A pathway for deeper US-India ties has been laid

The following article originally appeared in The Hindustan Times on June 23, 2023. 

The India-US relationship is one that continues to elicit surprise, which is itself surprising given the steady improvement for almost a quarter century under multiple leaderships in both countries. Beyond the pomp and ceremony, the outcomes of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington represent cooperation across the wide breadth of the relationship, from strategic relations to economic engagement, technology cooperation to people-to-people links. The two leaders’ joint statement included some lofty language – “no corner of human enterprise is untouched by the partnership between our two great countries, which spans the seas to the stars” — but it is not all that exaggerated.

More significantly, rather than loose promises, the two countries laid out tangible cooperation in many of these areas, often involving private entities in the two nations. These include specific investments by companies in each other’s countries, the establishment of research scholarships, professorships, and funds, major deals between corporate entities, and joint initiatives involving expert government agencies within the two bureaucracies. Taken together, these agreements have the potential to embed significant cooperation between the two countries for some years.

On defence and security, the two countries have made a concerted attempt at identifying specific ways in which India can maintain a competitive edge in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. This is not altruistic on Washington’s part: The U S benefits both through commercial contracts and by having a capable balancing partner in the Indo-Pacific and in world affairs. One breakthrough involves the production and transfer of technology to India for jet engines, a valuable and lucrative business that could become an important catalyst for Indian industrial policy and the aerospace sector more broadly. After all, India is likely to be one of the fastest growing civil aviation markets over the next decade. Other defence requirements – from long-range artillery to unmanned systems – have been identified as primed for further cooperation. Furthermore, agreements and initial discussions for ship repair, liaison officers, and procurement represent steps to put defence cooperation into practice.

On trade and economic issues, the two countries are in broad agreement about the limitations of a post-Cold War trade order that inordinately benefited China and concentrated manufacturing supply chains. Barring aerospace and semiconductors, China now competes with or has overtaken the US and its allies in most manufacturing endeavours, with its dominance of electric vehicle battery supply chains being but the latest development. The coronavirus pandemic and Ukraine war have underscored the importance of diversified and resilient supply chains – particularly in critical commodities and manufactured goods. Attempts at securing major investments in both countries, linking financial entities and start-ups, and fostering business relations represent an attempt by both India and the US to strengthen resilience in the face of potential economic warfare or other disruptions. Moreover, the two sides agreed to resolve some thorny differences on trade in the multilateral sphere, which had, in the recent past, adversely coloured their relationship.

On technology, there is considerable convergence on some basic principles, despite the US and India having very different technological capabilities and needs. This is translating into cooperation on semiconductors, 5G and 6G telecommunications, space, Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, high performance computing, as well as medical and atomic research. Setting standards and acquiring capabilities in these domains will have long-term consequences, given the widespread applicability of some of these critical and emerging technologies.

Additionally, a suite of clean energy technologies is also being ramped up, with particular interest in nascent green hydrogen and carbon capture as well as more established solar and wind generation and battery storage. Space cooperation is likely to see a fundamental shift with India signing the Artemis Accords, enabling not just agreement on principles, but opening up room for scientific collaboration and information-sharing as well as manned spaceflight.

Finally, a great differentiator is the people-to-people connection between India and the US. First- and second-generation Indian Americans constitute an outsized and growing proportion of US corporate board rooms, scientific laboratories, university classrooms, and government offices. Many Indian Americans have strong links to India, facilitating investment, research, and cultural links, and additional efforts are being made to increase education about India among Americans writ large through scholarships and professorships.

There are obvious challenges, including political differences and linguistic and geographical disparities, as well as bureaucratic hindrances. The opening of further consulates in both countries aims to overcome that. The US already has its third largest diplomatic footprint in India – after Mexico and China – and it is set to grow further.

There have been similar moments in the past. But a shared sense of global challenges, deepening people-to-people and commercial links, and the diminishing relevance of prior obstacles such as Pakistan have paved the way for more meaningful India-US relations. The fact is that the US cannot preserve its technological and economic edge without a wide-ranging partnership with India. Equally, and in a variety of ways that include but are not limited to investment, technology, security, and market access, India’s rise benefits tremendously from a constructive partnership with the US and its allies.

Indo-Pacific Summits Mark a Global Churn

The following article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on May 17, 2023.

This month will witness several leaders’ summits that capture the changing nature of India’s international engagement in the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the broader international order. Taken together, they represent a coalescing of certain trends that have been manifest for some time. The politics of trade and economic interdependence, China’s global role, the relative emphasis of India’s international partnerships, and the world’s major political fault lines have all undergone structural shifts. But these developments have yet to sink in with certain commentators: Indians clinging to false equivalences, Americans who regularly understate relations with New Delhi, and individuals or institutions in places such as Brussels, Singapore, and New York who seek a reversion to a bygone economic and political order.

At the G7 meeting in Hiroshima this week, the leaders of the world’s largest developed economies will gather, as they have on an annual basis since the 1970s. The G7 agenda is likely to be dominated by the ongoing war in Ukraine, where the grouping has stood firmly behind Kyiv, including over sanctions on Russia. But the G7 – barring the United States (US) and Canada – are in for a period of relative economic decline. The non-US G7 members have seen their collective Gross Domestic Product drop from 52% of the G20 in 1992 to 23% today. As a collective, G7 unity matters more today, but their weight matters less.  

India will be attending the summit as a guest, as it has annually since 2019, at a time when it is deepening cooperation with all G7 members. This includes with the United States and Japan in  Quad, with the European Union through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), and with the United Kingdom and Canada in advanced trade negotiations. Leveraging these mechanisms for accelerating India’s development and economic security objectives – at a critical demographic and macroeconomic juncture for India – remains paramount.

Simultaneously, the G7 summit presents an opportunity for India to raise issues of national and international concern that might otherwise receive short shrift from the developed world, including in the context of the Ukraine war and India’s G20 presidency. These issues encompass energy and food security, supply chains resilience, climate finance and sustainable development, international institutional reform, and debt sustainability. Such concerns are especially important given that higher US interest rates, innovations in digital currencies and payments, unsustainable trade imbalances, and international sanctions are likely to roil the global economy over the coming few years.

