of any foreign intervention.

It's a Conundrum
Although Syria may be less crucial to Indian interests, New Delhi finds itself in a somewhat similar bind. A default view articulated by many Indian diplomats and commentators is that India ought to oppose any Western-led military action. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has unequivocally stated that India would not support a military option without the Security Council's mandate, a view reinforced by PM Manmohan Singh at the G20 Summit. Beyond its legality and justification — the jus ad bellum — India certainly has its reasons to oppose a US-led strike on Syrian targets.

Should American intervention contribute to Assad's fall, the primary beneficiaries could well be Sunni Islamist extremist groups, and India has long been at the receiving end of virulent militant Islamism. India has also shouldered the material costs of West Asia's destabilisation. Oil prices have risen over 20 per cent since the start of the Arab Spring. And it comes just as each rupee lost against the dollar adds an estimated Rs 8000 crores to India's annual oil import bill.

But the Syrian conundrum also raises the question of what world order India desires. While a West Asia marked by Islamist extremism and sectarian conflict is certainly not conducive to Indian interests, neither is one characterised by heavy-handed authoritarianism and chemical weapon use.
Further problems with India's position are exposed when considering the longer-term implications of the Syrian crisis. Even if Assad were to emerge victorious, he would hardly be let back into the fold of the international community. Barring the West, he appears to have burned enough bridges with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey — all countries with which India has important relations — to give New Delhi reason for pause.

Finally, India's stated position of not supporting an international military intervention in the absence of a Security Council mandate is troubling. Rather than grounded in Indian interests, its policy is effectively at the mercy of the P5; so much for the worthy goal of an independent foreign policy.

India's default stance also raises doubts about India's international leadership aspirations. An absence of a cogent defence of India's position, whatever it may be, is one reason why India's concerns are not regularly taken into consideration on issues it does consider important. In other words, India's studied silence on seemingly remote matters of global importance may have come at a cost closer to home, whether on Iran, Afghanistan or Myanmar. For the time being, India can afford to live with its contradictions because its direct stake in the Syrian conflict is relatively marginal and because its ability to affect outcomes is still rather limited.

US-China bilateral relationship talks still lack strategic depth

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on July 17, 2013.

When the top diplomatic and economic leaders from the US and China met last week for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, there were few significant breakthroughs. But the annual official jamboree provided a good opportunity for both sides to take stock of their complex bilateral relationship, one that has become increasingly relevant for the rest of the international community.

Over the past year, cyber security has assumed greater salience in US-China relations. Although Washington has shied away from criticising Beijing for government snooping — the US is, after all, on weak ground in this respect, following revelations concerning the NSA's elaborate surveillance programme — it has complained about the theft of trade secrets. This was a point US President Barack Obama brought up in his meeting with Chinese representatives.

What About the Pivot?

Beyond the cyber realm, security competition between the US and China has taken on greater complexity due to a combination of Chinese assertiveness, the American response, and leadership transitions in both countries. China's new leadership under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang has indicated a willingness to repair tense relations with neighbours. But sceptics argue that their conciliatory gestures mark a tactical shift rather than a sincere move, pointing to such incidents as the PLA's incursion in Ladakh in April.

The US, for its part, appears to be conflicted about the "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia it announced two years ago. The pivot comes just as the US seeks to cut its military budget, and American officials have recently emphasised its non-military aspects, including a greater diplomatic presence and a more active role in Asian economic integration. Even these policies have been criticised for being too feeble.

Some have noted that US Secretary of State John Kerry seems far more intent on addressing thorny diplomatic problems in Middle East than on pursuing American objectives in Asia. Others have pointed to the Obama administration's lukewarm approach to international trade liberalisation. The political and military contradictions in China and the US also echo ambiguities in the economic space.

American leaders understand that a consumption-driven model may not be sustainable and that their economy will need to adapt to keep pace with new technologies and competitors. China's leaders, meanwhile, know that their country faces complex challenges associated with avoiding a middle-income trap and coping with decelerating growth. Many experts in the US and China believe that the answer lies in redressing the imbalances in the two economies.

The US needs to expand its manufacturing sector and cut its current account deficit, while China must transition away from exports and consume more. The decision by Chinese negotiators to drop some of their opposition to a bilateral investment treaty with the US could be seen in this light. But others question the merits of such an approach, believe that mutual interdependency will continue to prove politically stabilising, or simply think that such a rebalance will be impossible to achieve.