Beyond Hiroshima, both Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden are expected to visit Papua New Guinea for meetings with the leaders of South Pacific countries. The South Pacific is often overlooked due to the small size and populations of its constituent islands, but the region constitutes one sixth of the world’s surface. It has also become a geopolitical hotspot, as a focus of China’s competition for influence with Taiwan, the US, France, Australia, and Japan. The region is also a focal point for the climate crisis, sustainable lending practices, and fishing and mineral resources.

For India, a summit in Port Moresby would be a natural continuation – after a pandemic-related hiatus – of the outreach that began in 2014-2017 through the Forum on India-Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC). In those years, the Indian PM met with 14 leaders in Fiji and hosted them all in Jaipur. It will be an opportunity to showcase India’s development and assistance programmes, as have been evident in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and present Indian proposals for solutions to certain common challenges afflicting the Global South. Meanwhile, Biden’s visit will surprisingly be the first ever by a sitting US president to a South Pacific country that is not a US territory, and marks a long overdue focus by Washington on an important region.

Finally, this month will witness the Quad summit in Australia, the third in-person meeting of the group’s leaders. There are few international groupings that the US president attends on an annual basis: The G7, G20, NATO, APEC, East Asia Summit, and UN climate conferences. Quad is the newest addition to this shortlist.

When it was first elevated to a presidential level meeting in 2021, Quad set up three working groups, but its activities have now proliferated to over 25 initiatives. Some have already demonstrated outcomes, such as the Quad fellowships, while others represent close cooperation, as on maritime issues, cybersecurity, and international lending and certain working groups are still very tentative. On other issues, such as supply chains and critical technologies, Quad is proving a mechanism to advance bilateral efforts between members (such as the national security advisor-led technology dialogue, iCET, involving the US and India) or bring in a larger set of countries, as on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and on maritime domain awareness (IP-MDA). These and other efforts will see some progress in time for the summit in Sydney.

Taken together, this month’s summitry in the Indo-Pacific highlights some major stirrings to the international order. Many established international commentators might struggle to appreciate these trends. But new kinds of economic relationships, new theatres and forms of geopolitical competition, and new mechanisms for addressing these challenges are taking shape in plain sight. 

A Common Agenda for the Global South

This article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on April 5, 2023 under the title 'A Common Agenda for the Global South.’

There is a great deal of curiosity and some scepticism in international capitals about India’s newfound embrace of the Global South. The term, initially a more palatable way of describing the so-called Third World during the Cold War, is used regularly by historians and development professionals, but did not take hold in the world of international relations, until recently. It encompasses regions and countries boasting considerable diversity in terms of language, religion, culture, political systems, and even levels of economic development. But they share experiences as post-colonial States that developed belatedly, resulting in their political marginalisation on the international stage.

In January, India convened a Voice of the Global South virtual conference, where leaders and ministers from 120 countries discussed a variety of issues, from health and agriculture to trade and energy. Issues of relevance to the Global South were also given prominence in the G20 agenda.

Four recent trends have reinforced the need for a common agenda for the Global South. The first is a combination of insufficient representation at international institutions coupled with questions about the availability and sustainability of international lending and debt financing. The Global South’s limited representation in international institutions meant that many developing economies have long felt vulnerable to established lenders from the developed world. Yet, in seeking an alternative in China, they often found hidden strings, longer-term burdens, and refinancing terms that were far from accommodating. With a global pandemic, geopolitical shocks, and rising interest rates, the issue of sustainable debt has become even more pronounced. The distress experienced recently by Sri Lanka is indicative of a more widespread problem.

Second, there is the issue of climate justice. The climate crisis is an existential problem for some small island States, such as in the South Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Caribbean. Many other countries in the Global South are particularly susceptible to droughts, floods, heatwaves, and tropical storms. While the developed world has been liberal in making vague commitments to emissions targets and passing judgments on others, it has often been miserly about sharing technology and ensuring adequate financing that could assist the developing world in making difficult energy transitions. The lack of action after every Conference of the Parties of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change is telling.

Third, the Covid-19 pandemic widened the sense of global inequality. A few countries monopolised critical medical and pharmaceutical supplies, such as personal protective equipment, medical devices, oxygen concentrators, and active pharmaceutical ingredients. When vaccines were developed, richer developed countries received priority. The multilateral Covax facility was, given the scale of the challenge, relatively meagre, certainly at the outset.

The fourth and final inflection point was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A major consequence was the impediment to grain and fertiliser exports from Ukraine and Russia, and sharp increases in global energy prices as Russian oil and gas was spurned by Europe. The Global South felt the sharpest pinch, given their vulnerability to fluctuating prices and low fiscal and consumer spending margins. But there was a pervasive sense that the strategic priorities of Russia, Europe, and the United States (US) overrode global concerns over food and energy security.

In each case, there is widespread frustration in the Global South with the developed West: The US, Canada, Europe, and in some cases, Japan. But equally, there are frustrations that Russia (on Ukraine and the climate crisis) and China (on debt sustainability and coronavirus) have exacerbated these problems, driven often by narrow self-interest. In fact, as both Russia and China are already embedded in international institutions, such as the UN Security Council, they are often just as intransigent about reforming those institutions. The Global South finds itself with few champions or platforms to air these collective frustrations.

It is against this backdrop that India has embraced the terminology and some of the common objectives of the Global South. Strategic decisions often involve difficult trade-offs between short-term interests and longer-term values. In the case of the Global South, India’s interests and values align rather seamlessly. India taking a role in amplifying the voices of the Global South is not just about lofty rhetoric, but because those same objectives — food and energy sustainability, sustainable debt, multilateral representation, equitable public health, and just climate transitions — are goals that serve Indian interests.

The Global South thus represents a strategic opening for India, both to advance its own development objectives and the cause of multilateral institutional reform. But it should not be conflated with a new non-aligned movement. As some Indian commentators have noted, while the Global South is an explicitly non-western construct, it is not an anti-western construct. The purpose is to work with, and be a bridge to, the developed world. It also does not mean that the Global South will operate unanimously, as recent voting at the United Nations indicates. While some shared concerns need to be voiced, the Global South is too diverse to be driven by singular political, economic, and security imperatives.

For US in Ukraine, an Opportunity Fraught with Risk

This article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on February 22, 2023 under the title 'US Has Bolstered Its Position in the World.'

The war in Ukraine may have officially begun in February 2022, but its antecedents were laid the preceding year. In March and April 2021, Russia embarked upon a major military build-up east of Ukraine and in Crimea. This triggered a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and United States (US) President Joe Biden in Geneva, ahead of which Biden waived sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Later that year, rising oil prices bolstered Russian reserves and legislative elections in September 2021 favoured Putin. Meanwhile, relations between Moscow and Beijing strengthened, the US was seen as hopelessly divided, and Europe gave signals of continuing economic and energy engagement with Moscow.

These circumstances persuaded Putin to order an even larger Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders and in Belarus in late 2021 and early 2022. The US intelligence community informed American leaders, those of other countries, and the media, of imminent Russian war plans. Various third parties, led by France, engaged in frantic last minute diplomacy to avert conflict. After a publicly televised national security meeting, Putin announced a special military operation — a massive, multi-pronged military intervention intended to seize Kyiv, topple Volodymyr Zelensky, and incorporate Ukraine squarely within Russia’s realm of influence.

For Putin and Russia, subsequent developments did not go according to plan. The assault on Hostomel airport was repulsed and the Russian column to Kyiv got bogged down. Russia was more successful in the south, and later in the east in Luhansk. Ukrainian counters around Kherson and Kharkiv regained ground in late 2022 before Putin announced the annexation of four administrative districts in southeastern Ukraine. Throughout, the US led its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) allies in providing Ukraine with detailed intelligence, considerable military equipment, and financial and technical assistance, while levying large-scale sanctions against Russia.

From the point of view of US national security planners, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been an opportunity, although one fraught with considerable risk. Whatever the outcome, Russia will have expended considerable material, human and diplomatic resources in a costly and inefficient manner. The US might be providing Ukraine with significant military and financial aid, but feels it can permanently degrade Russian capabilities with no loss to American lives, and military outlays approximating 5-6% of the defence budget. Meanwhile, the US intelligence community, which has struggled for resources and expertise after the Cold War, appears to have somewhat burnished its reputation.

There is no question that the US is now indispensable to Europe’s security. Finland’s Prime Minister Sanna Marin said so explicitly, “Europe isn’t strong enough right now. We would be in trouble without the United States.” It is no coincidence that Zelensky’s first visit abroad since the outbreak of war was to Washington, and not Berlin, Paris, or Brussels. US military influence, which had earlier been confined to the borders of Nato members, has now effectively extended to Ukraine’s frontlines with Russia.

But US involvement has created other headaches for Washington. Although American public opinion is still largely in support of aid and military support for Ukraine, there are early signs of conflict fatigue. Anti-war sentiments animate the Left wing of the Democratic Party, while some on the political Right are adamantly opposed to open-ended US military commitments. The country’s ability to influence global opinion has also proved limited. Outside committed allies, few countries – especially in the Global South – have wholeheartedly supported the US-led sanctions.

A further challenge for Washington involves the allocation of scarce military resources. It is true that the Ukraine War has depleted stocks that might be used in other contingencies, notably those involving China. But apart from fungible budgetary resources, the military requirements needed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are different. US leaders and strategic documents have repeatedly stressed that the Indo-Pacific represents the primary strategic priority. Despite a near-term focus on Ukraine, the US strategic shift to compete with China is well underway.

Finally, like in any conflict, especially with a military potent power such as Russia, there are fears of escalation and accidents. Late last year, US leaders became fearful of the imminent use of nuclear weapons by Russia. This resulted in frantic diplomacy before the situation was defused. As Russia readies for further campaigns this year, and Ukraine prepares to counter, the prospect of dangerous military escalation that might potentially involve the US and Nato directly cannot be ruled out.

Some observers, including a section in India, believe that the US policy in Ukraine has boomeranged, contributing to energy shortages, inflation, and diversification away from the dollar. Some consequences were indeed initially severe, but higher US energy output and a relatively mild winter in Europe have mitigated some of the worst effects. Inflationary pressures eased with higher interest rates and the removal of some supply chain bottlenecks. A better than expected showing for the Democrats in November’s midterm elections has further strengthened Biden’s hand. As underlined by his surprise visit to Kyiv this week, American efforts in Ukraine represent a good return on investment from the point of view of US national security planners. Nevertheless, over the next year, risks abound.

Precision Targets: Accelerating the U.S.-India Defense Industrial Partnership

 

The following report, co-authored with Gopal Nadadur, was published by ORF America in February 2023.

INTRODUCTION

- Download a PDF of the full report -

The inauguration of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in early 2023 has created greater momentum for bilateral defense industrial cooperation. The India-U.S. defense partnership has progressed by leaps and bounds since the year 2000, when President Bill Clinton’s visit signaled a resumption of normal ties following India’s 1998 nuclear tests. In the years since, the two countries have expanded the range and sophistication of their military exercises, which now involves all services and several partner countries. They have concluded negotiations over enabling agreements covering logistics, secure communications, and other protocols. The two countries’ security cooperation has been given a political and bureaucratic structure, including through the 2+2 Dialogue, Defense Policy Group (DPG), and various bilateral and Quad working groups. Defense trade has also taken off, with the Indian armed services now using at least eight major U.S.-designed or -produced platforms. Yet defense coproduction and research and development (R&D) have not grown as significantly, despite some marginal successes. The Defense Trade & Technology Initiative (DTTI), despite some modest success with air-launched unmanned aerial systems, has not produced the results that were once envisioned.

But recent developments have created new openings. Many old impediments, including stifling export controls, insufficient enabling agreements, and lack of political engagement, have largely been addressed. On the Indian side, elements of an industrial policy that involve the private sector have begun to take shape, creating more attractive conditions for private investment and supply chain integration. Geopolitical factors are also more conducive, given the growth in India-U.S. coordination on the Indo-Pacific and the declining relevance of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation. Meanwhile, wartime attrition, supply chain disruptions, and secondary sanctions will create challenges for Russia’s 1,300 defense companies – which account for 20% of the world’s weapons sales – resulting in a partial vacuum in the global arms market. Other actors are already seeking to fill some of that gap.