Given new leaderships in both countries, the fifth US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue could not have realistically provided either side with much greater clarity about the other's intentions. This is not reassuring for the rest of the world, for whom the relationship between the two most potent economic and military powers will have important consequences.

Beyond Snowden: US surveillance system a useful model for democratic, terror-hit India

The following article appeared in the Economic Times on June 27, 2013.

Edward Snowden, who leaked details of the US National Security Agency's PRISM electronic surveillance programme, is now in Moscow, where he has become embroiled in a sometimes farcical cat-and-mouse game involving several countries.

But the high drama surrounding Snowden obscures the important debate on government surveillance. The only response to the US intelligence agency accessing users' information from internet companies has been outrage, in the US and around the world, including in India. But the issue is about a lot more than Snowden's fate and anger at Big Brother.

FINE BALANCING ACT
At its core, the issue of digital privacy is about reconciling three somewhat contradictory objectives. The first is the government's responsibility to ensure the security of the state and its citizenry. The second is individuals' right to privacy and opportunity. And the third is the preservation of a conducive business climate, in this case, for internet firms that often provide services to users for free.

Thus, gathering vital intelligence might impinge on individuals' privacy, ensuring citizens' rights may mean sacrificing business interests, promoting internet access could necessitate concessions on security, and so forth. Each state has to find its own balance between security, privacy and a favourable business climate based on the nature and severity of the security threats it faces, its legal regime and system of governance, and its economic landscape.

A perfect solution is impossible. But a state can nonetheless strive for an optimal balance between its competing priorities. Unfortunately, on each measure - security, privacy and business climate - India's efforts can be said to have fallen short.

SHORT ON SECURITY
Take security. All states, especially those facing major security threats, must at times conduct surveillance on individuals to gather critical intelligence, including electronic surveillance, in a world where information is increasingly becoming digital. In fact, a state that does not have adequate electronic surveillance capabilities is failing in its security duties.

While details about India's surveillance capabilities are not all public, it appears to be lagging in this respect. Its shortcomings were deeply exposed during the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, when the perpetrators used voice over internet protocol (VoIP). That led to the fast-tracking of the Central Monitoring System (CMS), theoretically capable of monitoring a wide variety of communications, including various online activities, wireless phone conversations and text messages, and satellite communications. CMS has been repeatedly delayed due to inadequate infrastructure, and is not expected to be activated until December, almost a year later than previously envisioned.

India also falls short on the matter of data privacy. Whereas the US makes strict legal divisions between spying on individuals in the US and those abroad, the distinction in India is less clear, meaning there is greater leeway for the state invading - and possibly abusing - the privacy of individuals it is supposed to protect. The Information Technology Act - specifically Section 69 and its attendant clauses - is extraordinarily wide-ranging, empowering both central and state governments to "exercise powers of interception".

LEAKY DIGITAL PIPE
Finally, the Indian government's relationship with private internet companies has been contentious, to the detriment of the broader business environment. Telecom licences disadvantage the private sector vis-a-vis government. And while representatives of internet companies argue that they regularly comply with court orders, they bristle at seemingly arbitrary requests to interfere with online data.

Such tussles have placed the government at loggerheads with many major digital service providers, so much so that a view in official circles is that digital communication is a nuisance, rather than a crucial resource for a fast-developing, services-oriented economy.

For all its obvious faults, PRISM, offers India a model for how to fashion a regime that goes some way towards assuaging various stakeholders, including the government, individuals and the private sector. That, naturally, assumes that adequate checks and balances are put in place and proper procedures are implemented.

From the perspective of internet users and companies, a system that enables the transfer of information upon specific request is preferable to the government's unfettered access to servers. Such an arrangement protects the majority of users' private information while minimally inconveniencing internet companies. From the government's standpoint, the loss of direct access is more than compensated by the convenience of not having to sift through vast quantities of raw intelligence.

Observers in India and elsewhere should be paying attention to emerging details about the PRISM programme. But rather than lambasting it as Big Brother gone wild, they should look at it as a model - however imperfect - of how a modern, democratic society tries to reconcile its conflicting objectives and make necessary compromises between stakeholders on the issue of digital privacy.

Will Xi Jinping-Barack Obama meet leave India at the risk of strategic marginalisation?

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on June 7, 2013.

When George W Bush was US president, an invitation to his ranch at Crawford, Texas, was considered the ultimate signal of intimacy with a visiting dignitary. Barack Obama doesn't have a comparable retreat (other world leaders have sometimes complained that he is impersonal and aloof). For that reason alone, the calculated informality of Obama's meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Sunnylands estate in California on Friday and Saturday will mark a noticeable break with tradition.