Taken together, these circumstances present an unprecedented opportunity for India-U.S. defense coproduction. But this will require translating the tremendous political progress at the government-to-government level into concrete outcomes at the business-to-business level. Priority areas discussed in iCET include jet engines and munition related technologies, but coproduction could extend to anti-tank and anti-air missile systems, fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, maritime surveillance systems, drones and counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS), and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities and services. In addition to creating a viable commercial basis for defense coproduction, the two governments could take several discrete policy steps to facilitate and accelerate such cooperation. This would include: (a) translating political agreement into outcomes such as approvals and procurement requests, (b) ensuring a greater predictability for demand on the Indian side to accelerate investment and technology transfers, and (c) on the U.S. side, improving public-private cooperation to ensure timely responses to proposals.

Will WC final be remembered for 2 individuals or 2 teams?

The following article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on December 16, 2022. An excerpt is below. 

Football is a team sport, but the exploits of individuals are often fondly recalled decades later in the popular consciousness. Mention Pele or Maradona, Eusebio or Cruyff and you’re far more likely to elicit a response from the casual fan than by recalling the West German team of 1990. At first glance, this week’s World Cup final poses an enticing contrast between an Argentina associated with the individual brilliance of Lionel Messi against a French squad defined by its collective competence. [Read More]

What Midterm Results Will Mean for the US and the World

The following article originally appeared on November 12, 2022 in The Hindustan Times.

This should have been a United States (US) midterm election for the Republican Party to win handily. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with President Joe Biden and his Democratic Party’s handling of the economy, including high inflation and supply chain disruptions. And yet, as votes continue to be counted, control of the US Congress remains uncertain. The Republicans generally performed well in Florida, Ohio, and Texas, fared poorly in other battleground states such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, and emerged with mixed results in Arizona and Georgia. It is likely that the Republicans will win a narrow majority in the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, while the Democrats may retain control in the Senate, especially were they to win a run-off election in Georgia next month.

Public opinion had pointed to a strong Republican showing. Seventy-five per cent of American voters believe the economy is doing poorly, 72% feel the country is going in the wrong direction, and 66% want to see substantial change in Washington. Voter turnout among younger voters was also low: Those aged under 45 comprised only about 30% of total midterm voters. Other factors proved mixed. Biden’s approval rating is only 44%, but almost half of the voters felt his presidency was not a factor influencing their vote. Although inflation topped the list of voter priorities (32%), it was followed closely by abortion (27%), and 60% of Americans favour legalising abortion in all or most cases. While Republicans performed well with White female voters (53%), they fared poorly among minorities.

The mixed results could have several, somewhat contradictory, political implications. Some of the blame among American conservatives has already focused on former President Donald Trump. Several candidates backed by Trump performed poorly or were perceived by unaffiliated voters as unsuitable.

At the same time, the result has strengthened the hand of some Republican governors and legislators who share Trump’s political positions on social issues, immigration, climate policy, trade, and foreign intervention. Florida governor Ron DeSantis, who won re-election by a sizeable margin, cements his position to potentially run for president in two years. In the House of Representatives, the conservative factions — the Freedom Caucus and Republican Study Committee — will have greater sway over the legislative agenda, given the Republicans’ slim majority.

US foreign policy and national security remain the primary preserve of the presidency and the executive branch of government. Congress, however, plays several important roles. First, it controls the purse strings and can facilitate or block foreign military or economic assistance. Second, it can provide oversight, potentially embarrassing the Biden administration, such as through public hearings. Speculation before the election, for example, concerned potential hearings on the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third, Congress needs to confirm senior officials. While much of the focus will be on federal judges — given the divisiveness of various social issues — this power has foreign implications as well, as indicated by the lack of Senate approval for a US ambassador to India.

While some foreign policy and national security issues — Ukraine, West Asia, trade, and treaties — might become more contentious, other areas enjoy greater bipartisan consensus. It is quite probable, for example, that a divided Congress will pass legislation to enable the US to better compete with China. Despite different priorities — industrial security, employment, human rights, military competition — both the Republicans and Democrats have their own reasons to adopt more competitive, even confrontational, policies towards Beijing.

India also remains an area of broadly bipartisan consensus, although again with different emphases. Both the Republicans and Democrats see the US partnership with India as integral to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Both are conscious of appealing to Indian-American voters, and both want cooperative economic and trade relations with India, although naturally with a greater emphasis on Indian market access. While the Democrats recognised the need to partner with India on climate change and are often appreciative of steps being taken by New Delhi in that regard, the Republicans see growing Indian energy demand as a valuable opportunity for American oil and gas exports. Differences between the parties — as on social issues and on Russia — are unlikely to complicate relations with India significantly. However, the potential for immigration reform, which was already remote, may now be further set back by a legislative deadlock.

Overall, the midterm results will have two major implications for the US. For the next two years, Biden’s ability to pass legislation in support of his governance agenda will be compromised, although perhaps less than had been anticipated. Beyond the immediate economic relief associated with the coronavirus pandemic, Biden and his Democratic allies in Congress had managed to make some important legislative breakthroughs over the past two years, including on gun control, the climate crisis, semiconductor manufacturing, and infrastructure spending. In some cases, these laws received the backing of certain Republicans.

The other big implication will concern the 2024 US presidential election. Neither Biden, who will be almost 82 years old, nor Trump, who will be 78, have ruled out the possibility of running for president again. But should either or both choose not to contest, the field will be open. On the Republican side, DeSantis enjoys the biggest national profile, but others potentially in the mix include former vice president Mike Pence, ex-secretary of state Mike Pompeo, former South Carolina governor Nikki Haley, and Texas senator Ted Cruz. The Democratic nomination would be even more uncertain, with vice president Kamala Harris hampered by low approval ratings, and several Democratic governors and cabinet members potentially waiting in the wings.

A divided Congress, a divided Republican Party, and a divided America may still be able to get some things done in the next two years. Although some trends do point to greater turmoil and gridlock, others suggest areas of potential compromise and change, with inevitable implications for the rest of the world.

India Plays a Crucial Role in US Semiconductor Plans

 The following article originally appeared on October 18, 2022 in The Hindustan Times.

In February 2021, just five weeks into his presidency, United States (US) President Joe Biden held up a tiny semiconductor chip in the White House. “This semiconductor is smaller than a postage stamp, but it has more than eight billion transistors,” he said. “These chips are a wonder of innovation and design that…enables so much of our modern lives to go on — not just our cars, but our smartphones, televisions, radios, medical diagnostic equipment, and so much more. We need to make sure these supply chains are secure and reliable.”

More than a year later, and after considerable political wrangling, the US Congress passed the CHIPS Act. This legislation will channel billions of dollars in subsidies to the US semiconductor industry to secure a vital component for future manufacturing, compete with China, and ride the next big wave of economic growth. There is one major problem with this plan: The US doesn’t have the people to do the job.

Even today, when the US produces only about 12% of global semiconductors, the sector faces a shortfall of about 90,000 workers, including technicians, scientists, and engineers. Conservative estimates suggest that the workforce required to take full advantage of the CHIPS Act could include another 350,000 professionals over the next decade.

The US education system does not create enough skilled workers for emerging technologies, including semiconductors. The variation in education policies between states inhibits a national human resource strategy. Younger Americans are less drawn than their counterparts in many other countries to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, even though the resulting careers are lucrative. Furthermore, investments made today in primary and secondary STEM education will take at least a decade to reflect in the workforce.

This is where India comes in. India is the second largest producer of STEM graduates after China, churning out about five times as many as the US each year. Indians are also the world’s most mobile tech workers.

While the quality of graduates’ skills is variable, Indian-trained scientists and engineers play a major role in tech research. On Artificial Intelligence (AI), for example, Indian university graduates — almost all working abroad — account for one in 11 leading researchers globally, the fourth most after the US, China, and Europe, according to MacroPolo’s Global AI Talent Tracker. Among the best of the best AI researchers, Indian university graduates account for the second largest number, after only US graduates.

A similar story can be told about Indian-born innovators. Approximately one in nine billion-dollar start-ups in the US was founded by an Indian immigrant, the most by immigrants from anywhere, according to the National Foundation for American Policy. Overall, immigrants to the US accounted for 20% of the US high-tech workforce a decade ago, and that proportion has undoubtedly increased. But for the US, sourcing Indian talent is no longer easy. For one thing, America is no longer the sole destination. Already, for every three top Indian tech researchers based in America, one is working in Canada, Australia, or Europe. While language remains a barrier, even Taiwan and Japan are looking to Indian talent to fill specific roles.

A further development involves India’s own semiconductor ambitions. Recent steps represent the third attempt by India — after the 1980s and mid-2000s — to develop a semiconductor industry. The Indian government has now pledged about $16.7 billion in financial support, and early steps include a proposal from the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a Tata assembly and test unit, and a joint venture between Vedanta and Foxconn. As India makes early moves towards manufacturing chips, it will contribute further to the already heated global competition for tech workers.

But the biggest challenges the US faces in attracting Indian talent may be self-imposed, and relate to outdated immigration policies. High skill H-1B visas are limited to 85,000 per year. Just 140,000 annual employment-based green cards (of which less than half go to principal workers) have resulted in a years-long backlog, although there was an uptick after Covid-19.

Since comprehensive US immigration reform is unlikely, given the politically fraught question of undocumented migrants, some partial solutions have been pursued. Workers with “extraordinary talent” have been encouraged to apply for O-1 visas. Innovators who can afford it are eligible for EB-5 investor visas.

Reports commissioned by Congress have recommended new special visa categories, increased job portability for O-1 and H-1B visa holders, and larger quotas for skill-based green cards. While industry and policy professionals can make a strong case for these and further steps, politics gets in the way. A Republican-led Congress and a Republican presidency are less likely to entertain such proposals.

Ultimately, the success of the US semiconductor industry — deemed a topmost economic and national security priority by the government — will depend on acquiring the requisite human capital almost overnight. Investments in a domestic American STEM education ecosystem will take years to reap results. Finding creative solutions to the high-skill immigration dilemma may, therefore, be the only solution. If properly designed and implemented, it could help both the US and India meet their economic and supply chain security objectives.

Post-Abe, the Contours of India-Japan Relations

The following article originally appeared on September 24, 2022 in The Hindustan Times.

Former Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated in July, was unusual in having made relations with India a topmost priority. His long tenure as Japan’s leader — almost nine years in two stints between 2006 and 2020 — witnessed a transformation in Tokyo’s ties with New Delhi, including accelerated defence and security cooperation, strategic Japanese investments in India, multilateral coordination (such as Quad), and a $75-billion bilateral currency swap agreement.  

Naturally, Abe’s impact on Japan was much broader, and his efforts with India should be placed in context. On foreign policy, he consolidated the United States (US) -Japan alliance, repaired Tokyo’s ties with Australia and Southeast Asia, and made unprecedented outreach efforts to Africa and West Asia. At the same time, he failed to make much headway on territorial disputes with Russia and historical differences with South Korea. Perhaps more significantly, Abe also transformed Japan’s security profile, upgrading the defence ministry, establishing a National Security Council, accelerating the development of a defence-industrial ecosystem, and reinterpreting the Constitution to give Japanese forces more leeway in supporting allies and partners.  

Economically, Abe gave an initial jolt to Japan’s monetary and fiscal policies and tried to promote women in the workforce, but his attempts at structural reforms proved incremental. Politically, he ensured the continuing primacy of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Abe’s assassination less than two years after stepping down as PM leaves a political vacuum that may affect the pace – if not necessarily the direction – of Japan’s future trajectory. This, in turn, has implications for Japan’s partnership with India.  