India is not projected to feature prominently in the discussions between Xi and Obama, with cyber security, North Korea and military contacts expected to top the agenda.

But New Delhi should nevertheless be observing developments carefully, for the outcome of the Sunnylands meeting could signal the direction Obama and Xi intend on taking the bilateral relationship between the US and China over the next four years.

RESETTING OF CYBER SECURITY
At one level, the meeting will be an opportunity for the two leaders to feel one another out. They previously met last year before Xi's ascendance to the chairmanship of the Communist Party and the presidency of the People's Republic. It could also mark a "reset" of sorts on the matter of cyber espionage, a sensitive issue about which American allegations concerning China's activities have become more frequent, detailed and pointed, particularly regarding the ostensible theft of industrial and military technology. Obama may raise the issue of state responsibility for cyber activity emanating from a country's territory, and could also hint at measures that the US might consider should such cyber espionage continue.

More importantly from India's vantage point, the summit could represent a renewed effort at establishing an informal compact between the US and China as the world's two preeminent economic and military powers: what some analysts have termed a G-2. This is an approach that continues to be propagated by policymakers in Washington, including Obama's former envoy to Beijing in an opinion article he co-authored last week. Serving US officials, including Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, have also been playing down the military aspects of the American pivot to Asia, which was widely perceived as an effort at responding to China's rapid military modernisation. And Washington appears to have accorded other important relationships in the region -- most notably, with India and Japan -- a lower priority in recent months.

TWO TOGETHER
In essence, a prospective G-2 would see the US and China accommodating one another's concerns on certain key strategic issues, potentially compromising the interests of India and other Asian powers that might harbour anxieties about China's predominance in its neighbourhood.

The arguments in Washington in favour of such an approach are based on the belief that most global challenges -- ranging from humanitarian intervention and regional stability to energy security and the preservation of an open trading system -- require Beijing's cooperation and that China's rise could help the US overcome some of its own domestic challenges.

However, recent experience does not inspire much confidence in Washington's efforts at injecting greater stability into relations with Beijing. In 2009, similar efforts backfired when China refused to accommodate US concerns on matters such as monetary policy, climate change, Iran's nuclear programme and North Korean belligerence.

From India's standpoint, any hint of a renewed effort by Washington and Beijing at reaching an exclusive arrangement -- even if tacit and informal -- is certainly cause for concern. It reinforces the belief that India cannot take the US' stabilising presence in Asia for granted and that New Delhi may need to forge its own network of balancing relationships in Asia as China continues its rapid rise as the region's preponderant power.

Recent attempts by India at cementing deeper strategic ties with Japan -- highlighted during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Tokyo -- indicates that a partial reorientation may already be underway as a consequence of the Chinese military's incursion into Ladakh in April.

LEAN FORWARD, NEW DELHI
India's recent experience suggests that proactively building partnerships may be the best way to mitigate any setback to its strategic position. In other words, India should anticipate and offset the risk of its strategic marginalisation by more actively engaging the widest possible set of strategic partners.

A willingness to pursue deeper ties with the US, China, Europe, Japan and other countries in India's vicinity in the mid-2000s produced a virtuous spiral of improving relationships, a process that was naturally facilitated by the fact that the Indian economy was booming. Coming particularly at a time when India's international reputation is experiencing a setback as a result of slowing growth and political scandal, a forward leaning foreign policy may provide a much-needed boost to India's increasingly perilous position in international affairs.

Boston Bombing

My article on the aftermath of the Boston marathon bombing appeared in the Economic Times on April 20, 2013. An excerpt is included below and the full text can be found here.

Terrorism is at its most disturbing when it hits you close to home. For residents of many Indian cities, the sense of vulnerability that accompanies random violence was at its most acute between 2001 and 2008, when Delhi, Mumbai, Varanasi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, and Bangalore, among many other places, were hit by severe attacks, on multiple occasions in the cases of Delhi and Mumbai. More than the attacks on government targets, those on public spaces - markets, crowded streets - underscored the randomness of the violence perpetuated by terrorists.

The otherwise sleepy suburban town of Waltham, Massachusetts, where I now live, is in lockdown as I write. News reports and local law enforcement authorities say that a 19-year-old ethnic Chechen named Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is still at large, last seen in the neighbouring community of Watertown...

...Information about the suspects, official law enforcement communications, and public service announcements over the past few hours all stand in stark contrast to the chaos that often follows terrorist attacks in India, most notoriously after the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. More details about this episode will inevitably emerge, including the probable motives of the attackers.