Japan’s current PM Fumio Kishida, who is supported by Abe’s faction, has strongly emphasised economic security, the new buzzword in Tokyo. This has involved the passage of related legislation and the appointment of a minister to oversee economic security. In practice, this means lessening Japan’s dependence on China through smarter decoupling, strengthening cybersecurity and access to critical minerals, tightening export controls on sensitive technologies, and guarding intellectual property. On national security, Kishida is likely to continue Abe’s approach of strengthening the US alliance, building up Japan’s independent strategic capabilities, increasing the defence budget, and planning seriously for Taiwan-related contingencies.  

However, differences appear in Kishida and Abe’s attitudes to international diplomacy. Kishida is keen, for example, on better managing relations with China, including through high-level meetings with senior Chinese officials. Such a thaw was contemplated earlier by Abe, who had invited China’s leader Xi Jinping for a State visit, but the distinction lies in Kishida’s relative emphasis on coexistence over competition.  

Another difference has emerged in attitudes towards the developed and developing worlds. Kishida has proved eager to stand by Europe and the US on the Ukraine war, and swiftly condemned Russian aggression and supported sanctions on Moscow. While this has won him plaudits in Washington and Brussels, it comes at the risk of Japanese influence in much of the developing world, where Abe had previously made significant headway.  

Further political complications have arisen due to the association of certain LDP politicians with the Unification Church, a religious movement. A grudge against the Unification Church was reportedly the motivation behind Abe’s assassination. In the aftermath of those revelations, Kishida reshuffled his cabinet to sideline politicians tainted by association with the movement. The controversy had resulted in a slide in Kishida’s popularity ratings, but also marginalised some politicians seen as capable executors of Abe and Kishida’s policy agenda.  

Japan’s relations with India are currently healthy but, in some respects, the proverbial glass appears only half full. On the economic front, trade between India and Japan has grown and diversified, the currency swap has proved effective, and Japanese investment is flowing to India both directly and through intermediaries such as Singapore and London. Newer aspects of economic engagement have also emerged, which is encouraging. These include green technology and the establishment of Japanese research centres in India.  

At the same time, Japanese technology transfers have become more restrictive. This is motivated primarily by concerns about intellectual property theft and reverse engineering in China, but also potentially affects emerging partner countries such as India. Rather than diversifying to other foreign markets from mainland China, many Japanese companies have opted for reshoring back to Japan. Infrastructure investment also presents a mixed picture. While there has been progress on rail systems (especially metros) and highways in northeast India, Japanese companies do not play a particularly big role in India’s port and airport development.  

On defence and security, military exercises such as Dharma Guardian and Malabar have become more frequent, port calls are now routine, and a logistics agreement has been operationalised. The recent JIMEX bilateral naval exercises broke new ground, and several strategic initiatives — such as on maritime domain awareness — have been subsumed under the Quad framework. Yet defence industrial cooperation, such as on unmanned ground vehicles, has been slow. Today, both sides are exploring more modest cooperation over major initiatives where their demands and capabilities do not necessarily align.  

Irritants have also emerged. There was mutual finger-pointing earlier this year after India denied a Japanese military aircraft clearance to access a United Nations depot. There was also some disgruntlement in Japan concerning India’s involvement in the Vostok military exercises with Russia, given the proximity to the sensitive disputed territory.  

While economic ties can be accelerated and some security frictions can be overcome, a major structural impediment in India-Japan ties remains people-to-people engagement. The pandemic has not helped, but the fact remains that Japan’s immigration system is rigid. A special programme for skilled workers is restricted to certain regions of India, such as the northeast, and a handful of sectors, such as nursing. Such restrictions inhibit the kind of broad-based partnership that India has been able to forge with countries in North America, Europe, and West Asia.  

If India-Japan relations have achieved much, it is largely due to Abe’s efforts and the enthusiasm reciprocated by his Indian counterparts, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi. Not long ago — after India’s 1998 nuclear tests — Japan called upon the rest of the world to condemn India’s actions. Bilateral ties started to brighten after 2000, but only accelerated in fits and starts. The fact that relations with Japan enjoyed broad political support in India helped.  

Today, the India-Japan relationship is on a qualitatively different plane. But as structural challenges make themselves felt in the relations, the biggest tribute to Abe’s legacy would be to find ways to surmount some of these hurdles. 

Democracy in Indian Foreign Policy

The following report, co-authored with Ammar Nainar, was originally published by ORF America in September 2022.

Introduction

India has often branded itself as the ‘world’s largest democracy.’ Its very existence as a large, diverse, developing democracy is an extraordinary feat. Yet the conventional wisdom articulated by both Indian commentators and foreign observers is that democracy has rarely played a role in India’s foreign relations.

This reading is somewhat questionable. It is true that for much of India’s independent history its relationships with the United States and other developed democracies in the West were marked by differences and irritants. Like many other countries, New Delhi often prioritized short-term interests over values in its regional diplomacy. Moreover, India was often hesitant about employing the rhetoric of democracy promotion or coalition-building.

At the same time, for decades, India supported decolonization movements in Asia and Africa, both rhetorically and through material means. It was a vociferous proponent of boycotting South Africa for its discriminatory Apartheid policies. India also assisted countries in the developing world in establishing governing institutions and in the conduct of elections.

Recent developments – most notably the rise and assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China – have led to a rethink about the role of democracy in Indian foreign policy. In 2005, former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh joined then-U.S. president George W. Bush in promoting the United Nations Democracy Fund. More recently, current prime minister Narendra Modi participated in the inaugural Summit for Democracies organized by President Joe Biden’s administration. At the same time, and to much less fanfare, India has increased support for democratic institutions in its nascent development assistance programs focused on South Asia and Africa and in its international training and capacity building efforts.

Between December 2021 and March 2022, the Observer Research Foundation America (ORF America) and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) co-hosted a series of five virtual round- tables on the role of democracy in Indian foreign policy. The roundtables, held under the Chatham House Rule, involved participants from the Indian strategic community, including the Indian government, as well as 17 subject matter experts.

This report provides a summary of those discussions as well as broader conclusions; as such, they do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors.

The major conclusions were:

• Democracy is an important aspect of India’s foreign policy outlook, even if it is not – and is unlikely to become – the leading determinant.

• The alignment of values and interests is most pronounced in India’s near neighborhood, as weak institutions compounded by growing Chinese influence have adversely affected Indian interests.