There will inevitably be commentary - much of it ill-informed - about their ethnic or religious impulses, the fact that they were at least partially 'home-grown', and parallels with other incidents of terrorism in recent years. Regardless, this incident offers some important lessons for how we can all be better prepared for acts of random violence.

US’s pluralistic attributes make me proud to remain an Indian citizen

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on Sunday, November 11.

BOSTON--On Tuesday, I accompanied my wife to the electoral precinct near our home to observe American democracy firsthand. The makeshift polling station was on a basketball court at a former middle school, where elderly volunteers steered voters through the process. There were nine choices on the ballot — for US president, US senator, US representative, state senator, state representative, governor's council, court clerk, deed register and sheriff — as well as five referendum questions, related to such things as the legalisation of medical marijuana and the prescription of euthanasia-inducing drugs.

Two girls stood outside selling homemade cookies to raise money for their school. The location and the ballot itself contributed to the parochial trappings of the enterprise: it may have been a national election, but it consisted of locals voting locally on local issues. That's not necessarily what the rest of the world imagines.

Perception vs Reality
America has long suffered for the discordance between foreign perceptions and ground realities. Although my family lived in the United States during my early childhood — a comfortable suburban existence that gleamed on the fringes of my consciousness — I spent my formative years observing America from afar. Like countless others around the world, I grew up associating this powerful nation with boorish, unintelligent people, social inequity and an absence of real history or culture.

Living in Delhi in the early 1990s, during the pinnacle of US unipolarity, I shared in the widespread resentment of the US acting as the world's self-anointed policeman. The occasional grating encounter with US expatriates, often in sheltered foreign outposts of Americana, contributed to these prejudices. None of this, curiously enough, impinged upon my voracious appetite for American films, television, music, fast food, or my desire to attend an American college.

Arriving as an undergraduate in Minnesota, deep in the Midwestern heartland, I stubbornly resisted the study of anything American, whether politics, history, or culture. But in time I developed a keener appreciation of my new country of residence and its people. Far from the stereotype of uncultured small-town hicks, I encountered a politically and civically engaged society with a surprising amount of curiosity about the world and an extraordinary appreciation for the arts. I anticipated hostility and xenophobia against South Asians following the 9/11 attacks, but never experienced overt racism.

Travel contributed to a much deeper understanding of the US's immense diversity: the many slivers of the country that escape depiction in exportable popular culture. And a lecture on the foundations of the American republic provided a first true glimmer of appreciation for the US's smug sense of exceptionalism. In time, professional experiences cemented my admiration for America's singularity: although I worked in public policy and security, inherently sensitive fields, I never felt constrained by my background or origins.

The Other Land
This year, I became eligible for US citizenship, an opportunity millions might seize in a heartbeat. But despite studying, working, residing and marrying in the country, I opted not to apply. To some degree, my choice was a direct function of India's rise. American citizenship once provided Indians a passport to unparalleled opportunity and security, but in relative terms it is losing its lustre. Favourable views of the US in India have tumbled from over 70% in 2005 to under 50% today, in large part due to America's declining attraction as a land of opportunity. H-1B non-immigrant employment visas, highly prized until recently by Indian professionals, now go unclaimed.

In other respects, my choice was influenced by identity: as much as I enjoy living in the United States, my loyalty to the country — insofar as I feel any — is tenuous. A sharp sense of unease and vulnerability resurfaces during those rare unpleasant encounters with American officialdom. In Joseph O'Neill's novel Netherland, his Dutch protagonist is maliciously denied a US driver's licence because of a minor clerical error. "I was seized for the first time by a nauseating sense of America, my gleaming adopted country," recalls O'Neill's narrator.

"The rinsed taxis," he observes, walking out into the New York streets, "shone like grapefruits; but if you looked down into the space between the road and the undercarriage... you saw a foul mechanical dark." It's a feeling immediately recognisable to anyone who has had to wait in line for a visa at a US consulate, parrying hostile questions about the reasons for one's visit.

Still at Home
There is still no denying that American society remains predisposed toward inclusivity, its strongest suit, and an unexpectedly contagious sentiment for an undertaking as exclusive as a national election. I may not have cast a ballot in this week's presidential vote; I could not, nor did I have any desire to. But my voluntary disenfranchisement has not prevented America — and the values it stands for — from earning my deep respect as a foreign national. In fact, it is that very appreciation of the US's pluralistic, democratic attributes that makes me prouder still to remain a citizen of that other great pluralistic democracy: India.