• The primary tools of Indian democratic support for other countries include development assistance and capacity building, but also aspects of diplomatic and military support.

• Sharper geopolitical alignments create opportunities for deeper democratic cooperation involving India. This has been reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine war, growing ties between Moscow and Beijing, and the development of the Quad.

• India has often had to balance short-term interests with longer-term values, as is most evident in recent policy towards Russia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan. In this respect, India is hardly alone among major powers.

• There is a strong generational divide in India’s strategic community on the role of democracy in foreign policy; by and large, an older generation adheres to a more values-neutral approach to international affairs while younger professionals place greater emphasis on the importance of democracy.

I2U2 Reflects New Geopolitical Realities for All Four Nations

The following article originally appeared on July 15, 2022 in The Hindustan Times.

When an official meeting of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States (US) was announced last October, it was greeted with a degree of surprise in West Asia, in New Delhi, and especially in Washington. The meeting of the four countries’ leaders this week, during US President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel, gives the grouping – dubbed I2U2 – a greater profile and an initial agenda focused on two areas: Food security and clean energy.

In Washington, at least, India’s involvement has elicited some surprise. This reflects the silos in which US foreign policy is often conducted: West Asia and South Asia have generally been treated distinctly. Now, somewhat belatedly, the size of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf, India’s role as a major energy market, and New Delhi’s defence and security relations in West Asia are all becoming better appreciated.

More importantly, the coming together of these four countries reflects some new realities. One, bilateral relations among all four have thickened in recent years to the point of their enjoying broad-based partnerships. West Asia is a region full of strategic contradictions, shifting coalitions, and tactical partnerships, so it is remarkable to hear working-level officials from all four countries talking of high levels of trust in each other.

Two, I2U2 reflects new geopolitical shifts. US ties with Israel and the Gulf Arab states have a long history, and India’s relations with Israel have grown since the 1990s. The two new developments have involved the rapid turnaround in India’s relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf Arab states since about 2015 and – more dramatically – the sudden public diplomatic and commercial rapprochement between the UAE and Israel embodied by the Abraham Accords.

Three, there is a further imperative on the part of Abu Dhabi, Jerusalem, and New Delhi: Keeping the US regionally engaged. Unlike other efforts at “minilateral” coalition building in recent years, the US was more of a latecomer to I2U2. The complexities and uncertainties of US domestic politics mean that for some partners, ensuring a productive US role in West Asia after two decades of post-9/11 wars is part of the calculus for preserving regional stability.

While there is undoubtedly a strategic logic to this four-sided partnership, there are – at present – trenchant disagreements among the four on great power politics. For India and the US, China continues to loom as their biggest strategic challenge. For India, this is apparent in the continuing border stand-off, economic and trade differences, regional security competition, and multilateral divergences. For the US, China is now recognised as long-term peer competition. But China is still more of an opportunity for the UAE – whether on energy exports or technology – and Israel, on civilian technologies, trade, and infrastructure. For now, Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem are cautious about being drawn into intensified competition in the Indo-Pacific.

If there are differences on China, there are even wider ones on Russia. As the Russia-Ukraine war rumbles along, India, Israel, and the UAE find themselves adopting similar approaches. The US is, in fact, the outlier. Starting to develop this important quadrilateral partnership on the basis of emerging great power competition is certain to prove frustrating, if not futile. It is worth recalling the fate of the Indo-Pacific Quad in its first iteration after 2008.

Instead, the group has wisely sought to develop its partnership from the ground up. Strengthening cooperation in a range of technical fields – water and food security, energy and transportation, health, and space – makes eminent sense. Following the blueprint of Quad by having identified working groups to achieve specific outcomes in a certain timeframe will signal a seriousness and indicate that the group will not just be a talk shop. The initial leaders’ joint statement does precisely that, unveiling $2 billion to integrated food parks in India and a hybrid renewable energy project for 300 megawatts of wind and solar capacity.

In time, a lot more could be done. Strengthening the start-up and innovation ecosystem between the four countries seems evident. The US has investment and a research and development infrastructure, Israel enjoys advantages in applied science and technology, the UAE is experimenting with competitive policies to attract and incubate start-ups, and India has human resources and talent at scale.

A further area that might be worth exploring, should some of the efforts at technical cooperation take off, would be in third countries and regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa. Demographically, Africa will be the fastest-growing region in the coming decades. Once again, all four I2U2 partners bring strengths to the table, whether in terms of diplomatic resources, investment and financing, technical expertise, or people-to-people links.

A leadership-level initiative involving India, Israel, the UAE, and the US focused on fostering a ground-up partnership makes sense, given regional volatility and convergent interests. But once basic cooperation gets underway, and the group has something to show for their efforts, exploring ways to combine their innovation ecosystems and partner in other regions would represent natural next steps.

Quad Must Deepen Security Cooperation

The following article originally appeared in The Hindustan Times on May 21, 2022.

When the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (US) meet for just the second time in-person as Quad in Japan this month, the focus will likely be on their economic partnership. A trade deal is currently out of the question: New trade deals lack support in the US Congress. But the US has proposed an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to promote economic connectivity, resilience, sustainability, and accountability and has been in the process of consulting partners on this initiative. While in some ways an extension of US President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda, IPEF’s success will hinge on its details, and the response and participation of other countries.

But amid its growing profile, activities, and importance, Quad should not lose sight of security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which will matter significantly for the regional balance of power. Over the past year, Quad cooperation on a number of other important areas has progressed considerably. These include critical and emerging technology cooperation, vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, scientific collaboration, and space. Some initiatives are still nascent, while others — such as on Covid-19 vaccines and university research fellowships — have received private sector support and will have near-term tangible outcomes. 

To be fair, Quad security cooperation is already underway. In readouts, the four countries have revealed discussions on Myanmar, Afghanistan, North Korea, and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Intelligence leaders and cybersecurity coordinators from the four countries have met as a group. The Malabar naval exercise brings together the four navies, which have also engaged in ad hoc exercises with Canada and South Korea (on anti-submarine warfare), the United Kingdom (UK), and France. 

But security cooperation among Quad countries remains largely bilateral. The four engage in 2+2 dialogues with each other, involving their foreign and defence ministers. They also hold military staff talks; organise military exercises, involving ground, air, and maritime forces; enjoy logistics-sharing agreements with each other; and have structured dialogues on maritime security, defence technology, and counter-terrorism. Recently, Japan and Australia concluded an agreement to facilitate a military presence on each other’s soil. The US and Australia (along with the UK) entered into an arrangement, known as AUKUS, to cooperate on sensitive technologies, including nuclear submarine propulsion. 

There are three reasons for why security cooperation involving all four Quad countries has not been accorded a higher priority. First, there are concerns in other regional Indo-Pacific countries — including in South and Southeast Asia — that Quad military cooperation could exacerbate tensions with China, rather than reduce them. By contrast, the non-security focus of Quad has been welcomed in Southeast Asia; in one elite survey conducted last year, 60% of Southeast Asian respondents favoured a stronger Quad with a largely non-security focus. 

Second, the bilateral security partnerships among Quad countries are different from each other and are, therefore, likely to progress at different rates. On one end of the spectrum, the US has decades-long alliances with Japan and Australia, which include a history of overseas basing and joint operations. By contrast, India’s security partnerships with Japan and Australia — despite impressive progress over the past two decades — is relatively new and is unlikely to resemble the US’s treaty alliances. 

Third, the security partnership among Quad nations benefits from its flexibility. There is no political appetite or expectation of mutual defence. Quad will, therefore, not resemble an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, closer cooperation is driven in large part by an acknowledgment of constrained resources. Budgetary constraints could mean that the US Navy will not be able to function in the Indian Ocean to meet future challenges, while an Indian naval presence east of the Malacca Strait will always be more limited. Quad is not about all four countries being everywhere at once, but, in fact, about a distribution of labour when it comes to security over a vast region. 

Nonetheless, a lot can still be done. A first area of focus ought to be on information and intelligence sharing, including — but not restricted to — the maritime domain. This will require coordinating information from maritime patrol aircraft, drones, satellites, and submarine sensors. While cooperation on maritime domain awareness has increased bilaterally, information gathered by all four countries can be more seamlessly integrated to meet certain shared security objectives. This would complement the current intelligence liaison relationships among the four countries and the sharing of strategic assessments by officials. 

A second area might involve operational cooperation. This can be done through cross-servicing, resupply and replenishment at sea, mid-air refuelling, ship repair, and a host of legal arrangements to facilitate such services. While in the past, Indian analysts have expressed concerns about such arrangements undermining Indian sovereignty, they need not be automatic or intrusive. Instead, India would benefit from such support to expand its military presence. Furthermore, such habits of cooperation could be utilised effectively against non-traditional security threats such as illegal fishing, piracy, smuggling, disaster relief, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

A third area of eventual cooperation might relate to improving defence capacity, including on trade, manufacturing, and technology. In all four countries, efforts are underway to indigenise defence production for security, economic, and political reasons. But joint efforts at integrating supply chains — particularly in less-sensitive areas — would complement the use by Quad countries of certain common platforms, such as aircraft and helicopters. Joint research and development may prove too complicated in most instances — given the differences in requirements and acquisition systems — but may be worth exploring in the future. 

Quad has certainly come a long way in a relatively short amount of time, defying many sceptics’ predictions. To its credit, the Biden administration did not dispense with Quad despite its earlier association with Donald Trump administration. It has resulted in multiple structured contact points within the four governments and has improved technology and economic cooperation. 

But if Quad is to help preserve a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, while continuing to provide the region with public goods, security cooperation will have to deepen. This will require acknowledging the concerns of partner countries, treading carefully, and slowly building trust and habits of cooperation. As the war between Russia and Ukraine has demonstrated, we are entering a dangerous new world, one in which the prospect of great power competition spilling over into great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility. 

The Quad Needs a Harder Edge

The following article, co-authored with Tanvi Madan, was originally published by Foreign Affairs on May 19, 2022.

 In 2017, when Australia, India, Japan, and the United States restarted their informal, four-way dialogue known as the Quad, many were skeptical. After all, the Quad’s hiatus had been prompted by Australia’s decision in 2008 to withdraw in order to protect its own ties with China, and it was far from clear that the four parties would hold together this time, either. Almost five years later, the Quad has made demonstrable progress. The group has survived major leadership transitions in the United States and Japan, as well as internal differences on topics such as the Russia-Ukraine war. Moreover, the Quad has grown in profile and widened its scope to include critical and emerging technologies, COVID-19 vaccines, and humanitarian assistance. Far from being a marginal body, the White House now describes the Quad as “a premier regional grouping . . . on issues that matter to the Indo-Pacific.”

Nonetheless, as the leaders of the four countries gear up for their second in-person summit in Japan on May 24, the group has much more that it needs to do. Despite the real progress the Quad has made on issues including technology, health, cybersecurity, and climate change, it must do more to deliver on its core security goals. Thus far, the group has prioritized a range of critical non-security or security-adjacent functions, such as technology and public health, over security-related efforts—an emphasis motivated in part by sensitivities in other Indo-Pacific countries about heightened military competition. To have a lasting effect, however, the Quad must ensure that it can adapt to fast-moving crises such as regional military conflicts and natural disasters, and manage expectations regarding what it can achieve.

The group must also do more to cooperate on shared security concerns in the Indo-Pacific. While the Quad has made meaningful progress, China’s growing assertiveness demands that the group move with greater urgency. Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine has only made the Quad more relevant, driving home the possibility of such aggression in the short-to-medium term in Asia, as well—and the need to deter or respond to it. With renewed concerns about China’s possible designs on Taiwan, against India, or in the East or South China Seas, the group’s mission to ensure collective peace and stability in the region will only become more critical. It is past time, then, for the Quad to live up to its potential. While the May summit will have several items on its agenda, including multilateral economic projects such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and regional developments ranging from instability in Sri Lanka to China’s recent agreement with the Solomon Islands, it will also be a crucial opportunity for the group to accelerate cooperation on security.

The full text can be found here.